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I. INTRODUCTION
As both the mainstream and trade press reports continue to herald,
the world is in the midst of an international telecommunications revolu-
tion. With the creation and implementation of the February 1996 World
Trade Organization Agreement on Basic Telecommunications Services
(the February Accord or WTO Agreement), the international telecommu-
nications community has (at least on paper) promised ostensibly to move
away from markets characterized by monopolies and toward a world of
competition and deregulation. The big question, however, is whether these
efforts will actually lead to better economic performance in the market for
international telecommunications products and services. The purpose of
this Article is to examine one particular, yet extremely significant, portion
of this inquiry-how much have U.S. international telecommunications
policies specifically helped or hindered this process.
This Article, after surveying Federal Communications Commission
(FCC or Commission) precedent from the FCC's first major international
policy decision (International Competitive Carrier) through the FCC's
implementation of the WTO Agreement (January 1, 1998), concludes that
despite a few laudable achievements, several key problematic themes run
throughout this time period.' In particular, the FCC's efforts have been
marred by both the demonstrable rise of neo-mercantilism over the past
several years at the expense of consumer welfare, and substantial legal and
economic analytical inconsistencies and outright errors resulting from the
FCC's embarrassing attempts to implement and defend this neo-
1. This Article draws heavily from Lawrence J. Spiwak, Antitrust, the "Public Inter-
est" and Competition Policy: The Search for Meaningful Definitions in a Sea of Analytical
Rhetoric, ANTITRUST REP., Dec. 1997; Reconcentration of Telecommunications Markets
After the 1996 Act: Implications for Long-Term Market Performance, ANTITRUST REP., May
1997; What Hath Congress Wrought? Reorienting Economic Analysis of Telecommunica-
tions Markets After the 1996 Act, ANTITRUST, Spring 1997.
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mercantilist policy.2 By adopting such economically flawed policies, there-
fore, the United States has achieved neither trade policy's basic goals of
promoting U.S. investment abroad nor the maximization of consumer wel-
fare under the FCC's public interest mandate. Tragically, the only tangible
achievement apparently has been the delay of effective World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO) implementation of the WTO Agreement and the rise of
international ill-will against the United States and, afortiori, U.S. firms.3
To examine these issues in greater detail, this Article is comprised of
three analytical strands: (1) The FCC's formulation, adaptation and modi-
fication of its International Competitive Carrier (also known as
"dominant" carrier) paradigm during this period; (2) the FCC's policies
toward international accounting rates and the implementation and adapta-
tion of its International Settlement Policy (ISP) during this period; and (3)
2. In another article, I describe in detail this policy shift in a multitude of antitrust and
regulatory contexts as the doctrine of "neo-competition"--i.e., the end goal of competition
(which, through rivalry, attempts to maximize consumer welfare by producing dynamic and
static economic efficiencies) has been recast to something more akin to fair, competition-
like outcomes accompanied by the benevolent use of "market-friendly" regulation. In other
words, competition is now a zero-sum game. Neo-mercantilism is simply one component of
this overall "neo-competition" philosophy. See Lawrence J. Spiwak, Antitrust, the "Public
Interest" and Competition Policy: The Search for Meaningful Definitions in a Sea of Ana-
lytical Rhetoric, ANTTRUST REP., Dec. 1997, at 2 [hereinafter Spiwak, The Search for
Meaningful Definitions].
3. See, e.g., David Molony, WTO Basic Agreement Put on Hold as Signatories Clash
over Timetable, COMM. WK. INT'L, Jan. 19, 1998, at 1 (reporting that "signatories to the
treaty claim the United States wants to take advantage of the current position by gaining
early access to its trade partners' markets on more favorable terms, without having to open
its own markets to foreign carriers"); EU Presses U.S. To Change Telecoms Rules,
REuTERs, Aug. 5, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File (reporting that the
European Commission warned that the United States "risks violating its world trading obli-
gations" if it continues with mercantile-type policies-i.e., the FCC's continued policy of
maintaining "broad and unclear 'public interest' factors" regarding foreign participation in
the U.S. domestic telecommunications market and, in particular, the fact that the FCC al-
lows factors such as law enforcement, foreign policy, or trade concerns to be taken into
consideration, as well as accepting the concept of "very high risk to competition" as a rea-
son for a license refusal); Albert P. Halprin, Two Steps Backward on Open Markets, N.Y.
TIMES, July 20, 1997, at F13 ("FCC, citing the supposed requirements of Federal communi-
cations law, is ... backpedal[ing] on major American commitments in the deal. If our na-
tion fails to live up to its end of the bargain, so will other signatories, and this historic op-
portunity will be lost."). Tragically, the United States' neo-mercantile approach towards
international telecoms continues to perpetuate international ill-will and harm consumer wel-
fare even as this Article goes to press. See Guy Daniels, Huffing and Puffing, COMM. INT'L,
Oct. 1998, at 8 ("As a possible trade war looms and Uncle Sam blusters over compatibility
issues.... the European Community is holding firm in the face of determined U.S. efforts
to muscle-in on the third generation mobile standards agenda"); Robert Aamoth, One Law
for the Rich, COMM. INT'L, Nov. 1998 ('The U.S. Federal Communications Commission's
international settlement rate policies have caused such disquiet in the global telecomms
community that... several of the world's largest carriers-and their governments-are
prepared to go to law to get things changed").
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the FCC's attempts to reconcile and distinguish these sometimes contra-
dictory, yet sometimes complementary, policies in the context of carrier-
specific adjudications. Each of these strands will be examined in both a
pre- and post-WTO context.
II. STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS AND BASIC ECONOMIC
CONDITIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MESSAGE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICE (IMTS4) MARKET
To put the concept of "international telecommunications" into con-
text, it is initially necessary to identify some of the major structural char-
acteristics and basic economic conditions of the market.
A. Relevant Markets
First, try not to visualize the market for international telecommuni-
cations products and services as some sort of generic, global information
superhighway. Rather, this market is made up of a series of individual
country-route markets between "originating" countries and "destination"
or "terminating" countries Both supply-side and demand-side factors lead
to this view.
From a supply-side perspective, because carriers need to obtain oper-
ating agreements and/or regulatory approval from each terminating-
country market, a carrier cannot freely provide service to a given country
merely if it wishes to do so. In addition, it is very difficult for a carrier to
shift its facilities from serving one country to serving another based upon
market conditions because the use of relatively few cable and satellite fa-
cilities often provides less flexibility than the broader-based domestic fa-
cilities. Before reducing or adding facilities, carriers often have to obtain
the acquiescence of the foreign correspondent in both the country in which
facilities were reduced and in which they were increased.
4. The "MTS" in IMTS was AT&T's old name for standard switched telephone serv-
ice.
5. Lawrence J. Spiwak, Reconcentration of Telecommunications Markets After the
1996 Act: Implications for Long-Term Market Performance, ANTITRUST REP., May 1997, at
22 [hereinafter Spiwak, Reconcentration]. For example, while some U.S. residential cus-
tomers may have a significant number of friends or relatives in several different destination
markets (and therefore have a need for an inexpensive, generic worldwide IMTS calling
plan), most residential U.S.-outbound calls are generally made to relatives and friends left
back in the old country. Id. Indeed, there is quite a bit of data that indicates that the majority
of U.S.-outbound calls from northern California are often to the Pacific Rim; the majority
of U.S.-outbound calls from southern California and the Gulf Coast are commonly to Latin
America; the majority of U.S.-outbound calls from Florida are generally to Latin America
and the Caribbean; and the majority of U.S.-outbound calls from the Northeast are generally
to Europe, the Caribbean, and Asia. Id.
[Vol. 51
Number 1] SURVEY OF FCC INTERNATIONAL POLICY
A demand-side perspective also supports a country-pair approach.
Because the demand for international telecommunications services tends to
be very "country-specific," consumers do not generally view international
service as a homogeneous, worldwide service. Rather, demand tends to be
targeted to those countries where friends and relatives may be. This de-
mand characteristic is quite different from the demand for domestic long-
distance service, where consumers tend to view the market as a single, na-
tionwide market. That is, a U.S. consumer in Chicago (the rough mid-point
of the United States) will want to be able to call New York City just as
easily as California.
Given the above, the conventional way to view IMTS markets is from
a vertical perspective, either unilaterally-originated service on country-pair
specific routes, or on specific country-pair routes including both domestic
and foreign originating traffic. As such, most U.S. regulatory initiatives are
ostensibly concerned with preventing, or mitigating, the effects from the
economic harms traditionally associated with vertical integration. These
harms often include (1) raising rivals' costs (e.g., forcing rivals to enter at
two levels or input foreclosure); (2) cross-subsidy/predation; or (3) a
"price squeeze."7 This is not to say, however, that vertical integration can-
not produce procompetitive benefits. The most frequently acknowledged
benefits of vertical efficiency include: (1) economies of scale and scope;
(2) eliminating free-rider problems; (3) spreading the risk of invest-
ing/losing sunk costs; (4) coordination in design and production; (5) the
elimination of double mark-up of costs; and (6) the minimization of effi-
ciency losses suffered by foreclosed competitors. Accordingly, under
conventional economic and legal thought, when reviewing vertical issues,
decision makers must balance procompetitive effects against likely anti-
competitive harms.9
Notwithstanding the above, significant horizontal aspects also affect
market performance. For example, there is a well-documented trend of in-
creasing industry reconcentration, both domestically and internationally.
Economies of scope can certainly have procompetitive benefits; however,
economies of scope can also create the ability to engage in strategic anti-
competitive conduct. Therefore, because of the significant costs of entry,
entry rarely occurs in "waves of competition" on a large scale basis.
6. See id.
7. Id. at 23.
8. James W. Olson & Lawrence J. Spiwak, Can Short-Term Limits on Strategic Verti-
cal Restraints Improve Long-Term Cable Industry Market Performance?, 13 CARDozo
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 283 (1995).
9. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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Rather, entry usually occurs in pin-point attacks wherever the incumbent
may be the most vulnerable. Yet, if the incumbent enjoys significant
economies of scope, it may attempt to allocate the defense costs of these
attacks over a much wider customer base where competitive pressures may
not be present. The more captive customers an incumbent may have, the
more the per-unit share of defense costs will decrease. If there are enough
customers to make the per-unit/customer share sufficiently de minimis-
such that neither captive consumers nor regulators notice (or care about)
this de minimis increase in price-then the incumbent has used its econo-
mies of scope both to deter entry and evade regulation successfully. 0
B. Supply and Demand Elasticities
As explained more fully below, there is a sufficient amount of public
data to support the conclusion that U.S. carriers face a high own-price
elasticity of demand, such that customers will readily switch carriers if
there is an increase in price or diminution in service. However, this de-
mand is characterized by country-specific preferences, rather than by a
preference for a homogeneous worldwide market." Regarding the elastic-
ity of supply of international facilities, there has been a demonstrable up-
ward trend in both the number of suppliers as well as in underlying facili-
ties. This is not to say, however, that there have not been short-term supply
shortages from time to time. Given the incredible increase in international
traffic minutes, there have been several periods where undersea cable ca-
pacity has in fact been constrained. In each case, however, the FCC has
determined that these shortages would only be temporary as both addi-
tional capacity and new technologies would relieve these constraints.
10. See Reconcentration of Telecommunications Markets After the 1996 Act: Implica-
tions for Long-Term Market Performance, Second edition, PHOENIX CENTER POLICY PAPER
SERIES, Policy Paper No. 2, at 32 (July 1998) (visited Nov. 1, 1998) <http://www.phoenix-
center.org/pcpp/pcpp2.doc> [hereinafter PHOENIX CENTER POLICY PAPER]; but compare
NYNEX Corp. and Bell Atlantic Corp., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 12 F.C.C.R.
19,985, para. 16, 9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 187 (1997) [hereinafter NYNEX/Bell Atlantic
Memorandum Opinion and Order], where an increase in market concentration can appar-
ently enhance "regulatory efficiency" as well. (The FCC found it necessary to impose strin-
gent reporting requirements as a condition of merger. "As diversity among carriers declines,
both this Commission and state commissions may lose the ability to compare performance
between similar carriers that have made different management or strategic choices" because,
in the FCC's view, the "Bell Companies, being of similar size, history, and regional con-
centration have, to date, been useful benchmarks for assessing each other's performance.").
11. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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C. Major Exogenous Regulatory Factors
It is impossible to discuss international telecommunications without
understanding the international settlement-of-accounts regime. The inter-
national settlement-of-accounts regime was developed in 1865 by twenty
European countries to provide for a standard, common method to divide
the revenues for international service between originating and destination
12
countries. However, neither the "accounting" nor the "settlement" rate is
a rate charged to end consumers. The rate charged to end consumers is
called the collection rate, and comes under the FCC's jurisdiction under
Title II of the Communications Act of 1934.
In contrast, the "accounting rate" is the privately negotiated internal
price between originating and terminating carriers. The accounting rate is
related, sometimes very loosely, to the carriers' end-to-end facilities cost.
The carriers then agree to a "settlement" rate-usually one-half of the ac-
counting rate-to hand-off and terminate traffic to each other in the middle
of the ocean (hence the phrase "half circuit"). If there is an exact equal
amount of traffic exchanged between the originating market and the desti-
nation market, then the originating and terminating carriers' "settlement of
accounts" will be zero. Unfortunately, for those countries which generally
have more outbound traffic than incoming traffic for nearly every interna-
tional route (i.e., the United States), these settlement rates-which, be-
cause of the foreign carrier's monopoly or dominant position, are often set
far above the actual costs of terminating a call-can create a substantial
subsidy from the originating market's consumers to the destination market.
When this occurs, the carrier who has to "settle-up" its account with its
foreign correspondent effectively has to pay more to terminate a call-
which therefore means it must offer a higher price for service to potential
customers. Thus, if a carrier can bypass having to pay a settlement rate to
its foreign correspondent, then that carrier will have a significant cost ad-
vantage over its rivals.1
3
The significance of this "dual price" system for international teleph-
ony (i.e., regulated collection rates and privately negotiated accounting
rates) on market conduct and performance cannot be underestimated be-
cause carriers' net revenue for international service is a function of both
their accounting rates as well as their collection charges. Thus, if traffic is
balanced on a particular route, the value of the accounting rate is essen-
tially irrelevant since no settlement is necessary and each carrier's revenue
12. See Chapter 3, Box 3.1 of Direction of Traffic, 1996, ITUTELEGEOGRAPHY INC.
(1996) (visited Nov. 1, 1998) <http://www.itu.int/intset/whatare/howwork/pdf> [hereinafter
Direction of Traffic].
13. See Spiwak, Reconcentration, supra note 5, at 22-23.
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will depend directly on its collection charge. On the other hand, however,
where traffic is imbalanced, the accounting rate may have a significant ef-
fect on the commercial options of the two carriers.
For example, if a carrier has a significant incoming traffic deficit,
then the settlement payments which it must make to its foreign correspon-
dent limit its ability to reduce its collection charges. Conversely, a carrier
with a net traffic surplus has little incentive to operate more efficiently or
to reduce the accounting rate because of the net settlement benefits it re-
ceives under the status quo. For this reason, carriers that have relatively
lower collection charges, often due to the competition from other carriers,
and a net traffic deficit, are dissatisfied with the current accounting rate re-
gime because the status quo tends to subsidize high cost monopoly carriers
at the expense of lower cost carriers and end-users from competitive re-
'4gimes.
Basically, there are two ways a carrier can currently bypass the set-
tlement-of-accounts regime. First, carriers can elect to build and own the
entire "full" circuit between the originating and the destination/terminating
market. Second, an originating carrier could merge with a foreign corre-
spondent, and therefore also obtain a full circuit (the originating half plus
the foreign termination half). Under either scenario, however, because one
carrier can bypass the international settlement-of-accounts regime while
other rivals (for a variety of reasons) cannot, the bottleneck now shifts
away from the half circuit to the point(s) of interconnection with the net-
work in the destination market.' 5 Thus, without standard, cost-based inter-
connection rates for all carriers (both indigenous and foreign) in the desti-
nation/terminating market, a monopoly or "dominant" carrier in a
terminating market with an affiliate in a high-volume originating market
could potentially engage in some kind of strategic, anticompetitive behav-
ior on that particular route. 6 As mentioned above, such strategic conduct
14. See Direction of Traffic, supra note 12.
15. See Spiwak, Reconcentration, supra note 5, at 23.
16. Id. That is to say, while the ability to bypass the settlement-of-accounts regime
certainly will enable a vertically integrated firm to realize certain economies of scale and
scope that competitors may not be able to achieve immediately (and, like any other lawful
business, this is not necessarily a bad thing), if a foreign correspondent also has, for exam-
ple, the ability to control return traffic or charge different interconnection rates to rivals,
then any alleged efficiencies resulting from vertical integration are not necessarily the result
of improved operational efficiencies, but rather of strategic, anticompetitive conduct. Thus,
without standard, cost-based interconnection rates for all carriers at the foreign end, given
the structural characteristics discussed supra, vertical integration by any carrier that is either
a monopolist or a dominant carrier in both the originating and terminating markets could
significantly distort the market performance of those IMTS routes, which are in high de-
mand by consumers in its core territory (e.g., U.S./U.K., U.S./Japan, U.S./Germany,
U.S./Mexico, U.S./Jamaica). Id. (citation omitted).
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could include, inter alia, raising their rivals' costs by forcing them to enter
the terminating market at two different levels, a potential "price squeeze"
or, depending on the structural characteristics of the originating and termi-
nating markets, some kind of predatory conduct by a local affiliate of a
dominant foreign firm.
i-. RELEVANT COMMISSION PRECEDENT REGARDING IMTS
MARKET PERFORMANCE PRE-WTO
A. The FCC's International Competitive Carrier Paradigm and Its
Progeny Pre-WTO: Improperly Shifting Policy Priorities from
Promoting Competition to Competitors
1. International Competitive Carrier
17
This Article begins with a discussion of the FCC's decision to apply
its domestic "competitive carrier" paradigm to the international market be-
cause this decision marks the first clear statement by the FCC that, with
proper regulatory incentives and constraints, it was possible to promote
competition for international service-in addition to domestic long-
distance service. In other words, in the Commission's opinion, there was
17. International Competitive Carrier Policies, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 100
F.C.C.2d 1270 (1985) [hereinafter Int'l Competitive Carrier NPRM], Report and Order,
102 F.C.C.2d 812, 59 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 283 (1985) [hereinafter Int'l Competitive Car-
rier Report and Order], recons. denied, 60 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1435 (1986).
18. See Policy & Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Servs. &
Facilities Authorizations Therefor, First Report and Order, 85 F.C.C.2d 1, 52 Rad. Reg. 2d
(P & F) 215 (1980) [hereinafter Competitive Common Carrier First Report and Order],
Second Report and Order, 91 F.C.C.2d 59, 52 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 187 (1982), Order on
Reconsideration, 93 F.C.C.2d 54, 53 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 735 (1983), Third Report and
Order, 48 Fed. Reg. 46,791 (1983), Fourth Report and Order, 95 F.C.C.2d 554, 56 Rad.
Reg. 2d (P & F) 1198 (1983), vacated, AT&T v. FCC, 978 F.2d 727 (D.C. Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. AT&T, 509 U.S. 913 (1993), Fifth Report and Order, 98
F.C.C.2d 1191, 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1204 (1984), Sixth Report and Order, 99 F.C.C.2d
1020, 57 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1391 (1985), rev'd, MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. FCC, 765
F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
The idea behind the Competitive Carrier paradigm was relatively simple: AT&T, as
the "dominant" carrier, would be subject to all existing regulations-i.e., rate of return and
then later price cap regulation, all new tariffs would continue to be suspended for 45 days
before any new rate could go into effect, numerous reporting requirements, and the like.
However, in order to accelerate entry into the long-distance market (and therefore improve
market performance to a level of sufficient rivalry such that regulation could eventually be
removed altogether), the Commission basically removed all regulatory barriers to entry for
new entrants. Spiwak, Reconcentration, supra note 5, at 19 & n.8.
In addition, the Commission-via its 1980 MTS/WATS resale decision, see, e.g., Re-
sale and Shared Use of Common Carrier Domestic Public Switched Network Servs., Report
and Order, 83 F.C.C.2d 167, 48 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1067 (1980)-helped new entrants,
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finally a sufficient competitive rivalry in the international market to im-
pose "streamlined" Title II regulation on nondominant international carri-
ers of international service.
a. Relevant Product Markets
The Commission basically divided the international market into two
groups: International Message Telecommunications Service (IMTS) and
non-IMTS service.' 9 The Commission found the latter market competitive;
the former it did not. For purposes of analysis, therefore, this Article will
focus exclusively on IMTS services from this point forward.
b. Relevant Geographic Market
Because of the significant regulatory approvals and individual oper-
ating agreements required to provide IMTS service to more than one
country, the Commission concluded that each country-pair IMTS route
should be considered to be a separate, distinct geographic market. °
c. Definition of Market Power
The Commission decided to adopt the same standard to define market
power in the IMTS context as it used in the domestic context-that is, the
"power to control prices or exclude competition." 2' Moreover, the Com-
mission recognized that while any determination of an international car-
rier's dominance or nondominance is not "scientifically precise," there are
several nonexclusive factors, such as market share, control of bottleneck
inter alia, to appear to consumers that they had a nationwide, facilities-based presence until
their networks could be completed. As a result of this paradigm, the long-distance market
was transformed from a market characterized by a single dominant firm with a small com-
petitive fringe, to a market characterized by a highly elastic supply (both in capacity and in
the number of competing firms), an extremely high chum rate, and a demonstrated trend of
declining prices and increasing services. See Lawrence J. Spiwak, What Hath Congress
Wrought? Reorienting Economic Analysis of Telecommunications Markets After the 1996
Act, ANTITRUST, Spring 1997, at 35 [hereinafter Economic Analysis]; Spiwak, Reconcentra-
tion, supra note 5, at 19 & n.8. Given these market conditions, the Commission eventually
decided to remove the asymmetrical regulation previously imposed on AT&T, realizing that
the economic harms created by asymmetrical dominant carrier regulation outweighed the
public interest benefits the dominant carrier regulation was originally intended to achieve.
See Motion of AT&T Corp. to be Reclassified as a Non-Dominant Carrier, Order, 11
F.C.C.R. 3271, 32 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 605 (1995).
19. The FCC found that IMTS and non-IMTS were discrete product markets because,
inter alia, from a demand substitutability perspective, the Commission found that customers
simply did not view the two types of services as acceptable substitutes for one another. See
Int'l Competitive Carrier NPRM, supra note 17, paras. 13-20.
20. See id. para. 29.
21. Int'l Competitive Carrier Report and Order, supra note 17, para. 40 (quoting
United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956)).
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facilities, rate of return, as well as the existence of actual or2Potential com-
petition that could indicate the possession of 
market power.
d. Merits
After review, the Commission concluded that: (a) American Tele-
phone and Telegraph (AT&T) was dominant in the provision of IMTS; and
(b) all other IMTS providers (i.e., Sprint, MCI) were not dominant. While
the Commission recognized that market share is not determinative of mar-
ket power, the Commission nonetheless held that it was "a clear indication
of dominance for AT&T's provision of IMTS." 3 The Commission found
that at the time of the Report and Order, AT&T was still the only provider
of IMTS between the U.S. mainland and a majority of foreign countries.
Moreover, in those countries where there were other IMTS providers, the
Commission found that AT&T still had an overwhelming market share.
Indeed, the Commission specifically rejected AT&T's argument that it
faced actual or potential competition, stating that "[m]erely because more
than one carrier provides service to a given geographic area does not
automatically mean that all carriers providing service to that area are non-
dominant."24 Additionally, the Commission noted that while it was adopt-
ing a country-by-country approach, the question of how many different
countries the new entrants served was a factor in determining if AT&T (or
any other carrier) faced effective competition. According to the Commis-
sion, "[t]here is clearly some competitive marketing advantage to be
gained if a carrier has the ability to serve all or most foreign points because
a subscriber is more likely to take service from a carrier with the more
comprehensive coverage." 5
In light of the foregoing, the Commission concluded that the IMTS
market was not yet sufficiently competitive to ensure that AT&T was un-
able to manipulate rates in a way to discourage competition. Thus, held the
Commission, "until such time as competition in the provision of IMTS
more fully develops so as to negate AT&T's ability to control prices or ex-
22. See id. para. 42; Int'l Competitive Carrier NPRM, supra note 17, para. 32.
23. As an important point, the Commission noted
that not all operating agreements obtained by AT&T's IMTS competitors provide
(or initially provided) for the handling of U.S. inbound traffic. Because the han-
dling of U.S. inbound traffic and the receipt of one half of the agreed upon ac-
counting rate directly influences a route's profitability as well as the U.S. carrier's
collection rate for outbound traffic,
the Commission stated that "any analysis of market power which looks at market share must
consider both outbound and inbound traffic shares." Int'l Competitive Carrier Report and
Order, supra note 17, para. 44 & n.44.
24. Id. para. 44.
25. Id. para. 45.
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clude competition, it is necessary to continue the full scale regulation of
AT&T for its IMTS offerings to all countries. 26 To determine whether
there was such competition, the FCC stated that it would look, on a coun-
try-by-country approach, "at a variety of factors including the number of
entrants, market penetration for both inbound and outbound traffic, re-
gional and global market positions, refiling and transiting arrangements,
control of facilities and the potential for non-competitive pricing.
'27
2. FCC's Foreign Affiliate Rules 8
This proceeding was designed to modify the original international
dominant/nondominant framework for IMTS services as set forth in Inter-
national Competitive Carrier. Specifically, the Commission stated that it
wanted to move away from a policy under which it always presumed that
"foreign-owned U.S. common carriers [were] dominant in their provision
of all international services to all foreign markets in favor of a policy that
regulates U.S. international carriers, whether U.S.-owned or foreign-
owned, as dominant only on those routes where their foreign affiliates
have the ability to discriminate" 29 in "favor of [their] U.S. affiliate in the
provision of services or facilities used to terminate U.S. international traf-
fic."30 Indeed, the Commission reaffirmed its tentative conclusion in the
NPRM that its then-current international dominant policy was "overbroad,
unnecessarily burdensome and may be detrimental to competition.",3' As
such, the Commission believed it appropriate to redirect its "regulation to
those instances where a relationship between a U.S. international carrier
and a foreign carrier may present some substantial risk of anticompetitive
conduct, [in an effort to] promote competition in the U.S. international
service market by reducing the costs of entry and operation, while con-
tinuing to protect unaffiliated U.S. carriers from discrimination by foreign
,,32
carriers.
First, the Commission addressed what it would consider as "control"
of a U.S. carrier. The Commission stated that it would treat a U.S. carrier
"as an affiliate of a foreign carrier when the U.S. carrier controls, is con-
26. Id. para. 46.
27. Id.
28. Regulation of Int'l Common Carrier Servs., Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 7
F.C.C.R. 577 (1992) [hereinafter Regulation NPRM], Report and Order, 7 F.C.C.R. 7331,
71 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 717 (1992) [hereinafter Regulation Report and Order].
29. Regulation NPRM, supra note 28, para. 2.
30. Regulation Report and Order, supra note 28, para. 4.
31. Id. para. 6 (emphasis added).
32. Id.
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trolled by, or is under common control with a foreign carrier., 33 In adopt-
ing this standard, the Commission recognized "the concern that a
less-than-controlling interest by a foreign carrier in a U.S. carrier could
give the foreign carrier the financial incentive to favor its U.S. affiliate."
34
However, the Commission also recognized that "the foreign carrier would
not be in a position to direct the actions of the U.S. carrier," and that "the
U.S. carrier would be unlikely to risk sanctions by this Commission for
participating in discriminatory conduct that violated Commission rules or
policy, or any conditions of its Section 214 certificate., 35 Moreover, the
Commission noted that "U.S. carriers will be subject to ongoing reporting
requirements that are designed to detect discrimination by foreign carriers
or administrations in favor of specific U.S. carriers," and that the Commis-
sion retained "the option to impose or reimpose dominant carrier regula-
tion on a particular carrier that is found to have engaged in anticompetitive
conduct."
Finally, the Commission recognized that the Department of Justice
continues to have the authority to take enforcement action under the anti-
trust laws in appropriate cases. Accordingly, the Commission concluded
that, on balance, it did not believe the "possibility of anticompetitive collu-
sion poses enough of a threat to competition to impose dominant carrier
regulation absent control by a foreign carrier of a U.S. carrier, particularly
in light of the substantial competitive benefits that can result from lifting
the burden of current regulation."
38
In so holding, the Commission specifically declined to craft "an af-
filiation standard that would capture certain non-ownership arrangements
between a U.S. and foreign carrier, such as co-marketing agreements for
the provision of telecommunications services or joint ventures for the pro-
vision of non-telecommunications services., 39 According to the Commis-
sion, although "these arrangements could provide a financial incentive for
carriers to act jointly in pursuit of marketing objectives, neither carrier has
the ability to direct the actions of the other or to derive a direct financial
benefit with respect to the other's telecommunications operations. Moreo-
ver, the U.S. carrier would "in all cases be subject to the ongoing regula-
tory requirements" imposed by the Commission on all U.S. international
33. Id. para. 10.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. para. 11.
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carriers." 40 Therefore, concluded the Commission, "submission and
evaluation of such arrangements would appear to require an unnecessary
expenditure of Commission and carrier resources.4' As such, the Commis-
sion held that these arrangements do not present a substantial possibility of
anticompetitive effects such that "these relationships need be addressed in
the context of deciding whether to regulate a carrier as dominant or non-
dominant., 42 Rather, the Commission stated that it would instead "rely on
[its] Section 208 complaint procedures and sanctioning authority to rem-
edy any anticompetitive consequences that might arise once a carrier gains
access to the U.S. market." 43
Having thus defined "affiliate," the Commission next turned to its
definition of a dominant carrier. As noted above, the Commission held that
it intended "to regulate U.S. international carriers as dominant only on
those routes where a foreign affiliate has the ability to discriminate in fa-
vor of its U.S. affiliate through control of bottleneck services or facilities
in the destination market." 44 To achieve this end, the Commission adopted
a three-part threshold to determine the level of regulatory scrutiny it would
apply to a given carrier. First, the Commission stated that it would pre-
sume that "carmers that have no affiliation with a foreign carrier in the
destination market... [are] nondominant for that route. 45 Second, the
Commission stated that it would presume that all "carriers affiliated with a
foreign carrier that is a monopoly in the destination market... [are] domi-
nant for that route. 46 And third, the Commission stated that for "carriers
affiliated with a foreign carrier that is not a monopoly on that route receive
closer scrutiny by the Commission., 47 Finally, the Commission stated that
it "will place the burden of proof on any party, applicant or petitioner, that
seeks to defeat the presumptions in the first two categories. 48
However, for those carriers covered by the third category that seek to
be regulated as nondominant, the Commission stated that those carriers
"bear the burden of submitting information to the Commission sufficient to
demonstrate that their foreign affiliates lack the ability to discriminate
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. para. 19.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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against unaffiliated U.S. carriers."49 Indeed, the Commission specifically
stated that it fully expects
carriers to address the factors that relate to the scope or degree of their
foreign affiliate's bottleneck control, such as: the duopoly or oligopoly
status in the foreign affiliate's country; and whether the affiliate has
the potential to discriminate through such means as preferential oper-
ating agreements, preferential routing of traffic, exclusive or more fa-
vorable transiting agreement, or preferential domestic access and in-
terconnection arrangements.
Moreover, the Commission stated that it also expects carriers to ad-
dress whether public regulation in the destination market can be relied
upon effectively to constrain the affiliate's ability to discriminate. Ac-
cording to the Commission, "[t]here would appear to be no substantial risk
of discrimination, for example, where a U.S. carrier is affiliated with a for-
eign carrier that operates solely through the resale of an unaffiliated for-
eign carrier's services in a destination market that provides equivalent re-
sale opportunities.""1
Finally, the Commission addressed the issue of potential anticom-
petitive harm resulting from "third-country leveraging."52 Given the struc-
ture of the international market, the Commission stated that it could not
"rule out the possibility that an affiliated U.S. carrier [would] attempt to
gain an unfair competitive advantage on affiliated or unaffiliated routes
through the negotiation of exclusive arrangements with foreign carriers or
administrations., 53 As such, the Commission amended Part 63 of the Rules
to require that Section 214 applicants with a foreign carrier affiliate in any
market certify in each application filed with the Commission that they
"have not agreed to accept special concessions directly or indirectly from
any foreign carrier or administration with respect to traffic or revenue
flows between the U.S. and any destination market served under the
authority of their Section 214 certificates and have not agreed to enter into
such agreements in the future."54 The Commission held that it would
"define 'special concession' as any arrangement that affects traffic or
revenue flows to or from the U.S. that is offered exclusively by a foreign
carrier or administration to a particular U.S. carrier and not also to simi-
49. Id. para. 20.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. paras. 25-26.
53. Id. para. 27.
54. Id. (citations omitted).
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larly situated U.S. international carriers authorized to serve a given
route."55
3. The FCC's Foreign Carrier or "ECO" Order"
On November 30, 1995, the Commission released an Order clarify-
ing its "public interest" analysis for international service applications.1
7
According to the FCC, this public interest analysis was comprised of two
distinct parts: (1) an "effective competitive opportunities" or ECO analy-
sis; and (2) an analysis of additional public interest factors that could
58
counter-balance (i.e., override) an adverse ECO finding. The Commission
stated that it undertook this initiative with the hope that this policy would
both promote entry by U.S. carriers on the foreign end and also promote
foreign entry into the U.S. market. 9 In reality, the Foreign Carrier Order
marked the debut of naked (of course, relative to the commonly accepted,
historically implicit meaning) trade concerns-rather than consumer con-
cerns-as the top priority for FCC international policies.
a. The Rise of Naked Trade Concerns
The Commission reasoned that its desire to promote potential new
entry of U.S. firms abroad was legitimate public policy because, in the
FCC's opinion, the option of entry into the U.S. telecommunications mar-
ket was such "a significant advantage, especially for those [foreign carri-
ers] who are trying to establish their U.S. market position largely through
their own marketing organization," the FCC assumed a fortiori that "a for-
eign carrier would[, therefore] have a significant incentive to encourage its
government to liberalize sufficiently to meet the effective competitive op-
portunities test for facilities-based or resale entry if that were necessary for
the carrier to control an end-to-end network service."6° Indeed, the Com-
mission found that there was "significant value in being able to establish a
substantial investment relationship with a U.S. carrier" because
"[p]artnerships with U.S. carriers, cemented by large equity holdings,
[would] provide foreign carriers with lower cost options for pursuing the
55. Id.
56. Market Entry and Regulation of Foreign-affiliated Entities, Report and Order, I I
F.C.C.R. 3873, 1 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 459 (1995) [hereinafter ECO Order].
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. para. 32.
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U.S. customer base. The partnerships also [would] provide immediate ac-
cess to the established customer base of the U.S. affiliate."6'
Moreover, reasoned the Commission, such partnerships would
"greatly strengthen the capacity to offer the benefits of one-stop shopping
for all global needs, including a single customized billing and cost control
system for all global services, and specialized service and software de-
signed to meet the special needs of the client."62 In short, argued the Com-
mission, these partnerships offered "important strategic capabilities in a
critical global market" and, therefore, "the ability to invest substantially in
the U.S. affiliate/partner [would permit] the foreign carrier to strengthen
its partner's capabilities in the U.S. market while creating a management
structure that better safeguards its competitive interests in the joint ven-
ture. 63 Thus, concluded the Commission, "the ability of a foreign carrier
to acquire a substantial equity position in a U.S. carrier can be an impor-
tant advantage in a major world market. This advantage can provide a sig-
nificant incentive for a foreign government to support liberalization."6
b. The Improper Redefinition of Market Power
Given the sales pitch above, the Commission explained that it would
apply its new "effective competitive opportunities" standard to foreign car-
riers or their U.S. affiliates of IMTS service only whenever a foreign car-
. 65
tier has market power on the foreign end. This inquiry, stated the Com-
mission, would be applied on a route-by-route basis. If a foreign carrier
or its U.S. affiliate failed this test, then the Commission would deny per-
mission to provide service on the particular route.67 According to the
Commission, possession of market power "may include the home market
of the foreign carrier, but it also includes all other destination markets
where it has the ability to leverage market power."'68
In contrast to the definition of market power it used in International
Competitive Carrier and in the domestic context, however, the Commis-
sion changed the definition of "market power" for purposes of the ECO
test.69 No longer would the Commission use a variation of the traditionaltest of whether a carrier has the power to control prices or exclude compe-
61. Id. para. 33.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See id. para. 21.
66. Id.
67. See id. para. 36.
68. Id. para. 116.
69. Id.
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tition. Now, as naked trade concerns became the obvious top priority of
FCC IMTS policies, the Commission stated that it would define market
power as "the ability of the carrier to act anticompetitively against unaf-
filiated U.S. carriers through the control of bottleneck services or facilities
on the foreign end.",70 The Commission then defined "bottleneck services
or facilities" as those facilities "that are necessary for the provision of in-
ternational services, including inter-city or local access facilities on the
foreign end."7'
c. The New ECO Standard
Under the new ECO standard, the Commission stated that it would
examine the following six factors:
(1) whether U.S. carriers can offer in the foreign country international
facilities-based services substantially similar to those that the foreign
carrier seeks to offer in the United States; (2) whether competitive
safeguards exist in the foreign country to protect against anticompeti-
tive and discriminatory practices, including cost-allocation rules to
prevent cross-subsidization; (3) the availability of published, nondis-
criminatory charges, terms and conditions for interconnection to for-
eign domestic carriers' facilities for termination and origination of in-
terational services; (4) timely and nondiscriminatory disclosure of
technical information needed to use or interconnect with carriers' fa-
cilities; (5) the protection of carrier and customer proprietary informa-
tion; and (6) whether an independent regulatory body with fair and
transparent procedures is established to enforce competitive safe-
guards.
72
d. Other "Public Interest" Factors
The Commission also held, however, that it would consider several
other "public interest" factors, in addition to its ECO test, that might
"weigh in favor of, or against, authorizing a foreign carrier to serve desti-
nation countries where [such carrier] has market power."73 According to
the Commission, there may be occasions when the public interest requires
that these additional factors actually override an ECO determination to ei-
74ther allow or deny entry. These factors included, inter alia, (1) "the gen-
eral significance of the proposed entry to the promotion of competition in
the U.S. communications market"; (2) as discussed more fully infra, and
perhaps most inflammatory to the international community, any "national
70. Id. (emphasis added).
71. Id.
72. Id. para. 40.
73. Id. para. 61.
74. Id. para. 62.
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security, law enforcement, foreign policy, and trade concerns raised by the
Executive Branch"; and (3) the "presence"-but not an absolute require-
ment of-cost-based accounting rates.75
e. Accounting Rate Issues
One of the most significant aspects of the FCC's ECO Order was that
it would not require the presence of cost-based accounting rates as a pre-
condition of entry. Quite to the contrary, the Commission was of the
opinion that requiring the presence of cost-based accounting rates "could
preclude otherwise qualified candidates from competing in the U.S. inter-
national services market. It would become, in effect, a barrier to market
entry. Such a result would be contrary to [its] objective of encouraging
competitive entry and, thereby, reducing industry concentration on both
ends of U.S. international routes.' 76 In fact, the FCC argued that
[a]dditional competition should produce service alternatives and price
competition in the U.S. market which should in turn stimulate U.S.
outbound demand. This, in turn, will make foreign carriers more ame-
nable to further reducing their accounting rates, in that they will expe-
rience less of a loss in settlement revenues. This reduces the per min-
ute settlements burden on U.S. consumers.
Moreover, the Commission specifically rejected the argument that,
absent a requirement of cost-based accounting rates, a U.S. affiliate of a
foreign carrier would be able to price its services without the full cost of
settlements with its foreign parent and, thereby, would have some kind of
anticompetitive advantage (in this docket, an alleged price squeeze) over
other unaffiliated U.S. carriers. 8 The Commission gave several reasons to
support this conclusion. First, the Commission stated outright that it was
not convinced that dominant foreign carriers can set the "input" ac-
counting rate level unilaterally. These rates are established by nego-
tiation between a U.S. and foreign carrier. Competitive pressures from
end users and carriers, as well as [its] International Settlements Policy,
have strengthened the position of U.S. carriers during accounting rate
negotiations, and [it] expect[s] this trend will continue.
79
Second, the FCC explained that "[e]ven assuming arguendo that a
dominant foreign carrier can unilaterally set an accounting rate, a squeeze
will not succeed if the high price of a particular input can be offset by
lower prices for other inputs, or economies of scale and scope, or other ef-
75. Id. (emphasis added).
76. Id. para. 67 (emphasis added).
77. Id. (citation omitted).
78. Id. para. 68.
79. Id. para. 69 (emphasis added).
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ficiencies."'0 Where such offsets are possible, "the integrated firm will
have little or no ability to inflict substantial harm on competitors via a
squeeze." 8' Moreover, "the affiliated U.S. carrier must maintain low prices
and high accounting rates over a sufficiently long time period so as to in-
flict substantial economic harm to competitors. 3 2
Third, because the FCC found that no party had demonstrated con-
clusively under the record of this proceeding that "above-cost accounting
rates on particular routes where a carrier has an affiliate on the foreign end
realistically jeopardize the ability of unaffiliated carriers to compete on
those routes or in the U.S. international services market as a whole," the
FCC found that "the possibility of such harm is [actually] outweighed by
the benefits of additional price and service competition that will result
from further U.S. market entry. 83
f Joint Marketing Agreements
The Commission was also concerned about the competitive effects of
"global alliances." On one hand, the Commission specifically refused to
apply its ECO test to both exclusive and nonexclusive nonequity arrange-
ments between a U.S. international carrier and a foreign Post, Telegraph,
and Telephone Administration (PTT) because the Commission found that
"foreign carrier participation in such alliances did not constitute entry into
the U.S. international services market as a common carrier."'' Moreover,
the Commission held that application of the ECO test in such circum-
stances could actually have negative consequences, as "[s]uch an applica-
tion could deny U.S. consumers the competitive benefits of the services of
such alliances and would do little to open foreign markets. '85 Indeed, the
Commission specifically recognized that such non-equity arrangements
can actually attenuate the potential for collusive conduct because while
"[nion-equity arrangements can provide a financial incentive for carriers to
80. Id. para. 70.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. As explained more fully infra, the significance of the Commission's specific
refusal to require cost-based accounting rates as a precondition of entry cannot be under-
stated. Much to the dismay of the international community, while the FCC has steadfastly
insisted on retaining the "national security, law enforcement, foreign policy and trade con-
cerns raised by the Executive Branch" component of its public interest inquiry, political
pressure subsequently fueled these fires by convincing the FCC to reverse completely its
decision not to require cost-based accounting rates as a precondition to entry. As discussed
more fully infra, the FCC announced in its Foreign Participation proceeding that the
United States will now charge an entry fee-i.e., the FCC's "benchmarks" condition.
84. Id. para. 95 (citation omitted).
85. Id. (citation omitted).
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act jointly in the pursuit of marketing objectives.., neither carrier [will
derive] a direct financial benefit with respect to the other's telecommuni-
cations operations. ' 6
On the other hand, however, the Commission found no evidence "to
contradict the conclusion that exclusive co-marketing or other agreements
affecting the provision of U.S. basic international services pose an unac-
ceptable risk of anticompetitive harm where the agreement is between a
U.S. carrier and a dominant foreign carrier."87 The Commission held that it
would "view such exclusive agreements as within the scope of the 'no ex-
clusive arrangements' condition [it has] placed on numerous Section 214
authorizations and cable landing licenses."" This condition requires that
"[the] carrier shall not acquire or enjoy any right for the purpose of han-
dling or interchanging traffic... that is denied to any other U.S. carrier."'"
The Commission also held that it would "view such exclusive agree-
ments as prohibited by the special concessions prohibition applied to for-
eign-affiliated U.S. carriers under Section 63.14 of [its] rules."0 According
to the Commission, it would
continue to enforce these provisions to prohibit any exclusive co-
marketing agreement or joint venture between a U.S. and a dominant
foreign carrier that, either on its face or in practice, grants exclusive
rights to the U.S. carrier for the provision of basic telecommunications
services originating or terminating in the United States.9'
However, the Commission also stated that it would look
favorably on requests to waive these provisions where the U.S. carrier
can demonstrate that its allied foreign carrier lacks market power, i.e.,
the ability to discriminate among U.S. international carriers in the pro-
vision of bottleneck services or facilities used to terminate U.S. inter-
national traffic.9
g. Trade and the "Public Interest"
Finally, the Commission made clear that it had jurisdiction to adopt
an ECO analysis under both Section 214 and Section 310(b)(4) of the
Communications Act.93 Moreover, the Commission reasoned that its ECO
paradigm is "consistent with [its] responsibilities under the Clayton Act to
86. Id.
87. Id. para. 255.
88. Id.
89. Id. (citation omitted).
90. Id. (citation omitted).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. para. 222.
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consider anticompetitive issues under the public interest standard." 94 First,
the Commission rejected commenters' arguments that it was adopting
nothing more than a naked trade reciprocity requirement under Section
214.95 In the Commission's words, it was "not adopting a reciprocity re-
quirement" but was, instead, simply "adopting a public interest analysis
that is comprised, in part, by an effective competitive opportunities analy-
sis for those Section 214 applications filed by U.S. carriers affiliated with
foreign carriers that have the ability and incentive to discriminate against
unaffiliated U.S. carriers, thereby harming U.S. consumers and busi-
nesses."'96 The Commission reasoned that it did not formulate this policy
paradigm "to secure open markets as an end in itself, but rather to ensure
that U.S. consumers and businesses realize the benefits of effective com-
petition in the provision of their international telecommunications serv-
ices." ' In support of this position, the Commission reasoned that
"effective competitive opportunities on the foreign end of U.S. interna-
tional routes are necessary to limit the potential for anticompetitive con-
duct by foreign carriers and to ensure that their entry promotes rather than
hinders competition in the U.S. international services market." 98 Thus,
concluded the Commission, "[t]he fact that Congress did not require us to
consider specifically the openness of foreign markets under Section 214 in
no way implies that this factor is not relevant under the broader concept of
the public interest, convenience and necessity."99
Second, the Commission also concluded that the ECO test is a
"permissible component" of the public interest analysis required by Sec-
tion 310(b)(4) of the Communications Act.' According to the Commis-
sion, under Section 1 of the Communications Act, it has
a general mandate to promote the availability to U.S. consumers of a
"rapid, efficient, Nation-wide and world-wide wire and radio commu-
nication service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges," and a
specific mandate under Section 310(b)(4) to allow foreign investment
above the benchmark level unless the Commission determines that the
investment is inconsistent with the public interest.10
Thus, reasoned the Commission, the ECO test will "promote increased
competition in the U.S. telecommunications market, thus furthering the
94. Id. (citation omitted).
95. Id. para. 227.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. (citation omitted).
100. Id. para. 238.
101. Id. (citation omitted).
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public interest by reducing rates charged to consumers, increasing the
quality of services, and encouraging the development of new and innova-
tive services for U.S. consumers."' Moreover, the Commission rejected
arguments that in adopting the ECO test, the Commission was, in fact, en-
gaging in trade issues which are outside the Commission's mandate. Ac-
cording to the Commission, the ECO paradigm "is fully consistent, not
only with [its] responsibility to promote the U.S. public interest, but also
with the responsibility of the Executive Branch to formulate and execute
U.S. international trade policy."103
Of course, keeping with the trade-centric theme of this Order, the
FCC specifically declined to apply its ECO test to U.S. carriers' invest-
ments overseas because, in the Commission's words, "such scrutiny would
not further the goals underlying this proceeding."'' 4 In the Commission's
view, although "a substantial investment by a U.S. carrier in a dominant
foreign carrier may raise competition concerns with respect to traffic be-
tween the foreign country and the United States, there are established
Commission rules and policies, as well as antitrust laws, that address such
concerns."' 105 As such, the Commission stated that while it has
"confidence" in its own ability to address any such competitive concerns
with its own safeguards, including its dominant carrier safeguards, it
lacked such confidence in other regulators' ability to regulate to the same
standard of excellence over issues outside the FCC's jurisdiction.106
Moreover, the Commission professed that it did "not want unnecessarily to
impede the flow of U.S. telecommunications carriers' investment and en-
try into foreign markets."'0 In the FCC's opinion, the "presence of U.S.
carriers not only benefits those carriers' U.S. customers, but also may fos-
ter liberalization efforts."' 8 Why? Because, in the FCC's view, "such a re-
striction on U.S. investment in foreign carriers would be tantamount to an
export control and would be directly contrary to long-standing U.S. policy
in favor of U.S. investment abroad."'"
The FCC further argued that it was wholly appropriate for it to apply
a different regulatory approach to U.S. carrier investment in foreign carri-
ers because its ECO analysis distinguishes between U.S. carriers and for-
eign carriers for three separate reasons. First, "the same anticompetitive
102. Id.
103. Id. para. 239 (emphasis added).
104. Id. para. 103 (citation omitted).
105. Id. para. 105 (citation omitted).
106. Id. (citation omitted).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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concerns [did not] exist where a U.S. carrier invests in a foreign carrier as
where a foreign carrier invests in a U.S. carrier.""1 In circumstances where
"a U.S. carrier has a substantial investment in a dominant foreign carrier
and uses its influence over the foreign carrier to obtain an anticompetitive
advantage on the affiliated route," the FCC has "jurisdiction over the U.S.
carrier, through its licenses and authorizations in the United States, to re-
dress its behavior," but in contrast, "where a dominant foreign carrier has a
substantial investment in, and influence over, a U.S. carrier, [it did] not
have similar jurisdiction over the foreign carrier, through its foreign li-
censes and authorizations, to redress any anticompetitive use of its bottle-
neck facilities."' " Second, the FCC argued that applying its ECO analysis
to "a U.S. carrier seeking to invest abroad would be contrary to U.S. pol-
icy."1 2 Finally, the FCC maintained that any application of the ECO analy-
sis "to a U.S. carrier investor simply would not serve the market opening
goals of this proceeding.""
3
4. International 214 Streamlining Proceeding
4
In this docket, the Commission proposed to eliminate unnecessary
regulatory burdens on international nondominant carriers in light of the
"dramatic growth in international competition '" 5 and international facili-
ties.1 6 As such, the Commission concluded that it was no longer appropri-
ate to require nondominant carriers to obtain an additional Section 214
authorization to acquire or lease capacity on noncommon carrier facilities,
as well as to add circuits on these facilities. "7 The Commission stated that
"the public interest would be served by expanding the types of global Sec-
110. Id. para. 106.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Streamlining the Int'l Section 214 Authorization Process and Tariff Requirements,
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 10 F.C.C.R. 13,477, 2 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 2191 (1995)
[hereinafter Streamlining NPRM], Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 12,884, 2 Comm. Reg. (P
& F) 857 (1996) [hereinafter Streamlining Report and Order].
115. Streamlining NPRM, supra note 114, para. 1.
116. In fact, the Commission noted that between 1988 and the time of this proceeding,
there was "no shortage of common carrier facilities as competition in satellite and cable ca-
pacity [had] increased greatly on most routes" and in all major regions (Atlantic, Pacific,
American Caribbean). See id. para. 25 & n.30. The Commission further noted that in recent
years, there had been "a large increase in submarine cable transmission capacity to all major
markets" and that "many new competitors [had] entered these markets." Id. para. 29. Addi-
tionally, over the last several years, the FCC found that "AT&T routinely [had] filed appli-
cations to convey transmission capacity in submarine cables," none of which had been
"opposed, commented on by a third party or denied." Id.
117. Id. para. 26.
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tion 214 applications eligible for processing to include those [applications]
filed by U.S. carriers with foreign affiliations." 1 8 However, the FCC cau-
tioned that, in its view, the public interest would only be served "so long as
the applications [were] tailored such that they [did] not request authority
for service on routes where applicants [had] affiliations with foreign carri-
ers," and the Commission had not made "a determination that the affiliate
[lacked] market power in the destination market."'' 9
Similarly, the Commission held "that a foreign-affiliated U.S. car-
rier.., should be treated no differently than a U.S. carrier without foreign
affiliations to the extent the affiliated carrier [sought] authority to serve
routes where it [was] not affiliated with a foreign carrier with marketpower.''120 Again, the Commission held that those "applications should be
specifically tailored... to ask for limited global authority to provide
service to points where either the carrier does not have affiliations, or [the
Commission] has previously determined that its affiliate does not possess
market power in the destination market.' ' 21 Finally, the Report and Order
directed the International Bureau to maintain an exclusion list that identi-
fies any restrictions on providing service to particular countries or using
facilities and whether Section 214 authority is needed for these countries
and/or facilities.'2
5. Summary and Analysis
The Orders analyzed above in Part III.A.3 demonstrate a clear and
wholly improper shift in U.S. government priorities toward protecting
competitors rather than competition (i.e., consumers).'3 Indeed, even
though International Competitive Carrier focused on the ability of
AT&T's rivals to obtain an operating agreement with a foreign correspon-
dent, the FCC did not attempt to force foreign markets open for the benefit
of these carriers. By adopting a naked reciprocity approach as a precondi-
tion of foreign entry in ECO, however, the FCC improperly changed its
policy objectives of IMTS regulation from ensuring that U.S. carriers
charge U.S. consumers just and reasonable rates, to acting as a wholly-
owned subdivision of the U.S. Trade Representative and the Executive
118. Streamlining Report and Order, supra note 114, para. 11.
119. Id.
120. Id. para. 12.
121. Id.
122. Id. para. 17.
123. See discussion supra Part llI.A.3.
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Branch to promote international trade for the benefit of these very same
carriers.'2
As explained below, the FCC often makes use of its broad "public
interest" standard as support for its various IMTS policy initiatives. With
the rise of naked trade concerns as a primary emphasis of these policy ini-
tiatives, the question of whether or not trade may be a legitimate public
interest factor must therefore be resolved. While the Commission has
stated that trade may be a permissible component of the public interest
standard, established legal precedent and economic theory indicate a con-
trary conclusion.
It is very important to remember that, as a general proposition, eco-
nomic regulation and trade policy seek to promote very different goals.
Antitrust and regulatory policy appropriately focuses on consumers-not
competitors.'2 Trade policy, on the other hand, by its very definition seeks
to promote competitors (i.e., competitors of the "domestic" sort). Thus,
while antitrust is certainly one of a number of policies affecting interna-
tional trade, the various national trade policies (which very often are not
even in harmony with each other) may at times be in tension with antitrust
policies. 126 Accordingly, because economic regulators have the responsi-
bility to maximize consumer welfare, and therefore these regulators-just
like under antitrust jurisprudence-are similarly not at liberty to subordi-
nate the public interest to the interest of equalizing competition among
competitors, trade considerations correspondingly should not be a legiti-
mate public interest factor in regulatory decision-making.
127
By tragically becoming "captured" by the Executive Branch-rather
than fighting to maintain its independence-the FCC took its first giant
step in dislodging the dominant carrier paradigm from its analytical an-
chors established in the domestic Competitive Carrier and International
124. See Spiwak, The Search for Meaningful Definitions, supra note 2, at 36 n.95 (citing
Reed Hundt & Charlene Barshefsky, FCC Isn't Backpedaling on Telecommunications Deal,
N.Y. TiMEs, Aug. 17, 1997, at F36 ("FCC will continue to show deference to the executive
branch on matters concerning foreign policy and trade.. ." and the "executive branch fully
supports this view.")). As I have observed in the past, such a statement is really quite inter-
esting, given the fact that the FCC is supposed to be an independent regulatory agency. See
id. at 18. As an additional anecdotal postscript, proponents of this hypocrisy continue to
spout this view to this day.
125. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977)
(quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)); Hawaiian Tel. Co. v.
FCC, 498 F.2d 771, 775-76 (D.C. Cir. 1974); SBC Comm., Inc. v. FCC, 56 F.3d 1484,
1491 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citing W.U. Tel. Co. v. FCC, 665 F.2d 1112, 1122 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
("equalization of competition is not itself a sufficient basis for Commission action")).
126. See ABA SECTION OF ANTTRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 991 (4th
ed. 1997).
127. Spiwak, The Search for Meaningful Definitions, supra note 2, at 16.
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Competitive Carrier proceedings; the FCC made final divorce from any
analytical foundation in the adjudications and rulemakings discussed infra.
Indeed, by removing the analytical underpinnings of the dominant carrier
paradigm, the FCC has now apparently turned the concept of dominance
into a regulatory term of convenience-in other words, the terms "market
power," "anticompetitive," and "dominant" now essentially boil down to
nothing more than the intellectual equivalent of "I don't like you."''
While such an approach may make great press release headlines, the
reality is that any argument that reciprocity can actually improve consumer
welfare is specious at best. Over 200 years ago, Adam Smith, in his classic
treatise THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, powerfully demonstrated that when-
ever government attempts to coordinate the efforts of entrepreneurs, such
policies almost invariably discourage economic growth and reduce eco-
nomic well-being. Smith called this system "mercantilism."' 29 Indeed,
given certain economic realities, it is quite unclear how, in the long run,
American consumer welfare will be enhanced by reciprocity. For example,
by essentially adopting a "reciprocity" analysis in favor of an accurate
economic analysis, a "reciprocity" approach actually creates-rather than
eliminates-significant barriers to entry for both new firms into U.S. do-
mestic telecommunications markets and U.S. firms into foreign markets.
Specifically, by adopting an aggressive "America First" approach, both
foreign governments and carriers will probably have a (if not exacerbating
an existing) substantial disincentive to engage in good faith negotiations
with U.S. carriers to enter their home markets (which, paradoxically, is
supposed to be the whole goal of such an approach in the first place).3 ° As
128. Id. at25 n.15.
129. Adam Smith concluded that mercantilism
retards, instead of accelerating, the progress of the society towards real wealth and
greatness; and diminishes, instead of increasing, the real value of the annual pro-
duce of its land and labour [because of] ... two basic reasons ... :a tendency of
special interests to turn government programs to their own narrow advantages,
and a tendency of joint business efforts to result in collusion to reduce output and
raise prices, especially when government willingly permits such collusion. [As
such, although] "the law cannot hinder people of the same trade from sometimes
assembling together, it ought to do nothing to facilitate such assemblies; much
less to render them necessary."
James C. Miller, et. al., Industrial Policy: Reindustrialization Through Competition or Co-
ordinated Action?, 2 YALE J. ON EG. 1, 5 (1984) (citations omitted).
130. Spiwak, The Search for Meaningful Definitions, supra note 2, at 19; see also Hal-
prin, supra note 3, at F13 (FCC simply "wants to keep its ability to treat foreign carriers
worse than its own domestic carriers-though this is exactly what the United States and 68
countries promised in Geneva not to do." Id. This policy will "delay other nations' entry
into our market by months, if not years, while allowing identical investments by United
States carriers to proceed immediately. Free trade delayed is free trade denied." Id.
(emphasis added)).
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noted above, cultivating foreign recalcitrance is precisely the one thing
that the FCC's IMTS policies have managed to accomplish successfully. '
Moreover, international commerce, by its very definition, raises far
more investment risks than domestic commerce does (e.g., different or in-
effective legal systems, political graft, retroactive or post-hoc "windfall"
taxes, etc.). 32 As such, the prices for international goods that require the
investment of substantial sunk costs are usually higher in order to reflect
this risk.'33 An aggressive trade approach, therefore, merely exacerbates
the possibility that a foreign country may, in an act of trade retaliation,
"nationalize" a U.S. firm's sunk assets-often without any adequate com-
pensation. This "uncertainty" can raise prices for U.S. consumers in two
ways. First, the greater the risk, the higher a U.S. firm's cost of capital be-
comes; as a firm's cost of capital becomes higher, end-prices for consum-
ers increase. Second, as risk increases, a U.S. firm will have a greater in-
centive to raise its prices to ensure that it can recover its costs in the
131. See Scott Blake Harris, Why the EC Has Got Its Priorities All Wrong, CoMM. WK.
INT'L, Jan. 19, 1998, at 9, where the former (and inaugural) Chief of the FCC's Interna-
tional Bureau lambasted the European Commission for suggesting the need for a European-
wide approach to licensing and other basic regulatory issues. In Mr. Harris' purported ex-
pert opinion, the "EC has a very long way to go before it could possibly be qualified to act
as a regulator. Indeed, it would need radically to reorient its thinking so that it focuses more
on fairness and openness, and less on industrial policy." Id. In fact, Mr. Harris appears
shocked at the notion that a regulator, in particular the European Commission and Director-
ate General XIII-would apparently "consider the promotion of European industry to be the
motivating rationale for competition and open markets." Id. This view, admonished Mr.
Harris, "squarely conflicts with the role of a regulator, which is to bring consistency, fair-
ness, and openness to the decision-making process." Id. (emphasis added). To help guide
our European friends, therefore, Mr. Harris suggested that the European Commission look
to the FCC as the very model of a pareto optimal regulatory body. For example, Mr. Harris
noted that as "a regulatory agency, the FCC is not allowed to play favorites. It must treat
[foreign firms] no better, and no worse, than it treats other [domestic] applicants." Id. Most
importantly, argued Mr. Harris, is that "the FCC cannot strike deals with other governmen-
tal agencies favoring" either domestic or foreign firms. Id. Thus, concluded Mr. Harris,
[t]o put it mildly, such trade-offs have no place at any regulatory agency. Let's
hope this is just a misunderstanding. But do not be shocked if it is not. The EC
still thinks its role is to protect European industry, and its respect for independent
regulatory processes seems to be mere talk.... If it ever hopes to be a regulator-
or have respect from regulators-the EC must understand that the fair and open
application of rules to facts is what regulators do. Looking out for "client" indus-
trial interests is not.
I believe the correct legal and economic term to describe accurately this argument can be
summarized in one word--"chutzpa."
132. Spiwak, The Search for Meaningful Definitions, supra note 2, at 19.
133. Id.
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shortest time possible.' 34 It would seem, therefore, ,that "FCC" should not
stand for "Facilitating Cartels and Collusion. '35
B. Accounting Rates and the Commission's International
Settlements Policy Pre-WTO: The Expansion of Neo-
Mercantilism
1. General Background
As highlighted passim, some of the more prominent economic dis-
tortions of the IMTS market are above-cost accounting rates and
"whipsawing" among U.S. carriers by foreign monopolists. To mitigate the
latter distortion, the Commission, inter alia, developed an International
Settlements Policy (ISP) for IMTS service. The ISP is designed to prevent
foreign monopolies from using their market power to obtain discrimina-
tory accounting rate concessions from competing U.S. carriers (hence the
phrase "whipsawing"). To accomplish this goal, the ISP basically ensures:
(1) the equal division of accounting rates; (2) nondiscriminatory treatment
116
of U.S. carriers; and (3) proportionate return of inbound traffic.
As far as lowering above-cost accounting rates (and eliminating the
huge outpayment flows they create), the Commission has over the years
attempted to formulate a wide variety of regulatory strategies to accom-
plish this goal. Primarily, these policies have attempted to actively pro-
mote methods of providing or accessing services that vary from the tradi-
tional correspondent relationship. For example, the Commission has
allowed resale of international private lines to provide switched service,1
37
call-back, 31 switched hubbing,139 and country-direct services.'4 While the
134. Id.
135. Id. at 34 n.73.
136. See Implementation and Scope of the Int'l Settlements Pol'y for Parallel Int'l
Comm. Routes, Report and Order, 51 Fed. Reg. 4736 (1986), modified in part on recons., 2
F.C.C.R. 1118, 62 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 408 (1987) [hereinafter ISP Report and Order],
further recons., 3 F.C.C.R. 1614, 64 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 956 (1988). See also Regulation
of Int'l Accounting Rates, Phase I, Report and Order, 6 F.C.C.R. 3552, 69 Rad. Reg. 2d (P
& F) 241 (1991), on recons., 7 F.C.C.R. 8049, 71 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) (1992). The FCC's
ISP also requires U.S. carriers to file copies of all contracts, agreements and arrangements
that relate to the routing of traffic and the settlement of accounts.
137. See Regulation of Int'l Accounting Rates, Phase II, First Report and Order, 7
F.C.C.R. 559, para. 8, 70 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 156 (1991). See also Market Entry and Reg.
of Foreign-affiliated Entities, Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 3873, paras. 157-61, 1 Comm.
Reg. (P & F) 459 (1995) [hereinafter Market Entry Report and Order].
138. "Call-back enables a customer in one country to access a dialtone in another coun-
try and carriers to bill customers at the latter country's collection rate." Policy Statement on
Int'l Accounting Rate Reform, Policy Statement, 11 F.C.C.R. 3146, para. 12 n.8, 2 Comm.
Reg. (P & F) 182 (1996) (citations omitted) [hereinafter Int'l Accounting Policy Statement].
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Commission has recognized that these "alternative routing practices have
put downward pressure on accounting rates and on foreign calling prices,"
these practices ultimately do not resolve how to decrease substantially the
out-flow of above-cost accounting rates created by traffic imbalances un-
der the existing system. 141 For example, while country-direct services in-
flate the settlements deficit by converting foreign-originated traffic into
U.S.-billed calls (which is good for consumers), "U.S. carriers nevertheless
embrace this service not only because it enhances their service offerings,
but also because it may increase their market share of outgoing traffic and
entitle them to a larger flow of lucrative incoming traffic under [the
FCC's] proportionate return rules.' 42
Faced with this Faustian dilemma of having to choose between pro-
moting consumer welfare or substantial industry pressure to reduce the
out-payment flow, the Commission chose the latter and decided that it was
time to take a more aggressive approach to the above-cost settlement rate
problem. Starting in 1996, and leading right up to the WTO Agreement
(and, as discussed infra, even after the conclusion of the WTO Agree-
ment), the FCC decided it would fight foreign monopoly power with the
substantial monopsony or, more accurately, "bargaining" power of the
United States-that is, it would set (and essentially give foreign carriers no
opportunity to refute) the maximum rate at which U.S. carriers could pay
foreign correspondents under the settlement-of-accounts regime.
2. The FCC's January 1996 Policy Statement on Accounting Rate
Reform
143
In this Policy Statement, the Commission argued that under current
market conditions, there was a clear need to establish new benchmark set-
tlement rates for IMTS service.TM The Commission determined that, in its
view, "the traditional system of bilateral correspondent services and
above-cost accounting rates has slowed progress toward competitive mar-
kets [because] this system unnecessarily restrains the development of
139. "Switched hubbing refers to the routing of U.S. switched traffic over U.S. interna-
tional private lines, whether resold or facilities-based, that terminate in equivalent countries
and then forwarding that traffic to a third, non-equivalent country by taking at published
rates and reselling the international service of a carrier in the equivalent country." Id. para.
12 n.9 (citation omitted).
140. "Country direct enables international calling card holders traveling in a foreign
country to call an international toll free number and gain direct access to an operator and the
calling prices of their home country." Id. para. 12 n.10.
141. Id. para. 12.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. para. 43.
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competition in the supply of services and their pricing." 14 The Commis-
sion further found that this performance is "especially true in a digital
world where technological advances are rapidly reducing the costs of pro-
viding service, yet above-cost accounting rates prevent consumers from
getting the full benefit of these reductions."' l 6
Playing the monopsony card, the Commission announced that "U.S.
consumers are the largest users of international telecommunications serv-
ices."'47 For virtually all countries, the Commission noted that "a greater
number of calls originate in the United States than are terminated here"
and, because originating carriers make settlement payments to terminating
carriers, "U.S. carriers pay substantial sums to foreign carriers. To the ex-
tent that accounting rates exceed the actual cost of terminating an interna-
tional call," the Commission reasoned that this payment is nothing more
• 148
than "a substantial subsidy" to the foreign carer.
In support of this conclusion, the Commission cited to a variety of
data. For example, the Commission noted that "[b]etween 1985 and 1994,
U.S. carriers paid $26 billion in settlement payments to foreign carriers[,
and] as much as one half of these payments may have exceeded the actual
costs of terminating calls.' 149 The Commission found that "[t]his subsidy
adds significantly to the cost of providing service and results in higher
U.S. calling prices" and is exacerbated as additional foreign carriers be-
come global carriers. 150 According to the Commission, because accounting
rates remain "significantly above the cost of originating and terminating
international telephone calls," such that "the ever-increasing number of
U.S.-originated calls and the growing disparity between U.S.- and foreign-
billed minutes have resulted in a dramatic increase in U.S. net settlement
outpayments" (specifically, since 1985, "the net settlement outpayment has
quadrupled, reaching over 4.3 billion dollars in 1994").15
As such, the Commission held that while "a competitive global mar-
ket might still yield a net U.S. deficit,.., a substantial part of the current
settlements outpayments is the result of economically inefficient account-
145. Id. para. 8 (citation omitted).
146. Id.
147. Id. para. 9.
148. Id. (citation omitted).
149. Id. (citing Regulation of Int'l Accounting Rates, Phase II, Second Report and Order
and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 7 F.C.C.R. 8040, para. 18 & n.40, 71
Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 868 (1992)).
150. Int'lAccounting Policy Statement, supra note 138, para. 9.
151. Id. para. 16.
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ing rates and monopoly pricing practices for consumers in foreign mar-
kets."
,152
3. "Flexibility" Order'
53
In this Order, the Commission stated that it wanted to attempt to es-
tablish "a more flexible framework for regulating international accounting
rates .... [thereby] creat[ing] or replicat[ing] market-based incentives and
prices for both suppliers and consumers of international telecommunica-
tions service."' 54 To achieve this goal, the Commission stated that it would
"permit, subject to certain competitive safeguards, alternative payment ar-
rangements that deviate from [the Commission's] ISP between any U.S.
carrier and any foreign correspondent in a country that satisfies the [ECO]
test."'55 Moreover, the Commission stated that it
[would] also consider alternative settlement arrangements between a
U.S. carrier and a foreign correspondent in a country that does not sat-
isfy the ECO test, where the U.S. carrier can demonstrate that devia-
tion from the ISP [would] promote market-oriented pricing and com-
petition, while precluding abuse of market power by the foreign
correspondent.
Specifically, the Commission stated that while it believed that "the
ECO test provides an effective measure of whether sufficient competitive
conditions exist in a foreign market to warrant flexibility in the ISP," it
recognized that "departures from the ISP may be justified in some circum-
stances where the ECO test [was] not satisfied.' 57 For example, suggested
the FCC, "a departure from the ISP [might have been] warranted where a
non-dominant U.S. carrier sought to negotiate an alternative arrangement
with a foreign entity that [did] not have economic market power in a for-
eign market, or where a foreign regulator guarantees cost-based intercon-
nection for international traffic." 5 1 In such cases, reasoned the Commis-
sion, "the potential for abuse of market power by a foreign carrier to the
detriment of U.S. carriers would [have been] constrained, and alternative
152. Id. (citations omitted). Not to appear too maudlin, however, the Commission pro-
vided a back-handed compliment to the rest of the international community, noting that
some significant, procompetitive changes had in fact occurred in the global communications
market in recent years as a result of technological innovations, privatization, regulatory re-
form, and evolving national market conditions. Id. paras. 29-30.
153. Regulation of Int'l Accounting Rates, Fourth Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R.
20,063, 5 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 452 (1996) [hereinafter Flexibility Order].
154. Id. para. 13 (citation omitted).
155. Id. para. 2 (citation omitted).
156. Id.
157. Id. para. 40.
158. Id.
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settlement arrangements [might have] foster[ed] competition and bene-
fit[ed] U.S. consumers."'5'9 The Commission therefore stated that it would
consider "alternative settlement arrangements between a U.S. carrier and a
foreign correspondent in a country that did not satisfy the ECO test where
the U.S. carrier [demonstrated] that deviation from the ISP [would] pro-
mote market-oriented pricing and competition, while precluding abuse of
market power by the foreign correspondent."'60
Notwithstanding the above, the Commission was concerned never-
theless that "allowing carriers with a significant share of the market to ne-
gotiate alternative arrangements [might] have unanticipated anticompeti-
tive effects in the U.S. market for 1MTS services. ' 6 For example, the
Commission reasoned that "dramatic and sudden shifts in return traffic
away from a U.S. carrier might impede that carrier's ability to compete ef-
fectively in the IMTS market, at least in the short term."'62 Moreover, the
Commission believed that there might be circumstances under which ei-
ther: (a) "a foreign carrier with a significant share of its market [might]
have the ability and incentive to misuse its market power to discriminate
against U.S. carriers, notwithstanding the existence of effective competi-
tive opportunities in the foreign market"; and/or (b) "a U.S. carrier with a
significant share of the market [might] be in a position to extract anticom-
petitive special concessions from foreign carriers to the detriment of other
U.S. carriers."'16' As such, if carriers seek flexibility from the ISP, the
Commission stated that it would require: (1) U.S. carriers to file with the
Commission "a copy of all alternative settlement arrangements affecting
more than either twenty-five percent of the outbound traffic on a particular
route or twenty-five percent of the inbound traffic on a particular route"
that would be made public; and (2) that "any alternative arrangement that
affects more than twenty-five percent of the outbound traffic or twenty-
five percent of the inbound traffic on a particular route not contain unrea-
sonably discriminatory terms and conditions."'64
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. para. 44.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. para. 45.
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4. Settlement Rate "Benchmarks" Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking 65
Soon after the penultimate round of WTO negotiations disintegrated
and two months before the final February Accord was concluded, the
United States apparently decided to push its negotiating hand by an-
nouncing that it was strongly considering a unilateral proposal to establish
benchmark settlement rates for U.S. carriers-regardless of the contractual
settlement rate agreements already in force between U.S. carriers and their
foreign correspondents. The Commission reasoned that such unilateral ac-
tion was necessary because under the traditional accounting rate system,
most "settlement rates greatly exceed the underlying costs of providing the
service in question, i.e., terminating an international call."' Indeed, the
Commission found that "[ilt is not unusual for settlement rates to be be-
tween five and ten times a reasonable estimate of the underlying cost of
terminating an international call."' 167 As such, reasoned the Commission,
"[s]uch significantly inflated settlement rates represent a major subsidy
from U.S. consumers, carriers and their shareholders to foreign carriers
and raise prices for international services to U.S. consumers many timesS ,,161
above the costs of providing those services. Moreover, the Commission
found that such rates "also distort IMTS market performance and restrict
market growth."' 69
Once again, the FCC argued that the most egregious competitive
distortions were those distortions
flowing from above-cost settlement rates when a foreign carrier col-
lecting those rates is able to send its switched service over resold inter-
national private lines into the United States, but U.S. carriers are un-
able to send their traffic over private lines in the reverse direction, and
must continue to pay a relatively expensive settlement rate.170
The Commission believed that because
foreign carriers could use the subsidy embedded in above-cost settle-
ment rates to cross-subsidize an affiliate providing international serv-
ices in the U.S. market.., a foreign carrier's U.S. affiliate could af-
ford to price its services in the U.S. market below the costs of
providing those services because its foreign parent would be earning
165. International Settlement Rates, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 12 F.C.C.R. 6184,
9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 2005 (1996) [hereinafter Int'l Settlement Rates NPRM].
166. Id. para. 7.
167. Id. (citation omitted).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. para. 75.
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substantial subsidies from terminating traffic at above-cost settlement171
rates.
In the Commission's opinion, however, "if a foreign carrier [was] collect-
ing cost-based settlement rates, or if its ability to collect above-cost set-
tlement rates [was] constrained by the existence of effective competition in
its home market, concerns about anticompetitive behavior [would] be sig-
nificantly diminished.'
72
To mitigate these market distortions, therefore, the Commission pro-
posed, inter alia, to condition various types of authorizations to provide
U.S. international services to address the potential market distortions cre-
ated by above-cost settlement rates.'73 "First, when a carrier seeks authori-
zation to provide international facilities-based service from the United
States to an affiliated foreign market, whether to provide switched service
or private line service," the Commission proposed to condition "any
authorization to serve that affiliated market on the foreign affiliate offering
U.S. licensed international carriers a settlement rate within the benchmark
range" set forth in this NPRM.174
Moreover, the Commission proposed that, consistent with its existing
ISP, "all U.S. carriers should receive the same settlement rate for traffic on
that route."' 75 However, if, "after the carrier has commenced service to the
affiliated market," the Commission learns that "the carrier's service offer-
ing has distorted market performance on the route in question," the Com-
mission proposed to order that "settlement rates to that country be reduced
to the bottom of the range ([its] estimate of cost-based termination) or to
revoke the authorization of the carrier to serve the affiliated market.'
176
Notwithstanding this proposal, however, the Commission recognized
that requiring cost-based accounting rates as a precondition of entry may
actually be inconsistent with its ECO test. As such, the Commission sought
comment on whether this proposal would affect the ECO test-that is,
"should this proposal be used in conjunction with the ECO test, replace the
171. Id.
172. Id. Notwithstanding the above, however, the Commission recognized that there
were, in fact,
opportunity costs to the foreign parent of offering service through an affiliate in
competition with U.S. carriers that formerly purchased termination service from
the parent. In serving its home market directly through its affiliate, the foreign
parent would no longer receive the settlement payment it formerly received from
U.S. carriers to terminate traffic in that market.
Id. para. 80.
173. Id. para. 76.
174. Id. (citations omitted).
175. Id. (citation omitted).
176. Id. (citation omitted).
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ECO test, or should [the Commission] modify the ECO test to ensure that
it is compatible with this proposal?"'177 The Commission emphasized, how-
ever, that the proposal contained in the NPRM is "to prevent U.S.-licensed
carriers from distorting the IMTS market through service to affiliated mar-
kets with excessive settlement rates."'' 78 According to the Commission,
"[t]he proposal does not serve as a barrier to market entry for foreign car-
riers."'179 Moreover, the Commission argued that under the pending pro-
posal, "[it] would not limit the ability of foreign carriers to enter the U.S.
market. Rather, it would ensure that all U.S.-licensed carriers (U.S. or for-
eign-owned) would face similar conditions on service to affiliated foreign
markets."8
5. Summary and Analysis
The preceding section raises an unusual question: If the FCC's Inter-
national Settlements Policy is expressly designed to keep the U.S. IMTS
"cartel" fat and happy, then why were all of the U.S. carriers nonetheless
jointly lobbying for a reduction in cost of a common input? Was this just
an industry attempt to cultivate some regulatory good will? Alternatively,
perhaps such lobbying might have been intended to portray U.S. carriers
(which are certainly not struggling or nascent firms) as victims of the for-
eign monopolist correspondents. Yet, such a "victim" mentality seems a
bit disingenuous, however, given the fact that U.S.-based carriers are not
the only ones faced with large settlement imbalances. Indeed, Japan-based
carriers have large deficits with Taiwan, the Philippines, South Korea,
Singapore, and other major Asian countries. Similarly, France Telecom
has large outflows to Africa, the Middle East, and even Latin America.
Moreover, the same holds true for British Telecom, Deutsche Telekom,
Telecom Italia, and other large overseas telephone companies.
Perhaps the more likely reason was-just like the motivations behind
ECO and its progeny-U.S. carriers' and government officials' xenopho-
bia of foreign competition. In their view: (a) under the existing interna-
tional settlement-of-accounts regime, the U.S. traffic imbalance effectively
forces U.S. firms to subsidize-via above-cost settlement rates-foreign
firms' activities; which subsidy (b) allegedly permits foreign firms to build
177. Id. para. 78 (citation omitted).
178. Id. para. 79.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See Spiwak, The Searchfor Meaningful Definitions, supra note 2, at 18; Maev Sul-
livan, Why Is the United States Whining About Its Own Creation?, COMM. WK. INT'L, Jan.
20, 1997.
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a "full circuit" and therefore bypass the international settlement-of-
accounts regime (i.e., provide IMTS service at lower cost); and because (c)
the ability for any firm to achieve lower costs must be a fortiori
"anticompetitive," the U.S. government should make it as difficult as pos-
sible for foreign firms to enter the U.S. market.
112
As such, the Orders discussed above appear to demonstrate a desire
by the United States to not put all of its "promoting U.S. investment
abroad" eggs into the reciprocity basket. To wit, the FCC in ECO at least
made the pretense of stating that entry into the United States would be
conditioned on reciprocal effective competitive opportunities for U.S. car-
riers abroad. With the release of the Benchmarks NPRM, the FCC sent the
first salvo that it would set a fee for entry as well."' As the FCC released
its Benchmarks NPRM in the throws of the final stages of the WTO nego-
tiations, however, it would therefore appear that the United States decided
to approach the final negotiations with no carrot-only a very big stick.
C. Carrier-Specific Adjudications
1. Foreign Firms' Mergers with, and Investments in, U.S. Carriers
a. B TIM CI 1'84 and BT/MCI 11185
BTIMCI I and II marked the first time that the FCC was forced to
deal with a substantial investment by a dominant foreign firm into one of
the largest telecommunications firms in the United States. In an apparent
effort to avoid a lengthy regulatory approval process, MCI and BT filed a
petition for declaratory ruling that: (1) the terms and conditions of BT's
investment in MCI did not result in a transfer of control of MCI to BT,
and, accordingly, prior Commission approval was not required pursuant to
Section 310(d) of the Act; and (2) BT's proposed 20 percent ownership
interest, even when aggregated with existing non-BT foreign investment
for a total of up to 28 percent foreign investment, was consistent with and
permissible under Section 3 10(b)(4) of the Communications Act. 1 6
182. See Spiwak, The Search for Meaningful Definitions, supra note 2, at 20.
183. See id. at 19.
184. MCI Comm. Corp. & British Telecomm. PLC, Declaratory Ruling and Order, 9
F.C.C.R. 3960, 75 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1024 (1994) [hereinafter BT/MCII Order].
185. MCI Comm. Corp. & British Telecomm. PLC, Declaratory Ruling, 10 F.C.C.R.
8697 (1995) [hereinafter BTIMCI II].
186. In BTIMCI II, MCI petitioned the Commission to declare that an increase in the
foreign ownership of MCI's capital stock from 28 to 35 percent would be consistent with
the public interest under Section 310(b)(4) and would not constitute a transfer of control
under Section 310(d). The Commission granted the petition, finding that the increase in for-
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Resolution of both questions was expeditious. In the former case, the
Commission found that because, under the deal as then-structured, BT
would not be able to exercise control over MCI, the transaction did "not
constitute a transfer of control and, therefore, did not require Commission
approval under § 310(d) prior to consummation of the transaction."'87
Similarly, the Commission found no public interest reason under Section
310(b)(4) to deny the petition because the proposed investment did "not
raise the traditional concerns present in a Section 310(b)(4) analysis as
[there was] only the potential 3 percent fluctuation in alien ownership be-
yond the 25 percent statutory benchmark due to the widely-held nature of
[MCI's] stock."'88
Yet, despite the fact that the Commission "granted" the BT/MCI pe-
tition, the Commission announced that because of other "public interest
concerns... regarding the effect that the BT and MCI alliance may have
on competition in the telecommunications market as a result of the poten-
tial for either discrimination or other anticompetitive conduct," it would,
nonetheless, conduct a post hoc in-depth review of the likely competitive
• . 189
effects of the investment. For example, the Commission believed that,
post-merger, "BT could leverage its dominant position in both the U.K.
international and local exchange markets to favor MCI... to the disad-
vantage of competing U.S. International carriers."'190 According to the
Commission, this "favorable treatment could manifest itself in a variety of
ways, such as preferential pricing or the provision of technical network in-
formation in advance of such disclosure to other U.S. carriers."' 9' To wit,
at the time of the proposed merger, BT controlled 97 percent of the local
termination points and had the most fully developed long-distance network
eign ownership of MCI would come from passive investors-each of which would own less
than 1% of MCI stock. These new owners would have neither the incentive nor the ability
to control MCI. Moreover, the Commission found that BT's ownership in MCI was not ex-
pected to change as a result of the proposed increase in MCI's foreign ownership, and, in
any event, MCI continued to be bound by the requirements of the previous BT/MCI I Order
outlined above. Id. para. 9.
187. BT/MCII Order, supra note 184, para. 18; see also id. paras. 10-17.
188. Id. paras. 19-23. The Commission was also comforted by the fact that the transac-
tion involved "a dominant U.S. presence among MCI's officers, directors and sharehold-
ers." Id. para. 22. As such, the Commission stated that it would view "the possible 3 percent
fluctuation in non-BT alien ownership beyond the statutory benchmark.., in light of the
presence of 80 percent U.S. directors and 100 percent U.S. officers in MCI, in addition to
the 100 percent U.S. officers and directors in MCI's Title In licensee subsidiaries." Id.
189. Id. para. 29.
190. Id. para. 30.
191. Id.
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to which interconnection is essential for the distribution of international
traffic in the United Kingdom.19
On the U.S. end, the Commission found that "MCI [was] the second
largest interexchange carrier and international service provider in the mar-
ket and, as such, maintained a significant U.S. customer base."19' 3 As such,
the Commission reasoned that "BT's 20 percent interest in such a major
U.S. carrier, coupled with its participation on MCI's Board of Directors,
[might] provide BT with the incentive both to discriminate in favor of MCI
and to influence the corporate decision-making process of MCI."194 "Thus,
in spite of the fact that MCI and BT [were] not 'affiliated' within the
meaning of [the Commission's] rules, [the Commission] believe[d] that
these factors create[d] additional incentives for BT to favor MCI, directly
or indirectly." 95
The curious thing about this conclusion, however, is that despite the
potential incentives for strategic behavior mentioned above, the Commis-
sion nonetheless concluded that dominant carrier regulation was not neces-
sary for MCI."' The FCC reached this conclusion for two reasons: (1) "the
safeguards imposed in the order [were] sufficient to ensure that the parties
do not engage in anticompetitive activities" (basically de minimis reporting
requirements); and (2) MCI's agreement to a "no special concessions"
provision.1 For example, the Commission found that
the amendment of MCI's international Section 214 certificates to in-
clude a "no special concessions" obligation would preclude MCI from
accepting from BT, or from any other foreign carrier or administration,
preferential or exclusive operating agreements or marketing arrange-
ments for the provision of basic telecommunications services, includ-
ing the introduction and provision of new basic services.
1 9 s
Similarly, the Commission found that MCI's amended certificates would
"preclude it from accepting from BT any distribution or interconnection
arrangements, including pricing, technical specifications, functional capa-
bilities, or other quality and operational characteristics, such as provision-
192. Id. para. 36.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. para. 37.
197. Id. (citation omitted). Indeed, the Commission specifically found that "nothing in
the record indicate[d that there [was] any need for several key provisions of dominant car-
rier regulation, such as filing of tariffs on 45-days notice, requirement of cost support justi-
fication, and prior Section 214 authorization for circuit additions. [According to the Com-
mission,] these restrictions would be needlessly burdensome in this context." Id. n.69.
198. Id. para. 37.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
ing and maintenance times, at rates or on terms and conditions that are not
available on a nondiscriminatory basis to all competing U.S. carriers."' 9
The FCC also rejected arguments that BT and MCI could use their
relationship to manipulate traffic streams or accounting rates, again re-
peating its belief that "existing Commission policy with respect to these
matters effectively limits the parties' ability to engage in such anticom-
petitive conduct.
'200
Finally, the FCC made two other significant findings in this case that
it would be forced to ignore deliberately two years later in BT/ICI III-
that is, that BT's failure to enter independently would not make a signifi-
cant competitive impact in either the U.S. domestic market or the market
for U.S.-originated traffic on the U.S.-U.K. route.20I Indeed, based on spe-
cific findings that even though BT had previously demonstrated an active
interest in (and made two unsuccessful attempts to enter) the U.S. market,
and, absent this transaction, BT might have elected to enter the U.S. tele-
communications market on its own, the Commission found that even if BT
were viewed as a potential entrant, there did not appear to be any anticom-
petitive effect if BT did not enter.2° Indeed, the Commission noted that, at
the time of this Order, there were "several hundred carriers, both facilities-
and resale-based, competing in the U.S. interexchange market" and, as
such, "the loss of the incremental competition that might [have been] pro-
vided by BT's independent entry into the U.S. telecommunications mar-
ket... appear[ed] to be of little competitive significance. 203 Similarly, be-
cause at the time of this Order there were "approximately 10 international
facilities-based carriers and hundreds of international resellers providing
U.S.-U.K. telecommunications services," the Commission again
"conclude[d] that the number of existing and potential competitors indi-
cate[d]" that BT's failure to enter independently would "not significantly
lessen potential competition in the provision of U.S.-U.K. telecommunica-
tions services. '0 °4
199. Id. (citation omitted).
200. Id. para. 38 (emphasis added).
201. Id. para. 50. Subsequent to this Order, the Commission granted BT's U.S. affiliate
a Section 214 application, subject to certain reporting requirements, to provide U.S.-
originated IMTS service. See BT North America, Inc., Order and Certification, 9 F.C.C.R.
6851, 76 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 920 (1994).
202. BT/MCI I Order, supra note 184, para. 49.
203. Id.
204. Id. para. 50 (citation omitted).
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b. The Sprint/Deutsche Telekom-France Telecom Merger205
In this Order, the Commission granted, subject to certain conditions,
Sprint's requests for rulings that a proposed alien ownership in Sprint of
up to 28 percent was "not on balance inconsistent" with Section 310(b)(4)
of the Communications Act, and that the proposed transaction was "not on
balance inconsistent" with the public interest.2 6 The Commission also
found that "10 percent equity investments each by France Telecom (FT)
and Deutsche Telekom (DT) in Sprint [did] not result in a transfer of con-
trol of Sprint to FT and DT and thus [did] not require prior Commission
approval under Section 310(d) of the Act."2°7 As explained more fully be-
low, while the Commission was concerned that France and Germany did
not offer effective competitive opportunities for U.S. carriers, the Com-
mission nonetheless granted the petition because the Commission found
that: (a) the proposed transaction would create procompetitive benefits;
and (b) "the French and German governments [were] committed to full
competition,.., in which U.S. companies [would] be allowed to partici-
pate.
,20 8
What is particularly significant (and humorous) about this Order,
however, is the FCC's apparent inability to decide whether it should apply
its ECO test in this situation. At first, the Commission decided to apply the
ECO test to the proposed transaction simply because of the size of the car-
riers involved. Yet, several paragraphs later, the Commission changed its
mind and decided that an ECO analysis was unwarranted in this case be-
cause it had already reached "the ultimate conclusion ... that, on balance,
the public interest weighs in favor of granting Sprint's petition ... ,,20
Notwithstanding this statement, however, commenters had convinced the
FCC that the proposed transaction created "ECO-type" competitive con-
cerns, and the FCC stated that it would address these concerns in this pro-
211
ceeding nonetheless-independent of the ECO analysis.
In particular, the Commission shared the commenters' fundamental
concerns "about the potential for anticompetitive behavior by FT and DT
on the U.S.-France and U.S.-Germany routes. 212 The Commission again
205. Sprint Corp., Petition for Declaratory Ruling Concerning Section 310(b)(4) and (d)
of the Communications Act, Declaratory Ruling and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 1850, 2 Comm.
Reg. (P & F) 409 (1996) [hereinafter Sprint Declaratory Ruling and Order].
206. Id. para. 1.
207. Id.
208. Id. para. 3.
209. Id. para. 39.
210. Id. para. 49.
211. Id. para. 51.
212. Id. para. 55.
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pointed out that "FI and DT [were] monopoly providers of French and
German international facilities-based services, [they controlled] the local
termination points in those countries, and [they controlled] the national
long distance networks to which interconnection is essential for the distri-
bution of international traffic."213 As such, the Commission reasoned that
although prior to the "proposed transaction, FT and DT had no incentive to
discriminate in favor of Sprint, the Joint Venture or any of their competi-
tors over others," after the transaction FT and DT would "each [have] a
substantial financial stake in the success of Sprint and the Joint Venture
and [would], therefore, give each an incentive to engage in anticompetitive
strategies to maximize the return on their investment. 2 14 As such, the
Commission concluded that "[a]bsent effective conditions, such strategic
behavior could yield Sprint more customers, calls and revenues, and ulti-
mately higher returns, than would otherwise be the case.,
215
213. Id. One other interesting aspect in this case is that the FCC specifically rejected
Sprint's claims that FT and DT had no more leveraging power than BT did in the BT/MCI
proceeding. For example, the Commission pointed out that Sprint overlooked the fact that,
in the United Kingdom, there was de jure competition in nearly every market segment (in
that BT faced competition to some extent at all levels), and, unlike in France and Germany,
U.S. carriers had a choice of carriers to haul their traffic. The FCC also found that as of the
time of this Order, there was an effective regulatory authority that is independent of BT,
which employed fair and transparent procedures while there were no such independent
regulatory authorities with fair and transparent procedures in France or Germany. Id. para.
58. Finally, the Commission rejected Sprint's arguments that EU regulatory prohibitions on
discriminatory conduct by FT and DT were sufficient to protect competition, particularly in
the U.S. market for "global, seamless services." Id. para. 60.
214. Id. para. 56. According to the FCC, potential discrimination
could take a number of forms, such as: (1) routing calls to Sprint and the Joint
Venture in proportions greater than those justified under [its] proportionate return
policy; (2) otherwise manipulating the calculations and settlements payments to
wrongfully favor Sprint and the Joint Venture; (3) routing high-profit calls to
Sprint and the Joint Venture, and leaving the rest to their competitors; (4) under-
charging Sprint and the Joint Venture and/or overcharging their competitors for
use of the same essential facilities in France or Germany; (5) leaking to Sprint and
the Joint Venture the confidential information that FT or DT receives from
Sprint's and the Joint Venture's competitors; (6) giving Sprint and the Joint
Venture advance notice of network changes and other information that Sprint, the
Joint Venture and their competitors will need to know; or (7) either as an agent or
through an affiliated third party, selling the services of Sprint or the Joint Venture
in ways that use FT's and DT's home market power.
Id. (citation omitted).
215. Id. para. 57. In the end, the FCC imposed the following five conditions: first, the
Commission classified Sprint as a dominant carrier (without price cap regulation, however)
for the provision of U.S. international services on the U.S.-France and U.S.-Germany
routes. Second, the Commission prohibited Sprint from operating additional circuits "on the
U.S.-France and U.S.-Germany routes until France and Germany... liberalized two im-
portant markets: alternative infrastructure for already liberalized services (which include
most non-public voice services) and basic switched voice resale." Id. para. 4. Third, the
Commission required Sprint to comply with nondiscrimination and reporting requirements.
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Notwithstanding the above, however, the Commission found several
strong countervailing reasons to grant the petition. First, the Commission
believed that the recent liberalization efforts by the French and German
governments were an important first step toward effective facilities and
216
services competition. Moreover, the Commission noted that the Euro-
pean Union established January 1, 1998, "as the date by which most Mem-
ber States, including France and Germany, must fully open their telecom-
munications markets by liberalizing existing monopolies for public voice,,• • 217
telephony services and transmission facilities.
Second, the Commission found that the proposed transaction would
result in significant procompetitive benefits-primarily by permitting
Sprint to use the substantial sum of new investment capital to upgrade its
existing infrastructure-in a variety of relevant product markets, including
domestic interexchange services, terrestrial commercial mobile radio
services (CMRS), U.S. international services, and the nascent market for
218global seamless services. While the Commission reasoned that "capital
investment is not, by itself, necessarily procompetitive or efficient, the
competitive forces in [these markets should] drive Sprint to devote the in-
vestment to making itself a stronger competitor in the ways it de-
scrib[ed].,, 2' 9 As such, the Commission believed that
Sprint's strengthening of itself as a competitor against its larger rivals,
AT&T and MCI, should yield procompetitive benefits for consum-
ers.... [B]y permitting Sprint to expand and upgrade its existing net-
work, undertake additional research and develop new applications and
Fourth, the Commission held that the proposed transaction would serve the public interest
only if Sprint obtained a written commitment from Fr to lower the accounting rate between
the United States and France to the same range as the U.S.-U.K. and U.S.-Germany ac-
counting rates. Id.
216. Id. paras. 63-73.
217. Id. para. 74.
218. Id. para. 88. The Commission recognized that at the time of the BT/MCI decision,
there were no established global seamless service providers. At the time of Sprint's petition,
there were several such providers in this market, such as AT&T's partnerships (through
Worldpartners and Uniword), and the BT/MCI alliance (Concert). As such, the Commis-
sion held that the "Joint Venture between Sprint, Fr and DT would add another significant
competitor to this market" and would yield significant competitive benefits for U.S. cus-
tomers. Id. para. 86. Specifically, the Commission reasoned that "[tlhe establishment of a
new, viable competitor in this area should result in more competitive options for U.S. cus-
tomers, particularly in terms of pricing and variety of services available for large scale,
high-end customers such as multinational corporations." Id. para. 87. In addition, the Com-
mission believed that the Joint Venture would "offer a number of efficiencies for Sprint,
such as greater economies of scale, easier entry into new markets and the sharing of risks.
Given that several strong competitors already exist[ed] in this market," the Commission
therefore concluded that "the procompetitive effects of the Sprint/FT/DT transaction out-
weigh[ed] any possible anticompetitive results in this market." Id.
219. Id. para. 80 (citations omitted).
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services, the capital should ultimately benefit consumers through lower
prices and more service choices.
22 0
2. Questions of Dominance and Effective Competitive
Opportunities
a. Generic Worldwide Dominance: The AT&T International
Nondominant Petition
221
In this Order, the Commission finally granted AT&T's petition to be
222declared a nondominant carrier for all U.S.-based IMTS routes. At the
time of this Order, "dominance" for AT&T meant that AT&T, for every
single international route, was subject to stringent FCC reporting require-
ments, price cap regulation, and any new tariff AT&T filed was subject to
a forty-five-day notice and comment period before it could go into ef-
fect.
223
First, the Commission found that AT&T's market share for IMTS
service declined consistently over the past several years (indeed, AT&T
actually lost market share faster for IMTS service than for domestic serv-
ice). This pattern of sustained reductions of AT&T's market share sug-
224gested intense rivalry for IMTS service. Second, the Commission found
that, as of the time of this Order, demand was highly elastic for IMTS
service; in fact, the Commission held that consumers are even more price
sensitive for international services than they are for domestic services.m
Third, the Commission analyzed the elasticity of supply of the IMTS mar-
ket, in terms of both the number of operators and the amount of capacity
available. In both cases, the Commission found that there were sufficient
competitive alternatives available to mitigate against any successful exer-
cise of market power by AT&T.2 In fact, the FCC found that to the extent
that barriers to entry continued to exist, they were not so great as to bar ef-
227fective competition, nor were they particular to AT&T.
220. Id. (citation omitted).
221. Motion of AT&T Corp. to be Declared Non-Dominant for International Service,
Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 17,963, 3 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 111 (1996) [hereinafterAT&T Order].
222. Id. para. 98. However, because there were four markets with de minimis revenues,
the Commission decided to forbear from imposing dominant carrier regulation on those
routes. Id. paras. 94-97.
223. As explained infra in Part IH.D, the FCC's concept of dominance was widely in-
consistent depending on its political mood dujour.
224. AT&T Order, supra note 221, paras. 37-39.
225. Id. paras. 42-47.
226. Id. paras. 48-51.
227. Id. paras. 56-57. While the Commission readily agreed "that U.S. international
calling prices are at the very high end of the 'zone of reasonableness' (indeed, the Com-
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As such, the Commission found that the "increasing availability of
both multiple operating agreements and of alternative means for U.S. fa-
cilities-based carriers to route their traffic support[ed] a finding to reclas-
sify AT&T as non-dominant on all but the four U.S. international routes"
on which it exercised its new authority to forbear from imposing dominant
228
carrier regulation.
b. Does the FCC View Competition/Antitrust Laws as Effective as
Regulation? The Telecom New Zealand ECO Case229
In this Order, the FCC granted, subject to certain conditions, Tele-
com New Zealand Limited's (TNZL) application to obtain Section 214
authority to acquire U.S. half-circuits in transoceanic dables and satellite
capacity in order to provide services between the United States and New
Zealand on a full-circuit basis.80 TNZL proposed to "terminate its facilities
at a point of interconnection on the West Coast of the United States, out-
side the geographic areas served by the local exchange telephone compa-
mission noted that residential IMTS pricing was (and continued to be) significantly higher
and more profitable than U.S. domestic long-distance calling prices, and some RITS prices
had risen over the past several years), the Commission concluded that because: (a) the rec-
ord in the ECO Order suggested that "high international calling prices result[ed] more from
problems with the structure, conduct and performance of the international market than from
market power unique to AT&T; [and (b) there was] evidence in the record to support [a]
conclusion that residential IMTS customers [were] very price "sensitive," and could be ex-
pected to switch international carriers in response to price promotions, the Commission
therefore found that "AT&T alone could not raise and sustain prices above a competitive
level for residential services without risking loss of its customers to its competitors." Id.
para. 83. In particular, the Commission stated that it was "especially concerned about the
apparently large profits that U.S. international carriers make as a result of imperfections in
the U.S. international market." Id. Indeed, the Commission found that "AT&T's competi-
tors, including WorldCom, could choose to sacrifice some of their profitability to increase
their market share, but have not done so." Id. (citing report that "WorldCom and its prede-
cessor companies, for example, provided a total return to investors of 57.3 percent per year
during the past decade." WALL ST. J., Feb. 19, 1996, at D2.) To remedy this situation, the
Commission stated that it would continue to take steps to "expedite the entry of additional
U.S. competitors to the U.S. international services market as provided for under the 1996
Act," because, in the Commission's own words, "[a]dditional competition is the best way to
reduce high U.S. international calling prices." Id. para. 86.
228. Id. para. 51. See also Streamlining Report and Order, supra note 114, para. 49.
There, the Commission streamlined its procedures for discontinuing international service
because it found that the "increase in the number of international carriers and competition in
international services means that customers can switch to another international carrier if
service is discontinued by their current carrier."
229. Telecom New Zealand Limited, Application for Authority under Section 214 of the
Communications Act of 1934, Order, Authorization and Certificate, 12 F.C.C.R. 19,379, 6
Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1 (1996).
230. Id.
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nies of Bell Atlantic Corporation and Ameritech Corporation," which held
indirect minority ownership interests in TNZL at the time of this Order.2'
The Commission reasoned that because TNZL was a "foreign car-
rier" within the meaning its rules, it had to examine TNZL's application
under the framework established in ECO-that is, whether it should apply
ECO if TNZL had sufficient market power in its home market that could
potentially be leveraged to the detriment of unaffiliated U.S. carriers pro-
232viding service to those countries. After reviewing: "(1) TNZL's market
share; (2) the supply elasticity of the market; (3) the demand elasticity of
TNZL's customers; and (4) TNZL's cost structure, size and resources, 233
the Commission concluded that because TNZL "controlled the only ubiq-
uitous local exchange network in New Zealand," TNZL therefore had mar-
ket power in the local access market and, as such, it was appropriate (and
necessary) to conduct an ECO analysis.3
The first public interest factor the Commission examined was
whether New Zealand had any legal barriers to entry for U.S. carriers to
provide international telecommunications services. After review, the
235Commission concluded that there were none. The Commission found
that all applicants (indigenous and foreign alike) seeking to provide inter-
national service in New Zealand simply had to register with, and pay a
registration fee to, the Communications Division of the Ministry of Com-
merce, "in circumstances where the applicant (other than a 'call-back' op-
erator) proposes to interconnect international facilities to the public
switched network. 236 The Commission further found that as of the time of
this Order, ten companies had registered as international service operators
in New Zealand (five of which were facilities-based) and, moreover, that
no applicant had been denied registration as an international service op-
erator as of the date of the Order.237
Next, the Commission examined New Zealand's terms and condi-
tions for interconnection. The Commission stated that while the New Zea-
land interconnection regime may not have been designed as the Commis-
sion preferred, it appeared that-based on existing laws and regulations,
the existence of multiple international facilities-based carriers (including
one with 23 percent market share), and most importantly on favorable toll
231. Id. para. 3 (citation omitted).
232. Id. para. 5.
233. Id. para. 8 (citations omitted).
234. Id. para. 9.
235. Id. para. 11.
236. Id. (citation omitted).
237. Id. para. 12.
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interconnection rates-U.S. carriers had the opportunity to obtain inter-
connection on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms for the provision of
international facilities-based service. 8 Indeed, the Commission stated that
while it was "concerned" that "New Zealand [did] not have standard rates
for toll interconnection, accompanied by a pricing methodology that en-
ables carriers seeking such interconnection to determine whether prices are
cost-based," the Commission nonetheless believed that "[o]ther aspects of
New Zealand's regulatory regime and market performance... weigh[ed]
in favor of finding that New Zealand satisfi[ed] this aspect of [the] ECO
test.
,2 39
Specifically, the Commission found that "New Zealand relies pri-
marily on its Commerce Act 1986-its general competition law-to regu-
late telecommunications."'24° "In particular, Section 36 of the statute pro-
hibits entities with a dominant position in a market from using their
position to restrict or eliminate competition., 241 In addition, the Commis-
sion noted that New Zealand had issued some sector-specific legislation,
including the Telecommunications Act of 1987, "which, along with subse-
quent amendments, liberalized the provision of telecommunications serv-
ices, authorized the government to regulate international services and re-
quired [incumbent carriers] to disclose financial and interconnection
information."'2 42 Moreover, the Commission found that the New Zealand
government has published several sets of regulations regarding telecom-
munications, including: (1) the Telecommunications (Disclosure) Regula-
tions of 1990; and (2) the Telecommunications (International Services)
Regulations of 1994.243 In addition, the Commission noted that while
"[i]nterconnection arrangements in New Zealand are negotiated on a pri-
vate contractual basis .... several factors [nonetheless] help protect against
discriminatory conduct."'244 In the FCC's view, such factors included:
(1) the legal requirement that [the incumbent carrier] provide intercon-
nection on terms that are. not unreasonably discriminatory; (2) public
and private remedies for anticompetitive conduct, and the apparent
willingness of the New Zealand government to utilize such public
. 245remedies;24
(3) the requirement that the incumbent carrier publish its prescribed serv-
238. Id. para. 17.
239. Id.
240. Id. para. 18.
241. Id. (citation omitted).
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. para. 19.
245. Id.
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ices and all interconnection agreements on a quarterly basis; and "(4)
emerging competition in the New Zealand local exchange market.,
246
Notwithstanding the above, the Commission could not resist taking
several cheap pot-shots at a country that decided to take a different regu-
latory approach than that adopted by the United States. To wit, even
though the FCC found that there was, in fact, adequate regulatory over-
sight in New Zealand (particularly when considered in combination with
the expanding list of competitors in the New Zealand international tele-
communications market), the FCC stated that it believed that "competition
in the New Zealand telecommunications market would be better served if
the government played a more direct role in overseeing interconnection
arrangements"'247 as the U.S. government had "concerns about the effec-
tiveness of the New Zealand regulatory regime." 24" Indeed, the FCC felt
compelled to comment that, in its humble, expert opinion, "competition
would be better assured if the Ministry took a more active regulatory ap-
proach." 249 The fact that the FCC made these statements while priding it-
self as the leader in "de-regulatory" and "procompetitive" initiatives is
comical at best.
c. ECO and Submarine Cable Landing Rights: The TLD and
C&W ECO Cases
If a foreign carrier wants to land an undersea cable onto U.S. shores,
this carrier must first obtain permission from the U.S. government before it
may do so. These situations are governed by the Cable Landing License
Act, which gives the President of the United States broad discretion to
grant, withhold, condition or revoke cable landing licenses if the President
determines
after due notice and hearing that such action will assist in securing
rights for the landing or operation of cables in foreign countries, or in
maintaining the rights or interests of the United States or of its citizens
in foreign countries, or will promote the security of the United States,
or may grant such license upon such terms as shall be necessary to as-
sure just and reasonable rates and service in the operation and use of
cables so licensed
250
By Executive Order, the Commission has been delegated the respon-
sibility for issuing cable landing licenses. This delegated authority is sub-
ject to the proviso, however, that "no such license shall be granted or re-
246. Id. (citations omitted).
247. Id. para. 20 (emphasis added).
248. Id. para. 35 (emphasis added).
249. Id. para. 34 (emphasis added).
250. 47 U.S.C. § 35 (1998).
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yoked by the Commission except after obtaining approval of the Secretary
of State and such advice from any executive department or establishment
of the Government as the Commission may deem necessary." 51
Thus, even though there is no "public interest" standard contained in
the Cable Landing License Act, the Commission decided to apply its ECO
test to these situations as well. For example, in Telefonica Larga Distancia
de Puerto Rico, Inc. (TLD), 2 the FCC denied TLD's applications to ac-
quire ownership interests in the COLUMBUS II Cable System
(COLUMBUS 1)-a common carrier cable-and for Section 214 author-
ity to provide service to Spain on COLUMBUS 11. Specifically, TLD,
"which [was] affiliated with Telefonica de Espafia, [applied] to have own-
ership interests as a licensee in a submarine cable landing in both the
United States and its home market, Spain. The ownership interests consist
of three minimum investment units ('MIUs') from the United States to
Spain to be jointly owned with Telefonica de Espafia." 53 Yet, because, in
the Commission's opinion, "U.S. carriers [were] denied effective competi-
tive opportunities to have ownership interests in cable facilities landing in
Spain and to operate as facilities-based international service providers in
Spain," " the Commission nonetheless denied TLD's application.
In defense of its actions, the FCC stated that its actions were fully in
accord with the coordinated positions of the U.S. State Department, the
Department of Defense, the National Telecommunications & Information
Administration, and the Office of U.S. Trade Representative, and that it
was also legally required to "consider whether granting a license will assist
in securing the rights for U.S. companies to land or operate cables in for-
eign countries."" 5 Moreover, even though the Commission conceded that it
did not address its market entry rules for applications under the Cable
Landing License Act in its ECO Order-and, in particular, that its analysis
as it applies to applications under the Cable Landing License Act "is simi-
lar but not identical to" its analysis under Sections 214 and 310(b)(4) of
the Act-this Order gave it "the opportunity to explain [its] historical ap-
proach to those types of applications, and how it relates to the effective
251. Exec. Order No. 10,530, 19 Fed. Reg. 2709,2711 (1954).
252. Telefonica Larga Distancia de Puerto Rico, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order,
12 F.C.C.R. 5173, 8 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 64 (1997) [hereinafter Telefonica Memorandum
Opinion and Order].
253. Id. para. 31. "A MIU is the minimum unit of investment for ownership in
COLUMBUS II. Each MIU contained 30 64 Kbit/s voice paths." Id. n.41.
254. Id. para. 2.
255. Id. para. 25 (citation omitted).
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competitive opportunities analysis adopted in the Foreign Carrier Entry
Order.
, 256
Once again, the FCC defined market power as "'the ability of the car-
rier to act anticompetitively against unaffiliated U.S. carriers through the
control of bottleneck services or facilities on the foreign end.'",27 Thus, be-
cause the Commission found that "U.S. carriers [were] forbidden from
having ownership interests in the Spanish end of international submarine
cable systems... Telefonica de Espafia, through its control of TLD,
[would] have ownership interests at both ends of the cable with monopoly
control at the Spanish end." 58 Because, in the Commission's view, there
would be no "equivalent rights... for U.S. carriers to have ownership in-
terests in submarine cables in Spain ... the Spanish market... [did] not
pass the first prong of its analysis that looks at the legal, or de jure, ability
of U.S. carriers to have ownership interests in submarine cables landing in
Spain." 259 Moreover, the FCC found that because TLD's ownership in
COLUMBUS II "would yield significant economic benefits to Puerto Ri-
can consumers that would outweigh [its] concerns about the lack of effec-
tive competitive opportunities for U.S. carriers to have ownership and op-
eration rights in the Spanish market," there were no countervailing reasons
260for it to grant this application.
Not content to apply its ECO test exclusively to landing applications
from common carrier undersea cables, the Commission announced that it
would also apply its ECO test to cable landing license applications from
private (i.e., noncommon carrier) submarine cables as well. As a test case
for this new policy shift, the Commission decided to use an application by
Cable & Wireless (C&W) to land a private undersea cable between the
256. Id. para. 26.
257. Id. para. 28.
258. Id. para. 32 (citation omitted).
259. Id.
260. Id. para. 33. In a related part of this Order, the FCC-for reasons similar to those
provided to support a denial of TLD's cable landing petition-also denied TLD's Section
214 application to provide IMTS service between the United States and Spain. Notwith-
standing Spain's failure of the FCC's ECO test, the Commission added that a denial was
also warranted in this case due to the FCC's concerns about Telefonica de Espaila's high
accounting rates for traffic between the United States and Spain. In the Commission's view,
not only were these rates much higher than other European countries' rates, but Telefonica
de Espafia's affiliates' rates to the United States were also "quite high." As such, the Com-
mission reminded the industry that while it declined to make cost-based accounting rates a
precondition to entry in the Foreign Carrier Entry Report and Order, it would consider the
presence of cost-based accounting rates as part of its overall public interest analysis. In the
Commission's view, therefore, the above-cost accounting rate of Telefonica de Espana was
simply another negative factor in its overall public interest analysis. Id. para. 39.
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2611United Kingdom and the United States. C&W responded, however, that
its application was not subject to an ECO analysis because the Commis-
sion previously determined in the Foreign Carrier Entry Report and Order
that the ECO analysis did not apply to "'domestic interexchange services,
enhanced services, separate satellite systems and other non-common car-
rier facilities."' 2
Citing its previous decision in the Telefonica Memorandum Opinion
and Order, the Commission rejected C&W's argument. Yet, while the
Commission recognized that C&W, unlike TLD, was requesting authority
to land and operate a noncommon carrier cable, the Commission nonethe-
less concluded that it should conduct an ECO analysis in this situation be-
cause the same principles "apply regardless of whether a carrier seeks to
own and operate a cable system on a common carrier or non-common car-
rier basis because all submarine cable applications are subject to the provi-
sions of the Cable Landing License Act.' 264 As such, the FCC looked to see
whether C&W could exercise market power-that is, whether C&W had
the ability "'to act anticompetitively against unaffiliated U.S. carriers
through the control of bottleneck services or facilities on the foreign
en d . , ,226
Upon review, the FCC found that at the time of this Order, there was
a "wide availability of circuits between the United States and the United
Kingdom."2' Moreover, the FCC found that the government of the United
Kingdom had just "issued licenses to forty-five new entrants, including a
number of U.S. carriers, to provide U.K. facilities-based service. 267 Be-
cause no further authorization was needed to land cables in the United
Kingdom under the terms of these licenses, the FCC also expected that
"new entrants [would] take advantage of this liberalization to construct and
operate new cable facilities in competition with BT and Mercury. '268 Ac-
cordingly, the FCC concluded that C&W did not have market power in the
United Kingdom, and, as such, it did not have to "reach the issue of
261. See Cable & Wireless, PLC., Application for a License to Land and Operate in the
U.S. a Private Submarine Fiber Optic Cable Extending Between the U.S. and the U.K., Ca-
ble Landing License, 12 F.C.C.R. 8516, 8 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 712 (1997).
262. Id. para. 19 (citing ECO Order, supra note 56).
263. Id. para. 22.
264. Id. para. 25 (citation omitted).
265. Id. para. 26 (citation omitted).
266. Id. para. 16 (citation omitted).
267. Id. para. 34.
268. Id.
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whether the United Kingdom affords U.S. carriers effective competitive
opportunities to'land and operate cable systems in the United Kingdom.
' 269
d. Who Needs Market Power To Apply ECO? The MAP and APC
PCS ECO Orders
270
On May 16, 1997, the FCC's International Bureau issued two Orders
which approved a foreign investment into a U.S. personal communications
services (PCS) company that would exceed the 25 percent benchmark
contained in Section 310(b)(4) of the Communications Act. In the first Or-
der, the Commission approved the investment by an Australian company
into MAP Mobile Communications, Inc., a U.S. PCS company; in the sec-
ond, the FCC approved the investment of a German company in APC PCS,
another U.S. PCS company. What is significant about these Orders is not
the fact that the FCC made no mention of the possibility of having either
the dominant firm from Australia or Germany leverage its foreign market
power into the U.S. PCS market, but the fact that in the absence of such a
concern, the FCC performed an ECO analysis of the German and Austra-
-- i 271
lian wireless markets nonetheless. What is also significant to note is that
the FCC decided to apply the reciprocal ECO test in these two situations
despite the fact that both Germany and Australia had signed on to the Feb-
272
ruary Accord and, in particular, the Regulatory Reference Paper.
3. Settlement Rate Disputes: The Telintar Trade War
The seeds of the Telintar "trade war" were first planted when
AT&T's settlement rate agreement with Telintar-the monopoly provider
of IMTS service in Argentina at the time of this Order271--expired, and the
parties could not come to a new agreement (under the previous contract,
269. Id.
270. MAP Mobile Comm., Inc. Petition for Declaratory Ruling Concerning Section
310(b)(4), Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 6109 (1997) [hereinafter MAP Order]; APC PCS d/b/a Am.
Personal Comm. Petition for Declaratory Ruling Concerning Section 310(b)(4) of the
Comm. Act of 1934, as amended, Declaratory Ruling and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 6535 (1997)
[hereinafter APC Declaratory Ruling and Order].
271. See MAP Order, supra note 270, para. 7; APC Declaratory Ruling and Order, su-
pra note 270, paras. 8-9.
272. See MAP Order, supra note 270, para. 19; APC Declaratory Ruling and Order, su-
pra note 270, paras. 17-18, 21; cf. ECO Order, supra note 56, para. 187 ("We do not be-
lieve it is unfair to hold foreign carriers accountable for the policies of their home govern-
ments.").
273. AT&T Corp., Proposed Extension of Accounting Rate Agreement for Switched
Voice Service with Arg., Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 18,014, para. 1 n.1 (1996). In addition,
'Telefonica of Argentina and Telecom Argentina, Argentina's two regional monopoly pro-
viders of local telephone service, each own[ed] 50 percent of Telintar" at the time of this
Order. Id.
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the parties had agreed to an accounting rate of $1.47 per minute).274 Al-
though the parties agreed to an interim extension of the contract, the par-
ties nonetheless immediately started to engage in surreptitious conduct
against each other.275
On Telintar's part, it allegedly: (a) blocked 180 of AT&T's circuits
over this period, thus preventing the use of those circuits by AT&T for
outbound U.S. international calls to Argentina; (b) "disabled AT&T's
USADirect@ Service from Argentina"; and (c) "rerouted a portion of
,276AT&T's return traffic to other carriers." Not without its own arsenal,
however, AT&T petitioned for, and in the end received, help from the U.S.
government in this matter. This help included communications from both
the State Department and the FCC to the Argentine regulator, the National
Telecommunications Commission (CNT).277 Unfortunately, the U.S. dip-
lomatic efforts failed, as Telintar continued to refuse to restore service.27'
With the failure of regulatory diplomacy, the United States-through
the FCC-decided to take stronger measures to protect its flagship tele-
phone company. As its opening salvo, the FCC announced to the IMTS
community that, "This Commission will not allow foreign monopolists to
undermine U.S. law, injure U.S. carriers or disadvantage U.S. consumers.
Telintar, of Argentina, is attempting to do just that. We must use our
regulatory authority to prevent this effort from being successful. 279 To
back this fiery rhetoric up, the Commission ordered all U.S. carriers to
suspend settlement payments to Telintar effective immediately and,
moreover, directed all U.S. carriers to continue this suspension until
AT&T's circuits were no longer blocked and its USADirect® Service was
restored.20
Yet, it appeared that the FCC only used rubber, rather than real bul-
lets in this skirmish. Specifically, Telintar would suffer no direct financial
damage because the FCC instructed U.S. carriers to pay Telintar any set-
274. Id. para. 4.
275. See id. paras. 4-5.
276. Id. para. 5.
277. Id. para. 6.
278. Id. The casualties of this trade war unfortunately spilled beyond the AT&T/Telintar
theater. As this fight was going on, Telintar allegedly refused to grant WorldCom adequate
facilities to terminate all of WorldCom's traffic destined for Argentina which forced
WorldCom to overflow as much as 25% of its traffic to other carriers for termination in Ar-
gentina. However, WorldCom did advise the Commission "that the additional capacity it
requires could be accomplished by means of circuit multiplication, and that no additional
investment in cable or satellite facilities [wa]s required." Id. para. 7.
279. Id. para. 1 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
280. Id. para. 15.
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2811tlements that had been withheld . Moreover, the Commission set a maxi-
mum interim accounting rate that U.S. carriers could pay of $1.43 per mi-
nute. While this rate was still higher than the FCC's prior maximum
benchmark rate of $1.20, this rate reflected the lowest level agreed to by
Telintar with a U.S. carrier (i.e., MCI and Sprint). In the FCC's view,
$1.20 "appear[ed] generous as an interim accounting rate.
' 282
When the dust cleared, however, the "power of the purse" won this
trade war in the end. Apparently finding that its immediate need for a con-
sistent and substantial stream of above-cost accounting rate revenue out-
weighed its willingness to stand on principle and suspend service indefi-
nitely as a matter of national pride, Telintar restored the blocked circuits.
As soon as it did, the FCC permitted U.S. carriers to resume payments.
D. Summary and Analysis
The cases analyzed in the preceding section run the full gamut be-
tween the good, the bad, and the ugly. On a high note, AT&T was finally
reclassified as a nondominant carrier, an Order that, especially when
placed in context with the other recent FCC items discussed herein, was
long overdue. As this Article has highlighted above, the Commission's
definition and application of its dominant carrier regulation have differed
greatly depending on the particular circumstances. To wit, at the time of
the AT&T Order, even though AT&T controlled neither foreign nor do-
mestic bottleneck facilities, AT&T's "dominance" meant that AT&T, for
every single international route, was subject to stringent FCC reporting re-
quirements, price cap regulation, and any new tariff AT&T filed was sub-
ject to a forty-five-day notice and comment period before it could go into
effect. Yet, in the Sprint Declaratory Ruling, where the investment of two
foreign, state-owned monopolists was involved, the Commission imposed
no price cap regulation and only required fourteen days notice and com-
284ment period for any new rate filings. Similarly, in BT/MCI I, where BT
readily admitted it was the dominant carrier in the United Kingdom at the
time of the initial transaction (indeed, BT/MCI I occurred well before the
United Kingdom started its recent comprehensive deregulation and pro-
competition initiative), the FCC said that it would not impose dominant
281. Id. para. 11.
282. Id. para. 12.
283. See FCC News Release, International Action AT&T Circuits to Argentina Reacti-
vated; Settlement Payments to Resume, Rep. No. IN 96-9, 1996 FCC LEXIS 1498 (Mar. 27,
1996).
284. These are essentially the same "dominant carrier" requirements the FCC imposed in
its ECO Order. See supra note 56.
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carrier regulation because of increasing effectiveness of competitive pres-
sures plus the effectiveness of the FCC's own ISP.
Unfortunately, everything seemed to go downhill from there. At bot-
tom, it appears that the Commission simply could not make up its mind as
to whether it wanted foreign firms to invest in U.S. carriers or even to en-
ter the U.S. market outright. For example, despite its reciprocity bravado,
the Commission's application of its ECO test in the Sprint Declaratory
Ruling turned out to be nothing more than a political sieve as the FCC
permitted the transaction to proceed essentially because France and Ger-
many stated "officially" that they were "committed to full competition." In
the case of New Zealand, the FCC had the hubris to tell the New Zealand
government that its exclusive reliance on market performance and compe-
tition laws were insufficient and that the FCC would prefer more govern-
ment intervention (i.e., regulation) in the market. Finally, in the Map Or-
der and APC Declaratory Ruling and Order, the FCC announced that
reciprocity concerns would trump the potential benefits consumers could
receive when somebody was actually willing to spend (and sink) the sub-
stantial amount of money necessary to construct additional submarine ca-
ble capacity in a market where demand increases exponentially on nearly a
daily basis.
In the end, therefore, the cases above demonstrate that the Commis-
sion's bravado, coupled with its ambivalence toward the effective en-
forcement of its ECO standard, apparently contributed positively to neither
consumer welfare nor promotion of U.S. investment abroad. Rather, such
policies unfortunately only succeeded in making everyone mad.
IV. THE WTO AND ITS AFTERMATH
A. General Overview
On February 15, 1997, under the auspices of the WTO, more than
sixty countries agreed to an international accord designed to promote
global competition for telecommunications services. The following Sec-
tion tries to explain exactly what the February Accord is-and, perhaps
more importantly, what it is not.
1. Brief History
The WTO Basic Telecommunications Agreement was concluded un-
der the framework established by the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS), which is one of the agreements negotiated in conjunc-
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tion with the creation of the WTO.2" For the first time, the GATS brought
trade in services within the international trading regime established for
trade in goods by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
after the Second World War. The GATS consists of general obligations
and specific sectoral commitments contained in individual Member
Schedules.
a. The GATS
The GATS is composed of three major components. The first com-
ponent consists of general obligations and disciplines which apply to all
WTO Members. The second component is comprised of specific commit-
ments relating to market access, national treatment, and other commit-
ments, which are embodied in individual WTO Member Schedules of Spe-
• . . 286
cific Commtments. The final component sets out exemptions from the
general obligations embodied in Lists of Article II (Most-Favoured-Nation
287(MFN)) Exemptions.
The most important of the general obligations and disciplines that
apply to all WTO Members is the requirement in Article II of the GATS to
accord MFN treatment to like services and service suppliers of all other
WTO Members, no matter what specific commitments a WTO Member
has made. MFN is essentially a nondiscrimination rule that requires each
WTO Member to treat like services and service suppliers from all other
285. The WTO came into being on January 1, 1995, pursuant to the Marrakesh Agree-
ment Establishing the World Trade Organization. Final Act Embodying the Results of the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, THE RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS 2 (GATT
Secretariat 1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter Final Act]. The Marrakesh Agreement
consists of multilateral agreements on trade in goods, services, intellectual property and
dispute settlement. See General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO Agreement], An-
nex 1B, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS:
THE LEGAL TEXTS 325 (GATT Secretariat 1994), 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994) [hereinafter
GATS]. There are currently about 130 Members of the WTO.
286. The Schedules of Specific Commitments form an integral part of the GATS pursu-
ant to Article XX of the GATS. The Schedules containing commitments on basic telecom-
munications services are available on the WTO Web page at <http://www.wto.org>. GATS,
supra note 285, art. XX.
287. The Annex on Article II Exemptions specifies the conditions under which a WTO
Member is exempted from its MFN obligations under paragraph 1 of Article II. The United
States excluded from its market access commitments and national treatment obligations and
took an MFN exemption for the provision of direct-broadcast satellite services, direct-to-
home satellite services and digital audio radio satellite services. GATS, Annex on Article II
Exemptions, WTO Agreement, Annex 1B, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS 352 (GATT Secretariat 1994), 33
I.L.M. 1196 (1994).
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WTO Members similarly.28 In addition to the MFN obligation, all WTO
Members undertake transparency obligations in accordance with Article I
(Transparency) of the GATS, which requires prompt publication of all
289laws and regulations applicable to the provision of services.
Many WTO Members, including the United States, undertook spe-
cific commitments with respect to market access and national treatment as
a result of the February Accord. GATS Article XVI (Market Access) re-
quires each WTO Member to "accord services and service suppliers of any
other [WTO] Member treatment no less favourable than that provided for
under the terms, limitations and conditions agreed and specified in its
Schedule" and to refrain from imposing certain types of quantitative re-
strictions, economic needs tests or local incorporation requirements, in
those sectors where the WTO Member has undertaken specific market ac-
cess commitments.290 This means that a Member may not maintain limits
such as the number of service suppliers or the corporate form in which a
service can be provided unless the Member has specifically listed such
limitations in its Schedule. Article XVII (National Treatment) is a nondis-
crimination rule that requires a WTO Member to treat like services and
service suppliers from other WTO Members no less favorably than it treats
its own services and service suppliers.2 1 Under GATS Articles II (MFN)
and XVII (National Treatment), treatment of domestic and foreign service
suppliers need not be identical to accord MFN or national treatment. The
critical aspect of an MFN or national treatment analysis is whether the
treatment accorded modifies the conditions of competition in favor of cer-
tain foreign or domestic suppliers. Thus, dissimilar treatment can be con-
sistent with MFN or national treatment obligations if it does not put the
foreign supplier at a competitive disadvantage to another foreign supplier
or a domestic supplier.
288. Article II of the GATS requires WTO Members to accord "to services and service
suppliers of any other [WTO] Member treatment no less favourable than that it accords to
like services and service suppliers of any other country." GATS, supra note 285, art. II.
289. See id. art. III.
290. Id. art. XVI. A quantitative restriction is a cap on the number of permitted suppli-
ers; an economic needs test is a limitation on the number of service suppliers based on an
assessment of whether the market will be able to absorb new service suppliers without harm
to existing service suppliers.
291. Article XVII states that "[i]n the sectors inscribed in its Schedule, and subject to
any conditions and qualifications set out therein, each Member shall accord to services and
service suppliers of any other Member, in respect of all measures affecting the supply of
services, treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its own like services and serv-
ice suppliers." IL art. XVII (citation omitted).
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51
b. The Inclusion of Telecommunications Under the GATS
At the conclusion of the negotiations creating the WTO in April
1994, the United States and other WTO Members made commitments to
allow market access for a broad range of services-including such diverse
industries as construction services, professional services (such as legal and
medical services), distribution services, and value-added (or enhanced)
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telecommunications services. Basic telecommunications, however, was
one of a limited number of service sectors for which negotiations were
extended beyond April 1994.293 WTO Members recognized the economic
importance of basic telecommunications services and established a sepa-
rate, sector-specific negotiation for these services which were scheduled to
conclude by April 30, 1996. Because the negotiations had made insuffi-
cient progress by that date, the WTO agreed to extend the deadline for
concluding the negotiations to February 15, 1997. This extension resulted
in the February Accord.294
292. The United States adopted the Commission's definition of enhanced services for
purposes of its GATS obligations, that is, "services, offered over common carrier transmis-
sion facilities ... which employ computer processing applications that act on the format,
content code, protocol or similar aspects of the subscriber's transmitted information; pro-
vide the subscriber additional, different, or restructured information; or involve subscriber
interaction with stored information." 47 C.F.R. § 64.702 (1997).
293. The other sectors were financial services and maritime services.
294. For a truly excellent summary of the negotiations, political back-stabbing and other
events leading up to the February Accord, see CYNTHmA A. BELTz, Tnn BORDERLESS
ECONOMY: GLOBAL TRADE RULES AND THE INTERNEr (AEI, forthcoming 1999). For exam-
ple, if the second round of WTO negotiations fell apart, the United States was fully pre-
pared to blame its "friendly neighbors to the north"-the Canadians-for seeking to impose
stringent indigenous content restrictions on broadcast and satellite services. See David Mol-
ony, U.S. Guns for Canada at WTO, COMM. WK. INT'L, Feb. 3, 1997, at 1. Not only is this
act alone outrageous (after all, how is one more choice-even if it is Canadian rules football
or repeats of SCTV's "Great White North"-actually bad for American consumers), but it
is especially hypocritical given Canada's long track record of broadcasting "acceptable"
children's educational programming-one of the Clinton/Gore/Hundt Administration's
primary regulatory agendas. See, e.g., Statement by FCC Commissioner Susan Ness on the
Death of Shari Lewis, 1998 WL 439268, Aug. 4, 1998 ("lament[ing]" that Shari Lewis "had
to go to Canada to find funding for educational children's programming"); see also Reed
Hundt, Statement on Westinghouse's Children's Educational Television Announcement,
WDC, Sept. 20, 1995 (visited Nov. 4, 1998) <http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Hundtl
spreh527.txt> ("Westinghouse's assurance that it will deliver three hours of children's edu-
cational TV on CBS underscores the tremendous importance of teaching our kids, instead of
harming them, with broadcast TV." In the words of President Clinton, American children
must not "lose 'countless opportunities to learn' from quality educational TV delivered by
commercial networks for free to every home in the country.") (Note: The FCC attempted to
act deceptively when Disney sought to acquire ABC/Cap Cities. Considering Disney's well-
documented record with creating children's programming, however, Mr. Hundt could only
argue that "it remain[ed] to be seen" whether Disney could still do something more to help
America's children.); Statement of Reed Hundt in Response to AT&T's Pledge of $150
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Those WTO Members that undertook market access commitments in
basic telecommunications services also became subject to the requirements
relating to domestic regulation of those services contained in Article VI
(Domestic Regulation). Pursuant to Article VI, paragraph 1, in sectors
where specific commitments are undertaken, domestic regulation must be
"administered in a reasonable, objective and impartial manner."295 Article
VI, paragraph 4 provides that a WTO Member could be in contravention of
its commitments if it applies measures that are not based on objective and
transparent criteria, are more burdensome than necessary, or restrict the
supply of the service.296 A WTO Member arguing, however, that a measure
does contravene Article VI, paragraph 4 also must show that application of
the measure could not have been reasonably expected at the time specific
commitments were made.2 7
The United States and fifty-four other countries also undertook addi-
tional specific commitments as a result of the negotiations in accordance
with Article XVIII of the GATS. 29 These additional commitments are the
much-heralded "pro-competitive" regulatory principles contained in a
document known as the "Reference Paper."299 The Reference Paper con-
tains principles relating to competition safeguards, interconnection, trans-
parency of licensing criteria, independence of the regulator, allocation of
scarce resources, and, of course, tiniversal service.Y Section 1 of the Ref-
erence Paper obligates a WTO Member to maintain appropriate measures
Million to Help Put the Nation's Schools on the Information Superhighway, 1995 FCC
LEXIS 7113, Oct. 31, 1995 ('We at the FCC hope that AT&T's gift," mysteriously made
concurrent with the FCC's decision to declare AT&T as a nondominant carrier for domestic
service "of free internet access and voice-mail to all the children of America will catalyze a
nationwide public/private partnership to network all classrooms as the President and Vice
President have challenged.").
295. GATS, supra note 285, art. VI, para. 1.
296. Id. para. 4.
297. Article VI, paragraph 5(a) states that a Member "shall not apply licensing and
qualification requirements and technical standards that nullify or impair [its] specific com-
mitments in a manner which... could not reasonably have been expected of that Member
at the time the specific commitments in those sectors were made." Id. para. 5(a).
298. Article XVIII states that 'Members may negotiate commitments with respect to
measures affecting trade in services not subject to scheduling under Articles XVI or XVII,
including those regarding qualifications, standards or licensing matters. Such commitments
shall be inscribed in a Member's Schedule." Id. art. XVIII.
299. The Reference Paper was distributed by the WTO Secretariat but never formally
issued as a WTO document. The text has been published in 36 I.L.M. 367. See Reference
Paper, FOURTH PROTOCOL TO THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN SERvIcEs 436 (WTO
1997), 36 I.L.M. 354, 367 (1997). Another 10 countries either agreed to adopt the Refer-
ence Paper principles in the future or inscribed their own regulatory principles in their
Schedules.
300. Id.
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"for the purpose of preventing suppliers who, alone or together, are a ma-
jor supplier from engaging in or continuing anti-competitive practices."'
With regard to licensing, the Reference Paper requires that all licensing
criteria and the terms and conditions of individual licenses be made pub-
licly available.3 2
The GATS also allows for exceptions to a WTO Member's obliga-
tions. Where these exceptions apply, a WTO Member may act inconsis-
tently with its MFN, national treatment, market access commitments, or
any other GATS obligation. Article XIV (General Exceptions) establishes
a limited set of exceptions including measures necessary to protect public
morals and order, protect human and animal health, or secure compliance
. 303
with nondiscriminatory laws and regulations. Article XIV bis (Security
Exceptions) permits a WTO Member to deviate from its GATS obligations
in order to protect its national security interests or to carry out any obliga-
tions under the U.N. Charter to maintain international peace and secu-
rity. 4
c. Enforcement of the February Accord
Again, it is extremely important to remember that the February Ac-
cord is a trade agreement-not a regulatory agreement. As such, the
commitments of the sixty-nine countries that participated in the WTO Ba-
sic Telecommunications Agreement are to be enforced through the WTO
dispute settlement process, and not before any one particular regulatory
301. Id. para. 1.1. "Major supplier" is defined in the Reference Paper as a "supplier
which has the ability to materially affect the terms of participation (having regard to price
and supply) in the relevant market for basic telecommunications services as a result of: (a)
control over essential facilities; or (b) use of its position in the market." Id. Anticompetitive
practices include: "(a) engaging in anti-competitive cross-subsidization; (b) using informa-
tion obtained from competitors with anti-competitive results; and (c) not making available
to other service suppliers on a timely basis technical information about essential facilities
and commercially relevant information which are necessary for them to provide services."
Id.
302. Id. para. 4. The Reference Paper also requires that the period of time normally re-
quired to reach a decision concerning an application for a license be made publicly avail-
able. Id. para. 4(a).
303. Article XIV states that "nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the
adoption or enforcement by any Member of measures: (a) necessary to protect public mor-
als or to maintain public order; (b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health; (c) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsis-
tent with the provisions of this Agreement .... GATS, supra note 285, art. XIV.
304. Article XIV bis states that "[n]othing in this Agreement shall be construed... (b)
to prevent any Member from taking any action which it considers necessary for the protec-
tion of its essential security interests.., or (c) to prevent any Member from taking any ac-
tion in pursuance of its obligations under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of
international peace and security." Id. art. XIV bis.
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commission (including the FCC).0 5 For example, if a WTO Member
(Country A) fails to give a carrier from Country B market access consistent
with that WTO Member's commitments or fails to implement the Refer-
ence Paper regulatory principles, then Country B may enforce those com-
mitments through the dispute settlement process at the WTO. The reme-
dies available if Country B prevails include, first, an obligation by Country
A to fulfill its market access commitments or implement the necessary
regulatory principles. If Country A fails to do so, then it is required to
compensate Country B in trade terms. Otherwise, Country B may take
compensatory trade action, first in the services sector, but if sufficient
compensatory trade action is not available in the-services sectors (e.g.,
telecommunications), then Country B would be authorized to take com-
pensatory action in the goods sector (e.g., widgets). Thus, if Country A, a
WTO Member that has committed to allow market access to provide inter-
national service, denied a license to a carrier from Country B on the
grounds of its nationality, then Country B would have the right to take a
dispute against Country A to the WTO. Similarly, if a dominant carrier in
Country A provided interconnection to carriers from Country B on less fa-
vorable terms than it provides to its own affiliates or to carriers from a
third country, then Country B could take a dispute to the WTO against
Country A for failing to maintain measures to ensure nondiscriminatory
interconnection.
2. Apparent International Policy Objectives
Notwithstanding the above, the real questions to ask are: what type of
IMTS market structure is supposed to emerge post-WTO, and what kind of
performance can we expect from this particular market structure? After re-
viewing the February Accord, the general policy objectives of the WTO
seem to be the following: (1) the creation of an IMTS market structure
characterized by multiple vertically integrated providers of bundled IMTS
telecommunications products and services; (2) full "point-to-point" service
between country-pairs; (3) the abolition of the international settlement-of-
accounts regime; (4) the abolition of economically expensive "anti-
whipsawing" provisions (i.e., the FCC's ISP); (5) elimination of domestic
monopolies; and, especially, (6) good market performance.306 The obvious
residual question, therefore, is whether the signatories to the February Ac-
305. GATS Article XXIII provides that any WTO Member may initiate a dispute settle-
ment if it believes that another Member has failed to carry out its obligations and commit-
ments. Id. art. XXIII.
306. See generally Rules and Policies on Foreign Participation in the U.S. Telecomm.
Market, Report and Order on Reconsideration, 12 F.C.C.R. 23,891, 10 Comm. Reg. (P &
F) 750 (1997) [hereinafter Foreign Participation Order].
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cord will implement both the letter and spirit of their respective commit-
ments, such that the end goals of the VTO can be achieved'0
B. Specific Provisions of the February Accord Regarding Switched
Telephone Service
The February Accord contains three different provisions relating to
telephone service: (1) provisions for opening "local" domestic markets; (2)
provisions for opening IMTS markets; and (3) the Regulatory ReferenceS 308
Paper briefly discussed above. Each provision is discussed in more detail
below.3°9
1. Entry into "Local" Markets
As a general proposition, ownership of local distribution facilities is
one of the quintessential elements for success in the telecommunications
industry. Under the February Accord, while it is indeed true that several
countries have in fact agreed to permit some kind of foreign ownership or
control of local telecommunications services and facilities by 1998, a close
examination of the WTO commitments reveals that investment into local
307. It is no coincidence that the end-policy objectives look remarkably similar to the
market structure envisioned by the 1996 Act. See Spiwak, Reconcentration, supra note 5
passim; Spiwak, Economic Analysis, supra note 18 passim. Indeed, U.S. officials and FCC
Orders were extremely quick to claim that the world had adopted the U.S. model in the
Regulatory Reference Paper as its "gold standard." See Reed Hundt, Statement of FCC
Chairman Reed Hundt Concerning WTO Agreement on Telecom Services, 1997 WL 63345
(Feb. 18, 1997). Unfortunately, given the current success record of the 1996 Act, I can see
why the world eliminated the gold standard.
308. The February Accord also contains a separate provision for satellite services. How-
ever, because the focus of this Article is on IMTS, and not satellite service, a thorough exe-
gesis of the WTO's satellite provisions and the FCC's implementation of those provisions
will not be discussed in detail here.
309. What is particularly interesting to note, however, is that contrary to the plethora of
press reports and politicians' statements that the February Accord accounts for approxi-
mately 90% of world telecommunications revenue, the actual scope and depth of the Febru-
ary Accord may be far less than suggested. See William J. Drake & Eli M. Noam, The WTO
Deal on Basic Telecommunications: Big Bang or Little Whimper?, 21 TELECOMM. POL'Y
799, 811 (1997) (While the February Accord is a "step in the right direction," it is "quite
another matter to declare it, as credit-grabbing victory bulletins did, a revolution, a break-
through, a telecommunications D-Day" because "the people directly involved in the draft-
ing, lobbying, analyzing, and implementing of the agreement have worked hard to seal the
deal, and it is therefore natural for them to believe that the result of their attention has been
a monumental change rather than a monumental effort."). To wit, the United States, Japan,
and the European Union alone account for 74% of total volume. Moreover, those signing
the agreement account for less than 55% of the WTO membership and the world's popula-
tion. In fact, as of the time of this writing, China and Russia are not signatories to the Feb-
ruary Accord, primarily because they are not even Members of the WTO. See BELTz, supra
note 294; Drake & Noam, supra at 811-12.
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markets may not be as easy as it may seem. That is to say, for those coun-
tries that committed to permit foreign ownership by 1998, most of those
countries prohibit foreign investment in the dominant incumbent provider.
Therefore, in these aforementioned countries, it appears that new entrants
are certainly welcome to invest in local facilities, but they must do so from
the ground up. Moreover, several countries did not promise to permit for-
eign ownership by January 1, 1998, but instead only agreed to permit for-
eign ownership beginning in 1999 or well beyond. Similarly, ten countries
agreed to permit only limited foreign ownership or control in certain tele-
communications services, and ten countries did not agree to permit foreign
control under any circumstances.
Under any conditions, however, entry into local markets is very ex-
pensive-for example, high sunk costs, incumbent's first-mover advan-
tage, subsidized "local" service, marketing costs, etc. 310 Indeed, as evi-
denced by the U.S. experience of cable overbuilding or the current struggle
to establish facilities-based competition for local telephone service, some-
times the economics just do not justify the investment and the risks. The
difficulty of creating a successful business case for local entry is often ex-
acerbated in those poor countries where there really is not much money to
be made providing service to, and keeping on the network thereafter, peo-
ple who probably cannot even afford to buy food-much less basic tele-
phone service.
2. Entry into IMTS Service
Unfortunately, so long as the huge revenue stream generated by
above-cost accounting rates continues, the real profit source in interna-
tional telecoms is the market for IMTS service. As such, it should also
come as no surprise that while thirty-one countries have in fact agreed to
"guarantee" market access to international telecommunications services
and facilities in 1998, a substantial number of countries on high-volume
routes only agreed to permit competition for IMTS service originating
from their markets until well into the future. These range from Peru (1999)
to the most egregious offer of Jamaica (2013).2 Moreover, six countries
310. George S. Ford, Opportunities for Local Exchange Competition Are Greatly Exag-
gerated, ELECrIC LIGHT & PoWER, Apr. 1998, at 20-21.
311. See C&W Sees Threat, THE JAMAICA GLEANER, Aug. 13, 1998 (visited Nov. 4,
1998) <http:1204.177.56.98/gleaner/19980813/fl.html> (reporting that the President and
Chief Executive Officer of Cable & Wireless Jamaica (a.k.a. "Telecommunications of Ja-
maica" or "ToJ") said that the monopoly on telecommunications enjoyed by the company
through its exclusive license was the only model which could deliver the infrastructure re-
quired by the country: "'We feel that the model has worked for Jamaica and is the only
model that will deliver the type of infrastructure that Jamaica will require to enter the 21st
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are open only for "selected" international service, and eight countries have
limited or no market access commitments for international service.
3. Regulatory Reference Paper
Finally, nearly seventy countries agreed to guarantee some or all of
the "pro-competitive" regulatory principles stated in the Regulatory Refer-
ence Paper. As mentioned above, these principles include the adoption of
competitive safeguards, interconnection, publicly available licensing crite-
ria, independent regulators, the "objective, timely, transparent and non-
discriminatory" allocation and use of "scarce resources" (e.g., frequencies,
numbers and rights-of-way) and, of course, universal service.312 It is im-
portant to note, however, that of the total number of these countries, only
fifty-four countries agreed to guarantee all of these regulatory principles.
Moreover, three countries only agreed to adopt an ill-defined amount of
the "pro-competitive" regulatory principles in the future, eight countries
agreed to adopt "some" amount of "pro-competitive" regulatory principles,
and three countries stated that they would make no additional regulatory
commitments.
It is also very important to note that among those countries which
agreed to guarantee these regulatory principles are many of the very coun-
tries that refused to agree to open their markets. As such, it would seem
that any international multilateral agreement in which, on one hand, the
signatory countries agree to uphold certain "pro-competitive regulatory
principles" yet, at the same time, these signatory countries also condone
those signatory countries which refuse to allow any new competitors to
enter their market, at first blush, the WTO agreement may not appear to be
really such a great bargain after all.
century."'); Bunny [Wailer] Bewails ToJ Monopoly, THE JAMAICA GLEANIER, Jan. 27, 1998
(visited Nov. 4, 1998) <http://www.204.177.56.98/gleaner/l19980127/news/n3.html>
("'Jamaica cannot afford to be observed as being alienated from international competitive-
ness in the telecommunications market by practices that corrupt goodwill and fair trade."').
312. Reference Paper, supra note 299. Several scholars are skeptical about the true effi-
cacy of the principles set forth in the Regulatory Reference Paper. For example, Drake and
Noam argue that:
Much is made over the acceptance of a regulatory reference model, making it
seem like the adoption of some universal charter of telecommunications freedom.
The reality is more modest. The "model" principles are mostly procedural, not
substantive. They speak of "independence" of the regulator, but this merely refers
to the independence from the monopolist, not from politics. As if formal inde-
pendence prevents capture. The principles speak of openness, public licensing
criteria, transparency, and objective allocation procedures. All this sounds good,
but is worth little because of its vagueness, if a government drags its feet. For ex-
ample, an openness of process can mean very little outside the public "sunshine"
on the senior staff level before ceremoniously reaching the official decision event.
Drake & Noam, supra note 309, at 816-17.
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Actually, such a conclusion may not necessarily be entirely correct.
At the end of the day, presumably no one would disagree that open mar-
kets are the best way to maximize consumer welfare. Yet as noted above
there are numerous countries that are, to state it politely, a bit recalcitrant
to open their markets. So long as these foreign incumbents' monopoly
power remains unchecked, therefore, foreign incumbents can engage in
whipsawing and other numerous price and non-price discrimination strate-
gies against or among U.S. carriers.313
Unfortunately, because the goal of promoting good market perform-
ance is not always complementary to the goal of promoting trade issues,
numerous constituencies are more concerned about promoting mercantile
agendas than focusing on the economic issues at hand. The problem of
such an arrogant approach is that it will not gain any ground. In these
situations, basic international law is pretty clear about enforcement op-
tions: barring evidence that one country is using its territory to stage a
military attack against another, one country may not interfere in the inter-
nal domestic affairs of another. Thus, the best way to mitigate unilateral,
strategic anticompetitive conduct for IMTS service is to convince the re-
calcitrant country to establish, inter alia, standard, cost-based accounting
rates and transparent regulation to mitigate against non-price discrimina-
tion. This is precisely what the hard-fought WTO Agreement (mainly at
U.S. insistence) achieves. As such, from an economic point of view,
whether or not a U.S.-based carrier has the ability to set up a rival network
in a WTO Member destination country should be irrelevant to the question
of whether a foreign firm can successfully engage in strategic conduct for
U.S.-originated traffic on that country-route. 4 Instead, substantial priority
should appropriately be dedicated to effective implementation of the WTO
regulatory principles; issues of entry can be addressed at a subsequent
time.
C. Exactly How Open Are U.S. Markets Post-WTO?
1. The FCC's Benchmarks Final Order
315
In this Benchmarks Order, the Commission unilaterally established
benchmarks to "govern the international settlement rates U.S. carriers may
pay foreign carriers to terminate international traffic originating in the
313. Spiwak, The Search for Meaningful Definitions, supra note 2, at 20.
314. Id.
315. International Settlement Rates, Report and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 19,806, 9 Comm.
Reg. (P & F) 1 (1997) [hereinafter Benchmarks Order], recons. pending, appeal filed, Or-
der, 13 F.C.C.R. 9188 (1998).
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United States. 316 In doing so, the Commission stated that the actions it
took in this Benchmarks Order, along with its Flexibility Order317 and its
proceedings implementing the February Accord, "substantially complete[d
its] plan to restructure the economics of the market for U.S. international
telecommunications services. 3" The Commission reasoned that this re-
structuring would "promote the low cost, technologically innovative inter-
connectivity serving all the world's consumers that should be the hallmark
of a Global Information Infrastructure., 319 While the Commission empha-
sized that it would prefer to achieve its goals through a multilateral agree-
ment on accounting rate reform, it argued that it must take unilateral action
to reform the current international settlement-of-accounts regime in order
to (a) fulfill its "duty to ensure reasonable rates for U.S. consumers"; 320 (b)
"allow consumers in all countries to receive higher quality service [and]
more service options"; 32' and (c) "benefit every carrier [regardless of na-
tionality] that provides international services by stimulating growth of
those [IMTS] services. '32
a. Pricing Methodology and Application
The Commission reaffirmed its belief that it should use the "Tariffed
Components Price" (TCP) methodology-that is, the tariffed prices carri-
ers charge to their own domestic customers-set forth in its International
Settlement Rates NPRM to establish settlement rate benchmarks in the ab-
sence of carrier-specific cost data.323 The Commission reasoned that by
316. Id. para. 1.
317. Flexibility Order, supra note 153.
318. Benchmarks Order, supra note 315, para. 1.
319. Id.
320. Id. para. 5.
321. Id. para. 7 (citation omitted).
322. Id. It is also interesting to note the FCC's opinion about the efficacy of participat-
ing in international organizations, especially the 1TU, to achieve accounting rate reform.
The Commission stated that while it had "contributed actively to the work of multilateral
organizations and agreed that [it] should continue to work vigorously with these organiza-
tions to pursue accounting rate reform .... [it] did not... agree that [its] contribution to
multilateral efforts should be [its] exclusive means of addressing accounting rate reform."
Id. Indeed, the Commission recognized that even though it must take action as the imple-
mentation process of the commitments made by the United States in the WTO Basic Tele-
communications Agreement moves forward, it nonetheless believed that it "must also take
action domestically in the interim to reduce settlement rates to a more cost-based level." Id.
Yet, according to the Commission, the unilateral action taken in this proceeding was
"concurrent with [its] continued efforts to achieve reform of the accounting rate system in
the ITU and other multilateral organizations." Id. para. 18 (citation omitted).
323. According to the Commission, it used the following three network components to
calculate the "tariffed component price" for each country basket: (1) the "international fa-
cility component," consisting of "international transmission facilities, both cable and satel-
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"[r]elying on publicly available tariff data and information published by
the ITU," it would both be able "to make some progress in achieving the
goal of cost-oriented settlement rates" and "treat foreign carriers fairly. '324
To wit, the Commission reasoned that the TCP methodology is appropriate
not only because it relies on carriers' publicly available "tariffed rates and
information published by the ITU," but because the TCP methodology is
"based on a framework that [already] received consensus approval from
the members of the ITU.''3" 5 Moreover, reasoned the Commission,
"[r]eliance on tariffed prices also means that U.S. carriers are treated
fairly" because "nondiscriminatory treatment of U.S. carriers would re-
quire that foreign carriers assess U.S. carriers a comparable charge for the
network elements necessary for international termination services as they
charge their own domestic customers." 26
Rather than establish country-specific benchmarks, however, the
Commission decided to establish benchmarks categories based on a par-
ticular country's level of economic development, as defined by gross na-
tional product (GNP) per capita: (1) "high income" countries (GNP per
capita of $8,956 or more); (2) "upper-middle income" countries (GNP per
capita of $2,896-$8,955); (3) "lower-middle income" countries (GNP per
capita of $726-$2,895); and (4) "lower income" countries (GNP per capita
of less than $726).327 The Commission opted for this "basket" approach be-
cause it believed that there were "certain shortcomings of using tariff data
that make reliance on each country's TCP to establish individual country
benchmarks inappropriate. ' 32 Using the simple average of the TCPs for all
lite, including the link to international switching facilities" (the Commission included "only
the half-circuit on the terminating end," however, because it reasoned that "originating car-
riers have traditionally been responsible for the half circuit on the originating end of a
call"); (2) the "international gateway component," consisting of "international switching
centers and associated transmission and signalling equipment"; and (3) a "national exten-
sion component," consisting of "national exchanges, national transmission, and the local
loop facilities used to distribute international service within a country." Id. para. 49.
324. Id. para. 66.
325. Id. para. 67 (citations omitted).
326. Id.
327. L para. 120.
328. Id. para. 101. According to the Commission, "[t]he primary shortcoming of using
tariff data to calculate settlement rate benchmarks is that any inefficiencies in foreign carri-
ers' tariffed prices are captured in its TCP." Id. para. 102. For example, the FCC maintained
that "carriers' tariffed prices in many cases do not reflect the underlying cost of providing
the tariffed service" because "the tariffs reflect social policies such as universal service
goals." Id. Similarly, argued the Commission, "many countries have rate structures that use
high international and domestic long distance charges to offset below-cost local service
fees.' Id.
Another reason the Commission believed that "tariffed rates reflect inefficiencies is
that, in many countries, telephone service is provided by monopoly carriers whose tariff
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countries for which it had data in each category, the Commission adopted
the following benchmark for each respective category:
329
upper income countries $0.15
upper-middle income countries $0.19
lower-middle income countries $0.19
lower income countries $0.23
However, notwithstanding the fact that the Commission stated that it
would "revise and update [its] benchmarks periodically as necessary,"
(according to the Commission, "periodic revisions are necessary to avoid
the problem in the future of [its] benchmarks not keeping pace with cost
reductions, and to encourage further movement toward cost-based settle-
ment rates"), 330 the Commission also stated---over substantial international
opposition-that it would not forbear from applying its settlement rate
benchmarks "on any route, including routes where competition has been
introduced."33' As support for this position, the Commission noted that be-
cause, as a general matter, "it will take time for vigorous competition to
create efficient pricing," it therefore could not "rely entirely on the devel-
opment of competitive markets to reduce settlement rates to more cost-
based levels in a timely manner.
3 32
As to why it would not forbear its benchmarks policy where there is
fully developed competition, the Commission dismissed opposing argu-
ments by presuming that in such circumstances, settlement rates would
likely be below its benchmarks. Thus, reasoned the Commission, "whether
the settlement rate benchmarks should be implemented on those routes
would be a moot question. 333 Moreover, the Commission maintained that
"with the increasing market liberalization that will result from implemen-
tation of countries' commitments made in the WTO Basic Telecom
rates may reflect protected market positions and an ability to charge prices not related to
underlying costs. Because tariffed rates vary widely as a result of these inefficiencies, simi-
larly situated countries could have substantially different individual TCPs." Id. (citation
omitted).
Moreover, reasoned the Commission, "using tariff data to calculate settlement rate
benchmarks" could be inaccurate because a foreign "country could attempt to influence the
level of its future benchmark rate by changing its carriers' tariff rates." Id.
329. Id. para. 111.
330. Id. para. 112 (citation omitted).
331. Id. para. 114 (emphasis added).
332. Id.
333. Id. para. 115.
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Agreement, [its] benchmarks policy [would] have minimal impact on most
WTO Member countries. '
Because the Commission lacked "the incremental cost data or a
costing methodology necessary to calculate a precise estimate of carriers'
incremental cost of terminating international traffic," however, the Com-
mission stated that it would "use the TCP methodology to calculate the top
end of its benchmark ranges. 335 As a proxy for the low end of its bench-
mark ranges, therefore, the Commission announced that it would instead
adopt a "best practice" rate that it would enforce "to the extent carriers
seek authorization to provide facilities-based service from the United
States to affiliated markets and to provide private line resale service" as a
safeguard when it detects a distortion in the U.S. market for IMTS. 336 Yet,
"[b]ecause [it] did not have [any] data to establish an accurate cost-based
rate," the Commission stated that it would "use a market-based rate as a
substitute. '337 In the Commission's words, this would be a "'best practice
rate' that is based on the lowest, commercially viable, settlement rate paid
today by U.S. carriers to an overseas carrier from a competitive market. '338
This "best practice" rate would "be a presumptive rate that [would] apply
in cases of market distortion until evidence is presented that other factors
should be taken into consideration."3 39 After review, the Commission
eventually settled on the rate of $0.08 offered by Sweden as a best practice
settlement rate.4
334. Id. As an interesting side note, the Commission rejected arguments that its bench-
marks policy is inconsistent with its flexibility policy. According to the Commission, its
flexibility policy is supposed to create a more "flexible regulatory framework that permits
carriers to take their international traffic off the traditional settlement system where effec-
tive competitive conditions permit and to negotiate alternatives for terminating international
calls that do not comply with the Commission's ISP." Id. para. 116. By contrast, argued the
Commission, "the goal of [its] benchmarks policy is to reduce settlement rates where mar-
ket forces have not led to more cost-based settlement rates." Id. The Commission stated,
however, that to the extent it "may in the future need to consider the application of the two
policies in individual circumstances, [it would] examine those situations at the time they
arise, on a case-by-case basis." Id. (citation omitted).
335. Id. para. 130.
336. Id. para. 132.
337. Id. para. 133.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id. para. 134. The Commission chose Sweden for a variety of factors. First, it found
that "the lowest settlement rate that U.S. carriers currently pay on average is with Sweden,
at 0.06 SDR ($0.08)." Id. (citation omitted). Second, the Commission concluded that this
rate is "commercially viable," in that "[Ihis rate [was] in effect since March 1996 and dur-
ing that time, Sweden had experienced sustainable, vibrant, procompetitive development of
its telecommunications industry." Id. Third, the Commission found that Sweden offered
"effective competitive opportunities ('ECO') for U.S. carriers to offer facilities-based
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b. Timing and Implementation
To implement these benchmarks, the Commission allotted a certain
period of time for U.S. carriers to negotiate settlement rates with their for-
eign correspondents for each income category discussed above. Signifi-
cantly, the Commission added one additional category for those "'least
telecommunications developed"' countries, where it would use teledensity
(as measured by lines per one hundred inhabitants) rather than GNP data.34'
The Commission reasoned that if a country has "a level of teledensity [that
is] less than one, [such data] is generally a strong indication that a coun-
try's telecommunications infrastructure is severely underdeveloped.
342
Depending on the specific country category, therefore, the Commission re-
quired U.S. carriers to negotiate settlement rates with their foreign corre-
spondents in accordance with the following schedule:343
carriers in upper income 1 year from implementation
countries of this Order3"
carriers in upper-middle 2 years from implementation
income countries of this Order
carriers in lower-middle 3 years from implementation
income countries of this Order
carriers in lower income 4 years from implementation
countries of this Order
carriers in countries with 5 years from implementation
teledensity less than 1 of this Order
In order to avoid the situation where U.S. carriers are unable to ne-
gotiate settlement rate reductions until the end of the applicable transition
period, however, the Commission stated that it would "expect"-but not
mandate-U.S. carriers to negotiate proportional annual reductions in set-
tlement rates.34" In particular, the Commission stated that it would expect
"U.S. carriers [to] negotiate twenty percent reductions annually of the
switched and private line services." Id. As such, concluded the Commission, the "vibrant
procompetitive development of the Swedish telecommunications sectors indicates that its
settlement rate with the United States is economically feasible and sustainable." Id.
341. Id. paras. 163-64.
342. Id. para. 164 (citation omitted).
343. Id. para. 165.
344. The Commission set the effective date of this Order as January 1, 1998, which is
the accepted implementation date of the WTO Accord on telecommunications. Id. para. 165
n.294.
345. Id. para. 172.
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spread between a carrier's current settlement rates and the relevant bench-
mark for carriers with a five year transition period. For carriers with a four
year transition period," an annual 25 percent reduction in the spread; "for
carriers with a three year transition period," an annual reduction of 33 per-
cent in the spread; and "for carriers with a two year transition period," an
346
annual reduction in the spread of 50 percent. Moreover, the Commission
stated that it would "consider providing additional transition time for ne-
gotiations with foreign carriers in countries for which annual reductions in
settlement rates, according to [its] transition schedule, would entail a loss
of greater than 20 percent of the country's annual telecommunications
revenue."
347
Moreover, it appeared that the Commission was just as unwavering
about the sanctity of its implementation schedule as it was about the sanc-
tity of the benchmark calculations themselves. For example, the Commis-
sion rejected arguments that its transition periods were unrealistic given
historical experience (including that of the United States). While the
Commission once again "recognize[d] that the transition to competition
takes time and requires difficult adjustments," the Commission simply re-
sponded that the transition periods required by this Order were "not in-
tended to be schedules for implementation of competition in other coun-
tries. Rather, they [were] intended to provide some time for carriers in all
countries, even those that have not introduced competition, to make the
adjustments necessary to transition to a more cost-based system of ac-
counting rates."3 48
Similarly, the Commission explicitly refused to adopt its original
proposal in its Notice "to provide additional flexibility in implementation
of the benchmarks beyond [its] transition periods for U.S. carriers and
their correspondents in developing countries"-even if those countries had
"demonstrated an actual commitment to fostering entry and promoting
competitive market environments.'3 49 The Commission gave two reasons
for its reversal. First, it believed that its "transition periods adequately take
into account the challenges faced by developing countries in moving to
more cost-based rates, especially given the longer transition periods [it]
adopt[ed] here for lower-middle income countries and countries with tele-
346. Id.
347. Id. para. 174 (citation omitted). However, the Commission did "emphasize... that
[it might] take enforcement action if a U.S. carrier is unable to make any progress in negoti-
ating settlement rate reductions during the transition periods and settlement rates remain
well in excess of [its] benchmarks." Id. para. 173.
348. Id. para. 168.
349. Id. para. 175 (citation omitted).
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density lower than one. 350 Second, it was "concerned that a policy which
would create an exemption based on market conditions in the destination
market... [might] not be consistent with [its] MFN obligations under the
GATS."
35
'
c. Enforcement
Notwithstanding the above, however, the Commission was a bit more
oblique as to actual enforcement mechanisms for its benchmark paradigm.
While the Commission stated that it would both: (a) identify recalcitrant
carriers and work with the responsible government authorities; 352 and (b)
"allow the U.S. international carrier to ask [it] to consider stronger
steps, 353 it declined in this particular Report and Order to "adopt any set
enforcement mechanism. 354 Instead, the Commission stated that it would
"consider the individual circumstances surrounding each carrier-initiated
petition to determine the appropriate enforcement action to take. ' 355 How-
ever, the Commission made clear that "whatever enforcement action [it]
take[s] with regard to a complaint about a foreign correspondent's unwill-
ingness to negotiate a settlement rate at or below the relevant benchmark[,
this action would] apply to all U.S. international carriers' dealings with
that foreign correspondent.
' 3
"
6
Yet, while the Commission was unwilling to impose a specific en-
forcement mechanism directly in this proceeding, it was willing to impose
two enforcement mechanisms ("competitive safeguards") indirectly. First,
the Commission stated that it would condition any and all facilities-based
switched and private line Section 214 authorizations (existing and pro-
350. Id. para. 176.
351. Id. (citation omitted). The Commission did state, however, that if, in the future,
there is an alternative "multilateral consensus on a substantially equivalent international
measure" that would achieve the United States' "goals of a cost-based system of settlements
in a timely manner, [then it would] waive enforcement of the benchmark settlement rates."
Id. para. 190; see also id. para. 5.
352. In particular, the Commission stated that it would convey its "concern about con-
tinued high settlement rates and the lack of meaningful progress," as well as "emphasize the
need for cooperation in achieving the goal of cost-based rates, enlist their active support in
achieving that goal, cite relevant ITU recommendations such as Recommendation D.140,
and suggest further discussions that may be necessary." Id. para. 185.
353. Id. para. 186. According to the Commission, "a U.S. international carrier may file a
petition that: (1) demonstrates that it has been unable to negotiate a settlement rate with its
foreign correspondent that complies with the rules and policies we adopt in this Order, and
(2) requests enforcement measures be taken to ensure that no U.S. carrier pays that foreign
correspondent an amount exceeding the lawful settlement rate benchmark." Id.
354. Id. para. 187.
355. Id.
356. Id. (citation omitted).
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spective) of carriers seeking to serve affiliated foreign markets from the
United States on the requirement that the affiliated foreign carrier offer all
"U.S. carriers a settlement rate [for] terminat[ing] U.S.-originated traffic
on the affiliated route that is at or below the relevant benchmark. 3 57 The
Commission stated that such a generic condition was necessary in order to
mitigate potential anticompetitive distortions in the U.S. market-in par-
358ticular, predatory price squeeze behavior.
To determine whether a market distortion has occurred, the Commis-
sion "establish[ed] a rebuttable presumption that a carrier has engaged in
price squeeze behavior that creates distortions in the U.S. market for IMTS
if... any of a carrier's tariffed collection rates on an affiliated route are
less than the carrier's average variable costs on that route., 35 9 "If any tar-
iffed collection rate is less than average variable costs, [the Commission
would] presume that the carrier is engaging in anticompetitive price
squeeze behavior and [as such would] take enforcement action."36° The
Commission stated that its presumption of market distortion could be re-
butted, however, if a carrier demonstrates that it had "an economically
justifiable reason for pricing below average variable costs" (e.g., "a carrier
could show that its pricing strategy is a time limited promotion in order to
gain market share).-"' If this presumption was triggered and not rebutted,
357. Id. para. 207. In fact, for those U.S. carriers that served affiliated markets with ex-
isting Section 214 certificates, the Commission required these affiliated carriers to negotiate
with all U.S. carriers and have "in effect within ninety days of the effective date of this Or-
der" a settlement rate for the affiliated route that is at or below the appropriate benchmark.
Id. para. 228 (emphasis added).
358. Id. paras. 208-16. What is particularly interesting to note is that the Commission
performed almost a perfect 180-degree reversal of its price squeeze analysis in the ECO Or-
der. As discussed supra, the Commission concluded in ECO that it was unnecessary to im-
pose such a condition to mitigate against a successful price squeeze. According to the
Commission, its "balance of considerations has changed significantly" since ECO because
its action in this proceeding "comes after the time period for implementation of 1TU Rec-
ommendation D.140 has concluded, yet settlement rates remain far above cost-based lev-
els." Id. para. 218. Against this backdrop, the Commission maintained that "the prospect of
freer entry into the U.S. market after January 1, 1998 pursuant to [its] rulemaking proposals
implementing the WTO Basic Telecom Agreement increases [its] concern that foreign car-
rier entry could create competitive distortions in the U.S. market." Id. Moreover, the Com-
mission argued that such a reversal was appropriate because "[it could] not find on that rec-
ord persuasive evidence that foreign carriers that entered [the U.S.] market pursuant to [its]
ECO framework could successfully engage in a price squeeze." Id. para. 217. The Commis-
sion nonetheless found that the concerns raised in the record in this proceeding were
"serious enough for [it] to take the preventive measure of adopting a Section 214 authoriza-
tion condition at this time." IdL para. 218.
359. Id. para. 224.
360. Id.
361. Id. para. 225.
For purposes of this bright line test, [the Commission] define[d] a carrier's aver-
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however, the FCC stated that it may, inter alia, require that "the settlement
rate of an affiliated carrier for the route be at a level equal to or below its
best practices rate" (again, $0.08), or revoke "the authorization of the car-
rier to serve the affiliated market.
362
The second Section 214 authorization condition the FCC imposed
was a requirement that any carrier that provides switched basic services
over international facilities-based or resold private lines between the
United States and foreign destination countries must ensure that the
"settlement rates for at least 50 percent of the settled U.S. billed traffic on
the route or routes are at or below the appropriate benchmark."3 63 Again,
the Commission warned that if it determines that competition "has been
distorted," it may, inter alia, "prohibit[] carriers from using their authori-
zations to provide switched services over private lines on that route until
settlement rates for at least 50 percent of the settled U.S. billed traffic on
the route are at or below the.., best practice rate of $0.08, or revocation
of the carrier's authorization."3 As a triggering mechanism, the Commis-
sion established a presumption that a "market distortion exists, [that is,]
inbound switched traffic is being diverted from the accounting rate system
to facilities-based or resold private lines, if the ratio of outbound (U.S.-
billed) to inbound (foreign-billed) settled traffic increases 10 or more per-
cent in two successive quarterly measurement periods.
' 365
age variable costs on the affiliated route as the carrier's net settlement rate plus
any originating access charges [because t]hese are the two primary expenses that a
carrier would not incur in the short term if it stopped providing IMTS from the
United States to its affiliated market... [and m]ost other expenses are fixed in the
short term, and would be incurred regardless of whether the carrier provided
service.
Id. para. 224 (citations omitted). The Commission reasoned that
recovery of average variable costs [was] an appropriate threshold standard for
determining the existence of price squeeze behavior because in the short run car-
riers can increase their profits (or minimize their losses) by offering service at a
price at or above average variable costs. Thus, any price below that floor would
indicate that the carrier is losing money by providing service. Alternatively, in the
case of a U.S. affiliate of a foreign carrier, any price below the floor could indi-
cate that the U.S. affiliate is attempting a price squeeze. Because the U.S. affili-
ate's net settlement payments are an intracorporate transfer and not a true cost, the
U.S. affiliate could price its service in the U.S. market below average variable
costs.
Id. para. 225.
362. Id. para. 231.
363. Id. para. 243.
364. Id.
365. Id. para. 249. As an example, the Commission stated that its "presumption of mar-
ket distortion would be met if the traffic ratio at the beginning of a quarterly measurement
period was 60 percent outbound traffic and 40 percent inbound traffic and the traffic ratio at
the end of the subsequent quarterly measurement period (i.e., six months later) had changed
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The Commission reasoned that such a condition was required in or-
der to mitigate the threat of "one-way bypass" of the international settle-
ment-of-accounts regime."6 Yet, as the Commission itself noted, "[tihe
provision of switched services over private lines has strong procompetitive
effects in the marketplace."3 67 Indeed, according to the Commission,
a more liberal policy with respect to resale of international private
lines will allow new entities to enter the market and offer services such
as JMTS. This new entry will compel carriers at both ends of the cir-
cuit to bring their prices closer to cost to avoid losing their current
customers to resale providers.
36
The Commission resolved its self-described "dilemma" by weighing
the "procompetitive effects of private line resale... against the market
distorting effects of one-way bypass. ' 369 After review, the Commission
held that the latter condition posed a greater public interest burden. Ac-
cording to the Commission, the "threat of one-way bypass of the account-
ing rate system cannot be ignored [because i]t has significant implications
for competition in the U.S. market for IMTS, and consequently, for U.S.
consumers. One-way bypass exacerbates the U.S. net settlements deficit
and ultimately increases the burden on U.S. ratepayers through higher rates
for IMTS." 370 The Commission also rejected the notion that the threat of
one-way bypass was ephemeral just because it had yet to take action
against carriers for such conduct. Quite to the contrary, the FCC argued
proudly that "[t]he reason [it had] been able to avoid one-way bypass in
the past [was its] equivalency policy. [The] policy permits private line re-
sale only to countries that afford resale opportunities equivalent to those
available under U.S. law. 371
2. The FCC's Foreign Participation Order (WTO Implementation
Proceeding)
372
In this Order, the FCC stated that it was abolishing its ECO test and
replacing it with an "open entry standard" for applicants from WTO Mem-373
ber countries. In particular, the Commission adopted, as a factor in its
public interest analysis, a rebuttable presumption that applications for
to 65 percent outbound traffic and 35 percent inbound traffic." Id.
366. Il para. 242.
367. Id.
368. Id. (citation omitted).
369. Id. (citation omitted).
370. Id.
371. Id.
372. Foreign Participation Order, supra note 306.
373. Id. para. 9.
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Section 214 authority from carriers of WTO Members do not pose con-
cerns that would justify denial of an application on competition grounds. 74
The FCC also adopted a "rebuttable presumption that such competitive
concerns are not raised by applications to land and operate submarine ca-
bles from WTO Members or by indirect ownership by entities from WTO
Members of common carrier and aeronautical radio licensees under Sec-
tion 310(b)(4) of the Act."375 Yet, despite substantial international objec-
tion, the Commission stated that it would, in appropriate situations, deny
entry to a WTO Member country if "other public interest factors" (i.e., the
general significance of the proposed entry to the promotion of competition
in the U.S. communications market, the presence of cost-based accounting
rates, and any national security, law enforcement, foreign policy and trade
policy concerns brought to its attention by the Executive Branch) war-
rant.176 The Commission was quick to disclaim, however, that "other publicinterest issues" would be present only in "very rare circumstances. '3V
374. Id. para. 69. Significantly, the Commission also concluded that it would apply its
post-WTO entry policy "equally to U.S. carrier investments in foreign carriers as well as
foreign carrier investments in U.S. carriers." Id. para. 70. The Commission recognized that
while it previously found in ECO that "it was unnecessary and contrary to the goals of that
proceeding to apply the ECO test to U.S carrier investments in foreign carriers" (indeed, the
Commission feared that the application of its ECO test on U.S. carriers would actually
'frustrate U.S. policy of encouraging foreign investment by U.S. companies"), its subse-
quent experience indicated that
there is a likelihood of competitive harm from an international carrier operating in
the U.S. market that possesses sufficient foreign market power in a market for
services necessary for the provision of U.S. international services to adversely af-
fect competition on the U.S. end of the route, regardless of whether the entity is
U.S. or foreign owned.
Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Of course, the fact that the Commission also feared
"that continuing to treat foreign carrier investments in U.S. carriers differently from U.S.
carrier investments in foreign carriers could be viewed as inconsistent with U.S. GATS ob-
ligations." Id. (citation omitted).
375. Id. para. 50.
376. Id. para. 65. For example, the FCC recognized that while foreign indirect invest-
ment in U.S. common carrier wireless markets is unlikely to raise anticompetitive dangers
(as those markets are, for the most part, wholly domestic and therefore, there is no possibil-
ity of leveraging foreign bottlenecks in order to create advantages for some competitors in
U.S. markets) and, in fact, could promote competition in the U.S. market, foreign owner-
ship of U.S. spectrum may raise national security concerns. As such, the FCC accepted the
FBI's concerns that even small investments in publicly traded securities could, if aggre-
gated, nevertheless create a degree of control or influence over a licensee that would be
contrary to U.S. national security or law enforcement interests that Executive Branch agen-
cies may need an opportunity to evaluate before a grant of section 310(b)(4) authority. The
FCC also found similar concerns for foreign ownership of aeronautical en route and fixed
services licenses. Id. paras. 111-18.
377. Id. para. 50. Moreover, given the substantial criticism received by the FCC that it
was inappropriately stepping beyond its mandate, the Commission was also quick to em-
phasize that it would only "make an independent decision on applications to be considered
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Notwithstanding the above, the Commission stated that because, in
its view, the circumstances that existed when it adopted its ECO and
Flexibility Orders did not change sufficiently with respect to non-WTO
Member countries, it continued "to serve the goals of [its] international
telecommunications policy to apply [its] ECO and equivalency tests in the
context of non-WTO Member countries. ''378 Significantly, the Commission
specifically rejected the argument that its sole focus in this proceeding
should have been on the "potential harm to competition in the U.S. mar-
kets." 379 In the FCC's view, "lilt continues to serve the public interest to
maintain policies directed at encouraging non-WTO Member countries to
open their telecommunications markets to competition. 380
Along a similar vein, the Commission also stated that it would hence-
forth apply the ECO test to a route whenever a carrier or its foreign affili-
ate, "without regard to whether the applicant, or its affiliate, is a U.S. car-
rier,... controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with a
carrier that has market power in a destination market, where that destina-
tion market is a non-WTO country. 38' In the Commission's opinion, as a
"more liberalized environment [emerges] from the WTO Basic Telecom-
munications Agreement, it will become increasingly difficult to define a
'U.S. carrier' for the purpose of distinguishing between U.S.-carrier and
foreign-carrier ownership of carriers," and, "[i]n light of those difficulties,
[it could] no longer rely on [its] greater ability to redress anticompetitive
conduct by U.S. carriers as compared to foreign carriers. 382
Again, the Commission specifically rejected the argument that the
application of the ECO test to third countries exceeds its statutory mandate
because when "a foreign carrier that controls bottleneck facilities controls,
is controlled by, or is under common control with a carrier that is affiliated
with a U.S. carrier, there is a danger that the bottleneck facilities will be
used to discriminate against unaffiliated U.S. carriers" and, absent the ap-
plication of its ECO test in these circumstances, the "U.S. affiliate of a for-
eign carrier that enters various markets through wholly owned subsidiaries
and [would] evaluate concerns raised by the Executive Branch agencies in light of all the
issues raised (and comments in response) in the context of a particular application." Id.
para. 66. The FCC was equally quick to point out, however, that it expected "that the Ex-
ecutive Branch [would] advise [it] of concerns relating to national security, law enforce-
ment, foreign policy, and trade concerns only in very rare circumstances, [and that those
concerns] ... must be communicated in writing and [would] be part of the public file in the
relevant proceeding." Id. (citation omitted).
378. Id. para. 124 (citation omitted).
379. Id. para. 125.
380. Id.
381. Id. para. 139.
382. Id. para. 140.
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would be able to serve all of those subsidiaries' routes." '383 In such a case,
reasoned the FCC, the "other subsidiaries would have the ability and in-
centive to use their market power to discriminate against unaffiliated U.S.
carriers by routing traffic in ways that take advantage of their market
power."3' 4 Moreover, reasoned the Commission, "applying the ECO test to
non-WTO countries [would] encourage non-WTO countries to open their
markets to competition in addition to privatizing their telecommunications
carriers" 385 In the FCC's opinion, "[b]ecause privatization without liber-
alization neither promotes competition nor reduces the risk of anticom-
petitive conduct, [its] goal is to encourage simultaneous privatization and
liberalization.... If the ECO test lowers the value of an exclusive ar-
rangement in a privatization, it would thereby encourage simultaneous lib-
eralization and privatization.
38 6
In light of this new "open entry" approach, the Commission stated
that it was appropriate to revisit, review, and modify its "competitive safe-
guards governing foreign-affiliated carrier provision of basic telecommu-
nications services in the U.S. market and, more broadly, U.S. carrier deal-
ings with foreign carriers."3 87 The Commission stated that it would, in
particular, focus its examination of its "rules preventing the exercise of
foreign market power in the U.S. market" in order "to monitor and detect
anticompetitive behavior in the U.S. market without imposing regulations
that are more burdensome than necessary." '388 According to the Commis-
sion, "[c]oncerns about potential anticompetitive conduct generally [would
be] triggered where one party has sufficient market power to cause harm to
competition and consumers in the U.S. market."389
Significantly, however, the Commission moved away from its defi-
nition of market power it used in previous international Orders (i.e., "'the
ability to act anticompetitively against unaffiliated U.S. carriers through
the control of bottleneck services or facilities on the route in question' )
3 9
to the more conventional definition of market power as "a carrier's ability
to raise price by restricting its output of services. ' 39' The Commission
maintained that such a clarification was necessary because the regulatory
framework it adopted in this proceeding focused "on dealings with foreign
383. Id. para. 141.
384. Id.
385. Id. para. 142.
386. Id.
387. Id. para. 143 (citation omitted).
388. Id.
389. Id. para. 144.
390. Id. (quoting ECO Order, supra note 56, para. 116).
391. Id. (citation omitted).
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carriers that possess sufficient market power on the foreign end of a U.S.
international route to affect competition adversely in the U.S. international
services market., 392 In particular,
"telecommunications services that originate or terminate in, or transit
the United States... includ[ing] the U.S. market for global, seamless
network services that increasingly are being used by U.S. businesses."
[The Commission's] primary concern in this proceeding, however, in-
volves the ability of U.S. carriers to terminate traffic on the foreign
end of an international route.3 93
Yet, despite the regulatory commitments agreed to in the February
Accord, the FCC rejected the view that it should eliminate competitive
safeguards altogether. In the FCC's opinion, absent effective regulation in
the U.S. market, "a foreign carrier with market power in an input market
on the foreign end of a U.S. international route [could] exercise, or lever-
age, that market power into the U.S. market to the detriment of competi-
tion and consumers. ' 3 4 Such anticompetitive conduct could, in the FCC's
view, include, inter alia, price discrimination, non-price discrimination,
and price squeeze behavior.395
The first competitive safeguard the Commission imposed was to
modify its "No Special Concessions" rule, under which U.S. carriers were
prohibited from entering into exclusive arrangements with any foreign car-
rier affecting traffic or revenue flows to or from the United States.396 Yet,
because the Commission again recognized "that special concessions
granted by a foreign carrier [could] serve the public interest in appropriate
circumstances" (e.g., "[s]uch arrangements... [could] involve innovative
services or operational efficiencies that reduce the rates for U.S. interna-
tional services or increase the quality of such services"), the Commission
modified its rule to prohibit only "U.S. carriers from agreeing to accept
special concessions granted by foreign carriers that possess market power
in a relevant market on the foreign end of a U.S. international route. 397 In
the FCC's view, such an approach "strike[s] an appropriate balance" be-
tween "encourag[ing] such arrangements," yet deterring arrangements that
result in an "unacceptable risk of harm to competition and consumers in
the U.S. international services market.
398
392. Id.
393. 1d. (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
394. Id. para. 145.
395. Id. paras. 145-49.
396. See 47 C.F.R. § 63.14 (1997).
397. Foreign Participation Order, supra note 306, para. 156 (citations omitted).
398. Id. (citation omitted).
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However, because the FCC believed that "determinations of market
power on the foreign end of an international route can involve extensive
analysis," the Commission decided to establish a "bright-line test." '99 This
test would be "a rebuttable presumption that foreign carriers with less than
50 percent market share in each relevant market on the foreign end lack
sufficient market power to affect competition adversely in the U.S. mar-
ket."4W "If a U.S. carrier seeks to use the under-50 percent market share
presumption as the basis to accept a special concession from a foreign car-
rier, it must file data with the Commission to substantiate that claim for the
relevant input markets on the foreign end of the international route."4'
In addition, the Commission found that it would be beneficial to de-
lineate the types of exclusive'arrangements that the modified No Special
Concessions rule would prohibit. After consideration, the FCC decided to
limit its No Special Concessions rule to "exclusive dealings involving
services, facilities, or functions on the foreign end of a U.S. international
route that are necessary for the provision of basic telecommunications
service." 2 In the Commission's view, the rule would therefore
prohibit any U.S. carrier from agreeing to accept from a foreign carrier
with market power any special concession not offered to similarly
situated U.S.-licensed carriers involving: (1) operating agreements for
the provision of basic services; (2) distribution arrangements or inter-
connection arrangements, including pricing, technical specifications,
functional capabilities, or other quality and operational characteristics,
such as provisioning and maintenance times; and (3) any information,
prior to public disclosure, about a foreign carrier's basic network
services that affects either the provision of basic or enhanced services
or interconnection to the foreign country's domestic network by U.S.
carriers or their U.S. customers. 03
399. Id. para. 159 (citation omitted).
400. Id. para. 161 (citation omitted).
401. Id. para. 163 (citation omitted). See id. paras. 156-62. Although the Commission
did not specify exactly what "share" it was concerned about (e.g., minutes? revenues? fa-
cilities?), it recognized correctly nonetheless that "market share is but one factor in a tradi-
tional market power analysis." Id. para. 161. Yet, because the Commission believed that
"market share data is more readily available" than other information, market share would
"serve as a sufficient approximation of foreign market power for purposes of satisfying [its]
rebuttable presumption." Id.
402. Id. para. 165. Unfortunately, this case was one of several "pavlovian" attempts by
the Commission to rely on market share as a bright-line test, even though using market
share as a bright-line test in these circumstances is a "tricky enterprise" at best. See, e.g.,
PHOENIX CENTER POLICY PAPER, supra note 10, at 32; Spiwak, Economic Analysis, supra
note 18, at 34 & n.14. Tragically, the European Union is not much better in this regard, where
the EC's blind reliance on market shares alone also has produced some truly absurd regulatory
decisions. See Mark Naftel, How Does One Say "Dominance" in European?, ANTITRUST
REP., Oct. 1997, at 2.
403. Foreign Participation Order, supra note 306, para. 165. Significantly, the Coin-
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Next, the Commission again believed it necessary to impose com-
petitive safeguards for those U.S. carriers affiliated with a foreign carrier
with market power in the destination market. As such, the Commission
stated that it would condition any authorization to serve an affiliated mar-
ket on the requirement that the foreign carrier offer U.S.-licensed interna-
tional carriers a settlement rate for the affiliated route at or below the rele-
vant benchmark adopted in the Benchmarks Order.4°4 Significantly,
however, the Commission "decline[d] to apply [its] settlement rate bench-
mark condition to switched resale providers." 405 The Commission ration-
alized this conclusion by noting that because its "goal in this proceeding
[was] to adopt a regulatory framework that is narrowly tailored to address
identifiable harms to competition and consumers in the U.S. market," it
approached "critically any request for conditions that would impose addi-
tional burdens on the manner in which companies could provide service to
the U.S. market and thereby provide consumers with additional choices."0
Specifically, the Commission stated it would not impose its bench-
marks condition on resellers because it did not find the same degree of
danger of anticompetitive effects resulting from a switched reseller's pro-
vision of service to an affiliated market as it did regarding the "ability of a
facilities-based U.S. affiliate of a foreign carrier to 'price squeeze' its
competitors because of its relationship with the foreign affiliate."W The
Commission gave two basic reasons in support of this conclusion. First,
the Commission believed that "a switched reseller has substantially less
incentive to engage in a predatory price squeeze strategy than a facilities-
based carrier."' 4 8 Second, the Commission believed that "it is easier to de-
tect a predatory price squeeze in the switched resale context than in the fa-
cilities-based context.9" Thus, reasoned the Commission, "[e]asier detec-
mission took great pains to clarify that its modified No Special Concessions rule would
prohibit "one-stop shopping." Id. para. 167. According to the Commission, "the rule does
not prevent a U.S. carrier and a foreign carrier from offering end-to-end services. It does,
however, prohibit U.S. carriers from entering into exclusive arrangements with certain car-
riers for certain services." Id. To illustrate this point, the FCC stated that, for example, "a
U.S. carrier cannot agree to enter an exclusive 'one-stop shopping' arrangement in which
the U.S. carrier acts as an agent on behalf of its U.S. customers in obtaining private line
service from a foreign carrier with market power, where the foreign carrier refuses to recog-
nize other U.S. carriers as agents." Id. In the Commission's view, "[tihis type of exclusive
arrangement would preclude competing U.S. carriers from serving an important segment of
the U.S. international services market." Id.
404. See discussion supra pp. 177-87 and note 315.
405. Foreign Participation Order, supra note 306, para. 194.
406. Id.
407. Id.
408. Id. para. 195.
409. Id.
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tion should deter switched resellers from attempting a predatory price
squeeze and will allow [it] or other authorities to take action in the event a
carrier does attempt a predatory price squeeze."410 Finally, the Commission
believed that the "benefits to consumers of additional new entrants and
existing switched resale providers in the U.S. market outweigh the mini-
mal risk to competition from a possible predatory price squeeze or other
anticompetitive behavior by a switched resale provider providing service
to an affiliated market.44'
Third, given the February Accord, the Commission found it appropri-
ate to modify the safeguards it applied to U.S. carriers classified as domi-
nant due to an affiliation with a foreign carrier that has market power in a
relevant market in the following ways: (1) the FCC replaced the fourteen-
day advance notice tariff filing requirement with a one-day advance notice
requirement and accorded these tariff filings a presumption of lawful-412
ness; (2) the FCC removed the prior approval requirement for circuit ad-
ditions or discontinuances on the dominant route; (3) the FCC required a
limited form of structural separation between a U.S. carrier and its foreign
affiliate;414 (4) the FCC retained its quarterly traffic and revenue reporting
410. Id.
411. Id.; see also id. paras. 193-94, 198-206.
412. See id. paras. 240-45. As discussed above, the Commission had recently modified
the tariff filing requirements it imposed on dominant and nondominant foreign-affiliated
IMTS carriers. In the former case, the FCC shortened the advance notice period for domi-
nant carriers to 14 days; in the latter case, the Commission shortened the advance notice
period for nondominant carriers of IMTS service to one day. Id. para. 242. Yet, while the
FCC recognized that "retaining the existing tariff filing requirements possibly could con-
strain the ability of a dominant foreign-affiliated carrier to engage in anticompetitive con-
duct," the Commission reasoned that "the fact that these requirements might help to deter
anticompetitive behavior [was] not, by itself, sufficient to retain these measures." Id. para.
243. In the Commission's view, "[it] should also consider whether and to what extent these
regulations would dampen competition and whether other regulatory provisions accomplish
the same objectives." Id.
After review, the Commission concluded that, on balance, "retaining the fourteen-day
notice period [would] significantly inhibit[] a dominant foreign-affiliated carrier's incentive
to reduce prices, because competitors can respond to pro-consumer price and service
changes before the tariff would become effective." Id. para. 244 (citation omitted). The
Commission believed that a "one-day notice period, coupled with a presumption of lawful-
ness, [would] provide carriers with additional flexibility to respond to customer demands.
To the extent that a foreign-affiliated carrier has the ability to engage in a predatory price
squeeze," however, the Commission maintained that "the existence of a tariff filing re-
quirement, regardless of the length of the advance notice, [would] serve to deter such be-
havior." Id. (citations omitted). Moreover, the Commission argued that "in the unlikely
event that a foreign-affiliated dominant carrier files an unlawful tariff, remedial action"--
either by complaint or on its own motion--"[could] be taken after the tariff becomes effec-
tive." Id. para. 245.
413. See id. paras. 246-51.
414. See id. paras. 252-69.
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requirement; 415 (5) the FCC replaced its provisioning and maintenance rec-
ord-keeping requirement with a quarterly reporting requirement that sum-
marizes the provisioning and maintenance services provided by the foreign
affiliate;41 6 and (6) the FCC required dominant carriers to file a quarterly
circuit status report.417 The FCC declined, however, to ban exclusive ar-
rangements involving joint marketing, customer steering, and the use of. ¢. .. 4181
foreign market telephone customer information.
Again, however, the Commission reaffirmed the appropriateness of
its unilateral policy perspective. For example, the Commission stated that
it would "not consider the effectiveness of foreign regulation as a separate
matter when making a determination of a foreign-affiliated carrier's regu-
latory classification" because "the benefits derived from such evaluations
[did not] outweigh the costs incurred. 419 In the Commission's opinion,
"such attempts at evaluating the effectiveness of regulation in a foreign
market impose significant burdens on the Commission," and its
"experience has shown that obtaining sufficiently reliable and timely in-
formation about a foreign regulatory regime is a difficult, resource-
intensive, and time-consuming process."
Similarly, the Commission stated that it would maintain its dominant
carrier safeguards for U.S. affiliates of foreign carriers from WTO Mem-
ber countries that agreed to adopt the regulatory principles contained in the
Reference Paper--even where the settlement rate may be within the FCC's
benchmark range-because, in the FCC's opinion, "removal of foreign
entry barriers alone will be insufficient to prevent foreign carriers with
market power from seeking to leverage their market power into the U.S.
market, especially in the short term. 42' According to the Commission, be-
cause the WTO Reference Paper "expressly provides that governments
have the right to adopt rules to prevent anticompetitive behavior by carri-
ers that, alone or together, control 'essential facilities or otherwise have the
ability to affect the market adversely,"' it was wholly appropriate for the
FCC to adopt an "open entry policy for carriers from WTO Member coun-
tries with an understanding that the public interest mandates that [it] en-
415. See id. paras. 270-73.
416. See ia- paras. 274-80.
417. See id. paras. 281-86.
418. See id. paras. 287-92.
419. Id. para. 230 (citations omitted).
420. Id. (citation omitted). The Commission did state, however, that "[i]n making a for-
eign market power determination. ... [it would] consider the presence and degree of barri-
ers to entry or expansion, which may relate to the foreign regulatory regime." Id. (citation
omitted).
421. Id. para. 237.
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sure against the leveraging of foreign market power into the U.S. mar-
ket." 422 Moreover, argued the FCC, even where a settlement rate may be
within the FCC's benchmark range, the "achievement of settlement rates
does not address all forms of anticompetitive conduct, such as non-price
discrimination, that [its] dominant carrier safeguards are intended to ad-
dress. 42 3
Finally, the Commission believed that it was also appropriate to
modify the framework it adopted in its Flexibility Order44 for approving
alternative settlement arrangements in light of the February Accord. As
such, the Commission stated that it would no longer apply its ECO test as
the threshold standard "for determining when to permit accounting rate
flexibility with carriers from WTO Member countries. ' 425 Instead, the
Commission established "a rebuttable presumption that flexibility is per-
mitted for carriers from WTO Member countries."426 In order to rebut its
presumption in favor of permitting flexibility, the Comnmission stated that
"a party must demonstrate that the foreign carrier is not subject to compe-
tition in its home market from multiple (more than one) facilities-based
carriers that possess the ability to terminate international traffic and serve
existing customers in the foreign market. ' 427 However, in order to mitigate
its residual concerns that a foreign carrier with market power may dis-
criminate among U.S. carriers in settlement rate negotiations--even if the
foreign carrier is subject to competition in its home market-the Commis-
sion retained the safeguards it imposed in its Flexibility Order.4z
3. The European Response
As demonstrated passim, the rest of the international community has
been-to state it politely--extremely dismayed and chagrined with the
FCC's unilateral neo-mercantile actions. Thus, in response to the FCC's
unilateral actions, on November 6, 1998, the international community-via
the Focus Group to ITU-T Study Group 3-submitted a "Final Report" re-
garding "Accounting Rate Principles for International Telephone Serv-
ice." 429 This International Telecommunication Union (ITU) Report, quite
422. Id. (citation omitted).
423. Id. para. 236 (citation omitted).
424. See discussion supra Part 1II.B.3 and note 153.
425. Id. para. 132.
426. Id.
427. Id. para. 307.
428. Id. para. 308; see id. paras. 302-12. For a detailed analysis of these safeguards, see
discussion supra pp. 144-45.
429. This Final Report takes the formal form of a new draft Annex E to ITU-T Recom-
mendation D.140 and is available at <http://www.itu.intlintsetlfocus/index.html>.
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deliberately, took a very different approach to settlement rate reductions
than the FCC's improper and arbitrary attempt to do so unilaterally. In the
ITU's own terse words:
The figures attained by applying the Focus Group's methodology con-
trast markedly with those that would be necessary if the FCC's
"Benchmark" methodology were applied. The FCC methodology
makes no allowance for dependence on net settlement payments. In
almost all cases the average rate of reduction necessary under the
FCC's methodology is steeper than even the worst case under the Fo-
cus Group methodology. In particular, for low-income countries, the
FCC's necessary rate of reduction would be between 22 and 28 percent
per year. For middle income countries, the necessary rate of reduction
is between 31 and 38 percent per year, while high income countries
would need to achieve a reduction equivalent to a 50 percent cut in one
year during the remaining three months of 1998. Application of the
FCC methodology would be particularly disadvantageous to small is-
land states especially for those such as [the] Cayman Islands, New
Caledonia or British Virgin Islands that are categorised as being high
income and which currently have settlement rates of around 0.3 SDR
per minute. In order to comply with the FCC benchmark for the upper
middle income group, they would be required to cut their settlement
rate to 0.112 SDR within three months. This represents an annualised
rate of reduction in excess of 95 percent! Overall, if the Focus Group
methodology is applied, the average rates of reduction that would need
to be applied by a typical (median) country / territory are around 6
percent per year (between 1999 and 2004) for an LDC or a low tele-
density country with a high dependence on net settlements ranges, 7
percent for small island states (between 1999 and 2001) and around 16
percent per year (between 1999 and 2001) for other countries. On the
other hand, if the FCC methodology is applied (for different target
year-ends between 1998 and 2002) the average necessary rate of re-
duction would be some 34 percent year. The FCC methodology im-
plies a rate of reduction which is at least twice as fast as that required
by the Focus Group methodology and, in some cases, is up to five
times faster.
430
Thus, in marked contrast to the FCC's "exacting" draconian unilat-
eral actions in which rates are prescribed arbitrarily, the ITU believes the
better way to obtain a "smoother transition path" is through "bilateral ne-
gotiations" using a wide variety of tools including, but not limited to:
(1) Staged reductions negotiated on the basis of volume-based set-
tlement rates;
(2) Staged reductions negotiated in absolute amounts (e.g., going
down by 0.1 SDR per year, rather than by the same percentage
430. See Methodological Note on Transition Paths to Cost-Orientation, Revision 1 of
Contribution from the ITU Secretariat, Nov. 9, 1998 (visited Nov. 16, 1998)
<http:llwww.itu.int/intsetlfocus/transition-path%20revl.pdf>.
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each year (i.e., the percentage reduction in the early years is less
dramatic than in the later years);
(3) Negotiating an agreement under which the accounting revenue
could be split in a manner which deviates from 50/50 by a few
percentage points-e.g., asymmetric arrangements could be
triggered if the net settlement payment were to fall by more than
a certain amount in any given year (According to the ITU, this
type of asymmetric arrangement could be negotiated in advance,
at any time during the transition period, but applied
retrospectively); and
432(4) Extending the transition period by mutual agreement.
Again, the ITU reiterated that:
These are only examples of the sort of the arrangement that could be
made to smoothen the transition period, for instance by making reve-
nue stabilisation measures to assist the Administration/ROA which is
the net recipient. The final report is not intended to be prescriptive.
431. In the ITU's view, applying asymmetric arrangements during the transition to cost
orientation may be appropriate because such mechanisms may both: (a) achieve a faster rate
of reduction in the total accounting rate; and (b) stimulate increases in the volume of traffic.
Moreover, as briefly alluded to above, the ITU would find it perfectly acceptable for an
asymmetric arrangement to be based on a prior agreement but applied retrospectively in the
event of a sudden fall in the net settlement payment in order to "cushion the impact of the
changing international telecommunications environment on those countries/territories
which are considered the most vulnerable." Id.
Finally, in addition to these proposed areas where asymmetric arrangements could be
applied, the ITU also acknowledged that regulators "in high teledensity countries may, on a
voluntary basis, offer cost-oriented call termination at cost-oriented rates without requiring
reciprocal treatment." Id. The ITU provided two reasons to support allowing the possibility
for this non-reciprocal treatment: First, the ITU recognized that because "many countries
have made commitments under the WTO agreements relating to basic telecommunications
to apply principles such as non-discrimination, national treatment and most-favoured nation
(MFN) status to market access, these same principles could, in theory, also be applied to the
termination of international traffic." Id. While the ITU conceded that this interpretation is
"not explicitly covered by the existing WTO agreements," this interpretation might be made
explicit by "new WTO agreements concluded during the lifetime of the transition period
(i.e., before 2001 or 2004)." Id. As the ITU further recognized, however, implementation
"would imply moving away from the bilateral regime of the ITU towards a multilateral ac-
cord," and it is "likely that such arrangements would be based on interconnection agree-
ments rather than on settlement rates." Id. Second, the ITU argued that "a non-reciprocal
commitment to call-termination at cost-oriented rates could be offered in order to enhance
Universal Access to telecommunications among the Least Developed Countries and other
countries/territories with low teledensity" because, in general terms, "these coun-
tries/territories produce very little outgoing international traffic." Id. Therefore, "the possi-
ble loss to the higher teledensity economy in offering this favourable treatment is likely to
be minimal." Id. Indeed, argued the ITU, "if the cost savings achieved by the low teleden-
sity country are passed on to its consumers in terms of lower collection charges, then the net
result could be a lower net settlement payable by the high teledensity country." Id.
432. Id.
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The exact form that a "smoother transition path" could take is better
left to bilateral negotiations.
433
D. Summary and Analysis
The cases examined in the preceding section represent perhaps the
nadir of FCC MTS policy decision-making. The passage of the Telecom-
munications Act of 1996 (1996 Act) and the conclusion of the February
Accord presented the Commission with a truly unique and once-in-a-
lifetime opportunity to lay, virtually tabula rasa, the foundations for an
underlying market structure conducive to tangible, competitive facilities-
based rivalry and only de minimis prophylactic regulation. Yet, because
the Commission tragically succumbed to both industry pressure and politi-
cal narcissism, the FCC squandered this unique opportunity because it at-
tempted improperly to play Metternich-style "power politics" rather than
attempting properly to seize this singular opportunity to maximize con-
sumer welfare a la Grotius. Critiques of the most glaring examples are
outlined below.
1. Problem No. 1: "Mercantilism Rising"-that is, It Is Arguably
More Difficult To Enter U.S. Markets Post-WTO than It Was
Under ECO
As highlighted in Part IlI.A.3 above, the FCC stated specifically in its
ECO Order that it would not make the presence of cost-based accounting
rates a per se precondition of entry. Rather, the FCC would permit foreign
entry to occur if it found either: (a) that U.S. carriers could avail them-
selves of "effective competitive opportunities" in the foreign destination
market; and (b) even in the absence of such effective competitive opportu-
nities, if it found that certain countervailing "public interest factors" were
present.434 In the Commission's recent Foreign Participation Order, how-
ever, the FCC decided to apply a completely opposite standard for foreign
entry into U.S. markets. 435 That is to say, in its Foreign Participation Or-
der, the FCC stated specifically that it would not undertake any analysis of
the basic economic conditions and structure of foreign markets of WTO
Member countries (and, in particular, the effectiveness of regulation or
other protections on the foreign end), but that it would simply charge a
substantial entry fee-that is, the FCC's infamous "benchmark condi-
433. Id. (emphasis added).
434. See, e.g., Sprint Declaratory Ruling and Order, supra note 205.
435. Foreign Participation Order, supra note 306.
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tion"-to any WTO Member country that wants to participate in U.S. mar-
kets.436
Yet, because the FCC stated specifically that it would not undertake
any analysis of the basic economic conditions and the structure of foreign
markets of WTO Member countries (and, in particular, the effectiveness of
regulation or other projections on the other end), then any time the FCC
classifies a firm as a "dominant" carrier (and with such classification, the
additional regulatory constraints associated with this status) afortiori sim-
437ply has no analytical foundation. That is, without performing an eco-
nomic analysis to determine whether a firm has the ability to raise prices
anticompetitively or restrict output, the FCC has essentially reduced the
concept of "dominance" to nothing more than "I don't like you.' '438 Ac-
cordingly, although it may prima facie appear that entry into U.S. markets
is easier post-WTO, the cases above indicate that due to the myriad of
complex (and not too subtly hidden) new regulatory hurdles that foreign
firms must nonetheless overcome, there is a strong argument that these ad-
ditional regulatory compliance costs actually make the process far more
difficult than before. Given the above, therefore, perhaps the more appro-
priate and accurate nomenclature to describe the FCC's attempt to make its
rules consistent with the United States' WTO obligations should be the
("We don't want any") Foreign Participation Order.
2. Problem No. 2: Despite Rhetoric, FCC Orders Reveal that the
United States Apparently Has Little Desire To Move to a Full-
Circuit World and Eliminate the International Settlement-of-
Accounts Regime
The cases discussed in the preceding section are replete with prolific
pronouncements from the FCC about how the world is moving away from
monopolies to "competitive" markets-in particular, IMTS country-route
436. Id. para. 230. As noted in Part 1V.C.2 supra, those non-WTO Member countries
that want to enter U.S. telecommunications markets (e.g., China and Russia) will be subject
to the worst of both regulatory worlds-an ECO analysis and the mandatory acceptance of
the Benchmarks condition. But cf. id. paras. 125-26 ("Since 1995, our application of the
ECO test has provided incentives for foreign governments to allow U.S. participation in
their markets, and it played a part in the WTO negotiations that resulted in the Basic Tele-
com Agreement. We believe that continuing to apply the ECO test to non-WTO Member
countries may encourage some of those countries to take unilateral or bilateral steps toward
opening their markets to competition and may provide incentives for them to join the
WTO.").
437. But cf. Motion of AT&T Corp. to be Reclassified as a Non-Dominant Carrier, Or-
der, 11 F.C.C.R. 3271, 1 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 63 (1995).
438. See supra note 83; Spiwak, The Search for Meaningful Definitions, supra note 2, at
25 n.15.
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markets characterized by: (a) numerous suppliers (with each carrier using
their own full-circuits), (b) standard cost-based interconnection rates, and
(c) a transparent and independent regulator on both the originating and
terminating end of the routes and, with this purported competition, the
elimination of (if not only a de minimis requirement for) both the interna-
tional settlement-of-accounts regime and the Commission's ISP (replete
with proportionate return requirements). While this vision is certainly a
worthy social goal, once practitioners read past the introductory sections of
these extremely lengthy Orders where these rhetorical "sound-bites" are
contained, it unfortunately appears that the substance of the FCC's policies
are never intended to reach this purported outcome.
In particular, the cases discussed above appear to indicate that despite
its "pro-competition" rhetoric, the FCC nonetheless intends to continue to
unilaterally impose settlement rate "benchmarks" and maintain its ISP in a
full-circuit world. The problem with this policy approach, however, is that
it is wholly inapposite to the very reasons the international community
agreed to the February Accord in the first place-that is, once Member
countries fully implement all of the regulatory principles contained in the
Reference Paper, the international settlement-of-accounts regime is osten-
sibly supposed to be eliminated. Likewise, any unilateral regulation by the
FCC to impose benchmarks to constrain the settlement-of-accounts regime
and to perpetuate its ISP should, afortiori, essentially be unwarranted un-
der such a market structure as well.
To get around this metaphysical inconvenience, the Orders discussed
above reveal that the FCC's policy response is simply to make the requi-
site conditions precedent for "flexibility" as difficult as possible to satisfy.
For example, under the FCC's "No Special Concessions" rule, while joint
ownership of end-to-end facilities is prohibited, it is apparently perfectly
acceptable under current FCC rules to have a single firm own the entire
full circuit using two affiliates-one U.S., the other foreign-each affiliate
owning 100 percent of its respective "half' of the circuit. Under this ar-
rangement, however, the two affiliates are nonetheless forced to corre-
spond with each other using the traditional international settlement-of-
accounts regime and, a fortiori, the FCC's benchmarks. Of course, while
the parent carrier is certainly welcome to petition the FCC for "flexibility"
on that route, the FCC nonetheless imposes benchmarks on a portion of
"flexible" traffic; it therefore appears that the FCC never intends to let
firms out of the very regime it is allegedly trying so hard to eliminate.
To readers unfamiliar with the inner politics of the IMTS business, it
does indeed seem a bit incredulous that the FCC would actually seek to
circumvent the very policy outcome it has publicly promised to achieve.
There are, however, several explanations for this paradoxical behavior.
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First, contrary to their public admonitions, the large, "traditional" U.S. car-
riers actually tend to like the ISP and would therefore like to see it re-
tained. Why? Because under oligopolistic market conditions, carriers'
profits rise with a coordinated increase in price/cost margins across all
competitors-that is, a publicly known, date-certain reduction in termina-
tion prices provides a coordinated increase in price/cost margins across the
industry.439 Moreover, because it is highly unlikely in the short-term that
there will be either a radical redistribution of market share among the big
firms or a mysterious, radical jump in minutes, the ISP provides a very
convenient mechanism for corporate finance officers to forecast somewhat
accurately their firm's expected revenue stream.
It must also be noted, however, that it is not appropriate to lay the
entire blame for industry pressure to perpetuate the ISP upon the collective
feet of the big U.S. IMTS carriers-that is, because proportionate return
favors carriers with small market share, new entrants are also likely to seek
to perpetuate such a regime."0 Finally, because it is a well-known (but
nonetheless unfortunate) fact that regulators are only truly happy when
they have something to regulate, if those firms subject to the regulator's
jurisdiction are actually begging to be thrown voluntarily into the prover-
bial "briar patch," then what self-respecting regulator could really refuse
such a generous offer?44'
439. See Douglas A. Galbi, Cross-Border Rent Shifting in International Telecommuni-
cations (INFORMATION ECONOMICS & POL'Y, forthcoming Nov. 1998) (manuscript at 20-22,
on file with author).
440. Id.
441. See Spiwak, The Search for Meaningful Definitions, supra note 2, at 1-12; Frank H.
Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term: Foreword: The Court and the Economic
System, 98 HARv. L. REv. 4, 15-16 (1984) ("People demand laws just as they demand
automobiles, and some people demand more effectively than others. Laws that benefit the
people in common are hard to enact because no one can obtain very much of the benefit of
lobbying for or preserving such laws." Easterbrook, supra, at 15. As such, because
"cohesive groups can get more for themselves by restricting competition and appropriating
rents than by seeking rules that enhance the welfare of all .... we should expect regulatory
programs and other statutes to benefit the regulated group .... Id. at 16. Accordingly,
these groups "need not 'capture' the programs, because they owned them all along. The
burgeoning evidence showing that regulatory programs increase prices for consumers and
profits for producers supports this understanding." (emphasis added and citations omit-
ted)); see also George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELt. J. ECON. &
MGMT. ScI. 3 (1971). It would seem, therefore, that U.S. carriers are now protected by
"market-friendly" regulation.
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3. Problem No. 3: Bringing Settlement Rates in Line with "Costs"
Does Not afortiori Mean that Either: (a) Prices Will Decline; or
(b) Telecom Providers' Revenues Will Increase
Under the cases outlined supra, it appears that the following logic
underlies the FCC's actions.
(1) Settlement rates are "above costs";
(2) Regulation can bring settlement rates in line with "costs";
(3) Once settlement rates are in line with costs, collection rates to
end-users will fall;
(4) A reduction in end-user rates will spur an increase in demand;
(5) An increase in demand will cause providers' net revenue to
rise;
(6) The FCC's policies are a good idea because both carriers and
consumers will be better off in the long run.
Wrong. First, even if the overall logic of this paradigm were true, because
the FCC has deliberately failed to articulate exactly what "costs" it is
talking about, it is metaphysically impossible to bring anything into line• 442
that is ephemeral at best. Instead, the concept of economic costs appears
to be tragically reduced to yet another regulatory term of convenience to
facilitate predetermined social outcomes. 443
Moreover, the FCC should be careful for what it wishes. As dis-
cussed below, the FCC has taken great pains to hide both the scope and
scale of the economic costs relating to its current flawed and controversial
universal service program. Much to everyone's surprise, however, the FCC
recently won one battle relating to universal service in court, where it con-
vinced the Eighth Circuit that access charges (the domestic version of set-
tlement rates) imposed on long-distance providers that include LECs' uni-
versal service costs are not "above-cost" "since universal service
contributions are a real cost of doing business."44 Yet, if the logic of the
Eighth Circuit is followed, then current settlement rates are similarly not
442. See, e.g., City of Holyoke Gas & Electric Dept. v. FERC, 954 F.2d 740, 743 (D.C.
Cir. 1992) ("Since it is already doing the relevant calculation, it is a small matter to abide by
the injunction of the arithmetic teacher Show your work! For the Commission to do less de-
prives the [consumer] of a rational explanation of its decision.").
443. See, e.g., Adri den Broeder, KPN Must Eliminate Corporate Discounts Says Regu-
lator, TotalTele.Com (Oct. 2, 1998) (visited Nov. 1, 1998) <http://www.totaltele.com/
news/view.asp?articleID=19554&Pub=Tr> ("Dutch telecommunications regulator OPTA
said telecommunications company Royal KPN NV must eliminate discounts for corporate
telephone-service clients by January 1, and base its charges on costs.").
444. Southwestern Bell Telephone v. FCC, 153 F.3d 523, 554 (8th Cir. 1998) (emphasis
added).
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"above-cost," since international settlement rates are also simply "a real
cost of doing business."
More significant, however, is the FCC's misunderstanding about the
relationship between per-minute prices for international calls and the in-
ternational settlement-of-accounts regime. Foreign carriers and regulators
(i.e., parties reaping the benefits from the above-cost settlement rates) are
unsurprisingly reluctant to reduce settlement rates. Yet, even though eco-
nomic theory indicates that prices are related to cost, for U.S. carriers the
settlement rate does not measure the settlement cost of providing a minute
of IMTS service. With multiple carriers and proportionate returns, the cost
relevant to the setting of prices is not only a function of the settlement rate
but of the input-output ratio (the ratio of inbound to outbound IMTS traf-
fic) and the carrier's market share.45 Only for a monopolist is the settle-
ment rate equal to the marginal settlement cost of the carrier. Given the ab-
sence of monopoly in the United States, therefore, there is no reason to
expect that the IMTS prices of U.S. carriers should be directly related to
the settlement rate. In other countries, however, where monopoly is
prevalent, the marginal settlement cost is the settlement rate, and, as such,
any reduction in the settlement rate will unambiguously reduce the mar-
ginal settlement cost of the carrier, other things constant.4 Thus, rather
than develop constructive solutions for the problem, the debate over the
relationship between prices and cost tragically continues to be fueled by
the FCC's lack of understanding of what the true settlement costs are.
445. Specifically, the marginal settlement cost is S.[l - I0.(1 - w)] where S is the settle-
ment rate, 10 is the input-output ratio, and w is the market share of the carrier. Note that for
a monopolist, (where w = 1), the marginal settlement cost is equal to the settlement rate.
Given proportionate returns, the cost function of the U.S. carrier to a particular country is
S-q - S.F(qlQ) where q is the carrier's outbound minutes, F is the industry inbound minutes,
and Q is the industry outbound minutes so that qIQ is the market share of the carrier. I am
grateful to George Ford, MCI Worldcom and Adjunct Fellow of the Phoenix Center, for
this economic analysis.
446. The common argument proffered by foreign carriers and regulators against the re-
duction of settlement rates that U.S. carrier's IMTS prices bear no relationship to the set-
tlement rate (since prices are not related to the settlement rates) and therefore, reductions in
the settlement rates offer no benefit is equally specious. Under basic economic theory, the
reduction of a price or rate substantially above marginal cost is unambiguously welfare im-
proving.
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4. Problem No. 4: The FCC Apparently Believes that the Mere
Potential for Foreign Carriers To Think "Evil Thoughts" Is
Sufficient Justification To Impose Stringent Regulation as a
Precondition of Entry
a. Price Squeeze-Type Conduct
As noted above in the preceding Orders, the FCC now concludes
(contrary to conclusions made in its earlier international proceedings and• 447
other domestic proceedings) that because a foreign carrier has the per se
ability to engage in "price squeeze" behavior, the mere fact that a foreign
carrier might also have the "incentive" to engage in price squeeze behavior
is sufficient grounds to justify the imposition of its "Benchmarks condi-
tion" as a prophylactic device. The problem with this analysis, however, is
that it runs completely inapposite to established antitrust and regulatory
price squeeze precedent.
That is to say, a predatory price squeeze plaintiff generally has two
options available. First, a plaintiff may apply for an administrative remedy
from the regulatory administrative agency with jurisdiction over the al-
leged anticompetitive rate. 48 Alternatively, the plaintiff may elect to sue
under section 2 of the Sherman Act in federal district court. However, be-
cause of the different roles of antitrust and regulation, each avenue has dif-
ferent criteria for success and different remedies.449
On one hand, as explained supra, it is well established that the role of
an administrative remedy is to ensure that rates are just and reasonable.4
50
As such, if a plaintiff seeks an administrative remedy from the regulator,
then the regulator typically is not required to focus its examination on the
firm's intent, but rather on the anticompetitive effects of the alleged price
squeeze on the wholesale customer/retail competitor and whether they are
outweighed by the effect on the supplying firm's financial viability and its
ability to serve its customers.45' If a plaintiff successfully proves a price
squeeze claim, however, then the regulator may remedy the price squeeze
447. See Parts III.A.-III.D supra.
448. Lawrence J. Spiwak, Is the Price Squeeze Doctrine Still Viable in Fully-Regulated
Energy Markets?, 14 ENERGY L.J. 75, 77 (1993).
449. See id.
450. Id. Notwithstanding this precedent, as mentioned elsewhere, the FCC now believes
erroneously that its "public interest" authority may be far broader and, as such, has created
its own trade division to address its regulatory constituents' concerns.
451. Id. (citation omitted).
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only by reducing the offending jurisdictional rate within a "zone of reason-
ableness. 452
In contrast, a section 2 claim seeks to remedy some kind of intention-
. • •453
ally imposed anticompetitive harm. A section 2 plaintiff must show more
than a general intent, however; rather, this plaintiff must show that the de-
fendant had some degree of monopolistic intent, as well as some demon-
strable harm to competition. If both prongs of the test are met, then
treble damages are available to punish the offender (and, moreover, the
plaintiff will not have to share this award with any other potential simi-
larly-situated plaintiffs not party to the suit because rate reductions benefit
all customers receiving service under the regulated firm's tariff).455
The FCC's approach to price squeeze conduct, unfortunately, re-
quires neither a showing of specific intent nor--even more importantly-
any showing of anticompetitive harm. Rather, the FCC seems to believe
that it may set prices over firms clearly not under its jurisdiction simply
because they have the potential to think "anticompetitive thoughts" in their
hearts. Indeed, the FCC's anticompetitive concerns appear unfortunately to
be far more ephemeral than probable. By deliberately choosing not to un-
dertake a detailed 6conomic analysis of the structural conditions in a WTO
Member country's home market, therefore, it is difficult to discern exactly
any clear nexus between the regulation imposed by the FCC and the spe-
cific anticompetitive harms this regulation is supposed to mitigate.
b. Posing a "Very High Risk" to Competition
Not content with the foregoing "prophylactic" mechanisms, however,
the FCC stated that it could not "rule out the possibility" that its various
"regulatory safeguards" would be "ineffective at preventing anti-
competitive conduct in a particular context, and that, as a result, a carrier
would be able to raise the costs of its rivals to the degree that end-user
customers would be injured. 4 6 As such, the Commission also decided to
adopt yet one more regulatory mechanism by introducing a brand new
term into the legal and economic lexicon-that is, a presumption that "an
application does not pose a risk of competitive harm that would justify de-
nial unless it is shown that granting the application would pose.., a very
high risk to competition.,4" The big problem, however, is the FCC's fail-
452. Id.
453. Id. (citations omitted).
454. Id.
455. Id. (citation omitted).
456. Foreign Participation Order, supra note 306, para. 51.
457. Id. (emphasis added).
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ure to provide a precise definition of the heretofore unknown standard of
"very high risk to competition.
According to the Commission, a "very high risk to competition" in
the U.S. market occurs whenever there is a situation which "cannot be ad-
dressed by [its] safeguards or conditions, and would therefore warrant de-
nial of a license. 45 9 In order to have the ability to pose such a risk, how-
ever, "an applicant must possess the ability to harm competition in the
U.S. market in addition to the ability to exercise its foreign market
power." 40 While the Commission was quick to point out various situations
that it would not consider a "very high risk to competition," 46' this standard
is just too vague (and gives the regulator far too much subjective discre-
tion) to have any analytical anchoring. In removing this analytical anchor,
the FCC has once again decided improperly that a "Potter Stewart I Know
It When I See It" test of anticompetitive conduct or market power can be
an acceptable substitute for sound legal and economic analysis in public-
policy decision-making.462 As such, the terms "market power,"
"dominant," or "anti-competitive" once again .tragically have been boiled
down improperly to nothing more than the intellectual equivalent of "I
don't like you."
5. Problem No. 5: In the FCC's View, What Is Good for the Goose
Apparently Does Not Necessarily Have To Be Good for the
Gander-Even When the Goose Refuses To Lay Any Eggs
To get around the jurisdictional issues associated with its Benchmark
conditions, the FCC stated that its settlement rate benchmarks applied only
to the charges paid by U.S. carriers to their foreign correspondents, and not
to the foreign correspondents themselves. At the end of the day, however,
the big question of what will the United States do if a foreign carrier sim-
ply refuses to cooperate with the FCC's unilateral actions remains unre-
458. Indeed, is this standard the same as "very very high risk to competition?" Or, con-
versely, somehow less dangerous than a plain old "high risk" to competition?
459. Foreign Participation Order, supra note 306, para. 52.
460. Id.
461. For example, the Commission stated that it would find it "highly unlikely" that a
"very high risk to competition" was present: (a) when an acquisition of less than a control-
ling interest in a U.S. carrier by a foreign carrier occurs; (b) when a carrier from a WTO
Member country has "open, competitive markets and a procompetitive regulatory regime in
place"; or (c) that the FCC would deny entry "'based solely on [the applicant's] market
share."' Id. (citations omitted).
462. See Spiwak, The Search for Meaningful Definitions, supra note 2, at 4 n.15 (citing
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (while it is impossi-
ble to define "obscenity," "I know it when I see it." (emphasis added)); see also supra note
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solved. Indeed, if a foreign carrier refuses to negotiate a settlement rate at
or below the FCC's benchmarks within the exact time specified by the
FCC, is a U.S. carrier really going to ask the FCC to declare their own
rates unlawful? Hardly.
History has taught that if countries are going to engage successfully
in real-politic diplomatic maneuvers, words must be backed with demon-
strable and swift action. In the U.S. case, however, while there certainly is
no shortage of fiery neo-mercantile rhetoric to create (if not exacerbate an
existing) substantial disincentive for both foreign governments and carriers
to engage in good faith negotiations with U.S. carriers to enter their home
markets (which, paradoxically, is supposed to be the whole goal of such an463
approach in the first place), the FCC's rhetoric is backed up with nothing
more than threats to punish rogue international carriers either by: (1) pub-
lic identification; (2) working with (i.e., complaining to) the offending car-
rier's government; or (3) allowing U.S. international carriers to petition the
FCC to consider stronger steps. As such, both U.S. consumers and busi-
ness should really not be surprised when the economic costs of neo-
mercantilism outweigh the very economic benefits the FCC promised that
they would receive.
As mentioned above in Part IV.A.5, the economic costs of mercan-
tilism can be substantial. These include as a general matter the creation-
rather than the elimination-of significant barriers to entry for both new
firms into U.S. domestic telecommunications markets and U.S. firms into
foreign markets; and, with such barriers, increased investment
"uncertainty" for international telecommunications development projects.
When this occurs, U.S. consumers are forced to pay higher prices to reflect
both this increased cost of capital and the firm's incentive to raise its
prices to ensure that it can recover its costs in the shortest time possible.
There are, moreover, many significant legal issues associated with
these policies of which practitioners may not be aware. For example, set-
tlement rates are set by privately negotiated agreements among U.S. carri-
ers and their foreign correspondents. After the parties reach an agreement,
the FCC accepts that rate and permits the U.S. carrier to pass that cost
component (if any) through to end consumers in the collection rate.
However, by unilaterally imposing mandatory settlement benchmarks cal-
culated by the FCC on a sua sponte basis, the FCC has essentially modi-
fied the parties' private agreement. In doing so, the FCC may have vio-
lated the parameters of the Mobile-Sierra doctrine.465
463. Id. at 19.
464. See generally 47 C.F.R. § 43.51 (1997).
465. See United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332, 339-43
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Under the Mobile-Sierra doctrine, the Commission has the power to
prescribe a change in contract rates when it finds them to be unlawful and
"to modify other provisions of private contracts when necessary to serve
the public interest."4" As Judge Bork once explained,
Although the legal standard for changing contract rates (they must be
"unlawful") differs from the standard for changing other contract pro-
visions (they must disserve "the public interest"), in fact the two stan-
dards are not very different. Before changing rates, the Commission
must make a finding that they are "unlawful" according to the terms of
the governing statute, which typically requires a finding that existing
rates are unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory, or preferen-
tial.... But as the Supreme Court recognized in Sierra, complaints
about existing rates do not concern the Commission unless the prob-
lems raised are sufficiently serious to "adversely affect the public in-
terest.
,467
Despite this authority, however, courts have held that Mobile-
Sierra's "public interest" standard is "practically insurmountable." 48 In-
deed, courts require an exceptionally high burden of proof to show why a
contractual term is not in the public interest.49 Moreover, satisfying this
burden is simply made more difficult by the fact that the Commission
lacks jurisdiction over one of the signatories (i.e., the foreign correspon-
dent) and that most of these agreements deliberately do not contain either a
"choice of law" or a "choice of venue" provision.
Perhaps more troubling, however, is that the FCC believes that it may
proscribe, sua sponte, specific, long-term prices under both the Communi-
cations Act and international law on a unilateral basis in the first in-
stance. 47 While the Commission certainly has the authority to proscribe a
(1956); FPC v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348, 353-55 (1956).
466. See Western Union Tel. Co. v. FCC, 815 F.2d 1495, 1501 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
467. Id. at 1501 n.2 (citations omitted).
468. See, e.g., Papago Tribal Authority v. FERC, 723 F.2d 950, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1983);
but cf. Northeast Utils. Serv. Co. v. FERC, 55 F.3d 686, 691 (1st Cir. 1995) ('We do not
think that Papago, read in context, means that the 'public interest' standard is practically
insurmountable in all circumstances. It all depends on whose ox is gored and how the pub-
lic interest is affected.").
469. See, e.g., Western Union Tel., 815 F.2d at 1501-02 (holding the FCC was not justi-
fied in abrogating settlement agreement which established compromise rates for leasing
special access facilities and set specific procedures for changing those rates in the future).
470. Specifically, the FCC's actions may, in fact, violate the International Telecommu-
nication Union (1TIJ) regulations, a treaty to which the United States is party and for which
the Commission is the U.S. enforcement authority under U.S. domestic law. 47 U.S.C. §
303(r) (1998). See, e.g., International Telecommunication Regulations, Dec. 9, 1988, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 102-13, art. I, para. 1.5 (1991) [hereinafter 1TU]. ('Within the framework
of the present Regulations, the provision and operation of international telecommunications
services in each relation is pursuant to mutual agreement between administrations [or
RPOAs]."); lTU, supra, art. 6.2.1 ("For each applicable service in a given relation, admini-
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S471particular ratemaking methodology, the Commission's authority to pro-
scribe rates is much more limited. Under existing precedent, courts have
held that it is only permissible for the Commission to proscribe specific
interim settlement rates because "any harm caused by the interim rates
[can] be remedied., 472 Moreover, the Commission may not exercise its
proscription authority in a vacuum. Under the plain language of the Com-
munications Act, the Commission may exercise its authority to proscribe
interim rates under section 205 only after it has first rejected rates initially
proposed by carriers as unjust and unreasonable.47 ' Thus, because it is still
the carrier who has the burden to justify that its specific rates are just and
reasonable, basic ratemaking principles instruct that there cannot be a sin-
gle, generic industry-wide rate under the common "just and reasonable"
standard.474 Accordingly, the FCC's "one-size"--or, more accurately "five-
sizes"-"fits all" approach to ratemaking is specious at best. The costs of
wiring Uzbekistan are simply not the same as the costs of wiring Uruguay,
and, moreover, if either Uzbekistan or Uruguay fail to meet the FCC's
benchmarks, the costs of wiring either country are still not the same as the
(U.S.) $0.08 the FCC thinks is the cost of wiring Sweden.
This process is not as difficult to satisfy as it may seem. In order for a
rate to be "just and reasonable," prices only need to fall within a "zone of
reasonableness"-that is, that these rates are neither "excessive" (rates that
permit the firm to recover monopoly rents) nor "confiscatory" (rates that
do not permit the regulated firm to recover its costs). 475 They need not-
strations [or RPOAs] shall by mutual agreement establish and revise accounting rates to be
applied between them, in accordance with the provisions of Appendix 1 and taking into ac-
count relevant CCITJRecommendations and relevant cost trends.") (emphasis added).
471. See Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc. v. FERC, 734 F.2d 1486 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
472. FTC Comm. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 226, 232 (2d Cir. 1984); Western Union Int'l v.
FCC, 652 F.2d 136, 144 (D.C. Cir. 1980); cf. discussion supra Part IV.C.3 (indicating FCC
conceded that it only had authority to proscribe interim rates). Of course, "interim" rates in
the telecommunications context can often last for quite a long time.
473. See Ralph Nader v. FCC, 520 F.2d 182, 198 (D.C. Cir. 1975); AT&T v. FCC, 449
F.2d 439, 450-53 (2d Cir. 1971); Western Union Tel., 815 F.2d 1495. See also Communi-
cations Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 205, 47 U.S.C. § 205, which provides in relevant part that:
Whenever, after full opportunity for hearing, upon a complaint or... on its own
initiative, the Commission shall be of opinion that any charge, classification,
regulation, or practice of any carrier or carriers is or will be in violation of any of
the provisions of this chapter, the Commission is authorized and empowered to
determine and prescribe what will be the just and reasonable charge or... charges
to be thereafter observed ....
474. See 47 U.S.C. § 203 (1998). See also New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 826
F.2d 1101, 1104 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
475. Farmers Union, 734 F.2d at 1502. Courts generally give administrative agencies
substantial discretion to define this zone. Indeed, as the D.C. Circuit Court once explained,
when examining an agency's determination that a particular rate falls within the zone of
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just like caviar or Rolls Royce limousines-be "fair" or "affordable" for
everyone. 4 6 Yet, while this standard is not very precise, the phrase "just
and reasonable" is clearly more than a "mere vessel into which meaning
must be poured."477 Rather, the delineation of the "zone of reasonableness"
in a particular case will involve a "complex inquiry into a myriad of fac-
tors." 478 These myriad of factors, however, may include both cost and non-
cost factors to determine whether particular rates fall within the zone.47'
Thus, had the FCC recognized the legitimacy of the basic notion that dif-
ferent countries have different economies and, afortiori, cost structures-
much as the ITU did in its recent proposal-the FCC's unilateral approach
would have stood on much firmer footing.
Moreover, the regulator is also going to have to determine whether
the firm under its jurisdiction is a single-output or, more likely in today's
era of "convergence," a multi-product firm. As such, whenever govern-
ment attempts to define the "zone of reasonableness," a primary focus on a
multi-product firm's aggregate profits is irrelevant. Rather, the appropriate
scope of government's inquiry should be whether the specific profits de-
rived from providing regulated products and services (and not from ancil-
lary businesses or investments) are the result of the regulated company's
ability to charge an excessive (i.e., monopoly) rate for the regulated prod-
uct or service-that is, the product or service over which it can raise price
or restrict output absent regulation. If the rate reflects the regulated com-
pany's true costs of providing the regulated product or service, but gov-
ernment nonetheless believes that this just and reasonable rate is "too ex-
reasonableness, it is not a court's "function... to impose [its] own standards of reasonable-
ness upon the Commission, but rather to ensure that the Commission's order is supported
by substantial record evidence and is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor an abuse of discre-
tion.' Nader, 520 F.2d at 192 (citations omitted). However, the court was also quick to
point out that, "[i]n terms of ratemaking, the agency's expertise allows us to accept its
judgment after it defines the zone of reasonableness; but we cannot rely on claims of judg-
ment to explain how the agency arrived at the zone." Id. at 193 (emphasis added).
476. See Spiwak, The Search for Meaningful Definitions, supra note 2, at 8 (emphasis
added); see also Farmers Union, 734 F.2d at 1504 (holding the concept of "'just and rea-
sonable' must clearly be more than a "'mere vessel into which meaning must be poured')
(citation omitted).
477. See Farmers Union, 734 F.2d at 1504.
478. Id. at 1502.
479. Id. When considering the latter, courts have upheld the legitimate role non-cost
factors may play in order to achieve a particular public policy objective (e.g., a desire to
establish additional supply), so long as the agency specifies the nature of the relevant non-
cost factor and offers a reasoned explanation of how the factor justifies the resulting rates.
Id. at 1502-03 (citations omitted); see also National Ass'n of Regulatory Utility Comm'rs v.
FCC, 737 F.2d 1095, 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1984); National Rural Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 988
F.2d 174, 182-83 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (affirming price cap regulation although not tied directly
to cost).
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pensive," "unfair," or not sufficiently "affordable," then it is therefore
wholly improper for government to require the regulated firm to
"subsidize" the price it charges for its regulated service with ancillary
profits just to make the rate more politically "affordable" or "fair." When
this occurs, "affordable" simply becomes an excuse for government to set
unlawfully confiscatory rates instead.
Similarly, because regulation is supposed to be the substitute for, and
not the complement of, competitive rivalry,480 regulators should attempt to
set a rate that approximates the equilibrium price (i.e., where supply equals
481demand) that a rivalrous market would produce. Thus, if government
truly wants to make prices for a "public" good or service more
"affordable"--regardless of whether the end-price for this product or
service is set by regulation or not-then government should focus its pri-
orities on promoting entry and rivalry, such that firms will be forced to in-
novate and lower costs and, with such innovation and increased efficiency,
force supply and demand to move down and to the right. If this shift oc-
curs, then the entire "zone" should therefore also be forced down and to
the right over time. So long as the U.S. government erects barriers to entry
in the name of promoting competition, however, such policies will provide
U.S. firms with no real incentive to innovate and lower costs and, as such,
412true deregulation and competition will never occur.
Finally, from a policy and economic point of view, any proposal that
advocates that the Commission should set prices sua sponte in the first in-
stance--especially a unilateral attempt to set international settlement rates
that were negotiated privately between parties, one of which the Commis-
sion clearly does not have jurisdiction over-has odious implications.
Permitting government to unilaterally set prices over products and serv-
ices-especially without first determining the actual underlying costs of
these products and services-is a proven way to eliminate innovation and
483harm competition. As mentioned above, this issue is especially acute inthe international context because U.S. public policy should not remove any
480. Indeed, it is not--contrary to popular belief--"because we can." Spiwak, The
Search for Meaningful Definitions, supra note 2, at 7.
481. Cf Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 26 (1st Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 1337, reh'g denied, 111 S. Ct. 2047 (1991).
482. Spiwak, The Search for Meaningful Definitions, supra note 2 passim.
483. See, e.g., Competitive Telecomm. Ass'n v. FCC, 87 F.3d 522, 529-30 (D.C. Cir.
1996) (" he test of a competitive market is whether consumers are offered the lowest possi-
ble prices or more or better services.... As [such], the goal of the agency 'is to promote
competition in the interchange marketplace, not to protect competitors."' Id. at 530
(citations omitted)); see also Central Iowa Power Corp. v. FERC, 606 F.2d 1156, 1163
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (holding simply because a tariff may be unduly discriminatory or prefer-
ential does not automatically mean that a tariff may be, in fact, anticompetitive).
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incentive for competitive reform in other countries. Similarly, because
U.S. consumer demand for IMTS service continues to grow exponentially,
mandating specific prices does not improve market performance either;
rather, it simply guarantees U.S. carriers a substantial revenue stream (they
make up the lost revenues by increased volume) and thus removes any in-
centive for them to compete.i4 And, of course, as mentioned repeatedly
above, so long as the FCC wants to play the "trade" game as well as the
"regulation game," any unilateral attempt to prescribe prices over people
not subject to the United States' jurisdiction will only create, and more
likely exacerbate an existing, recalcitrance by foreign carriers to do busi-
ness with U.S. carriers, which was the whole goal of this exercise in the
first place.
485
6. Problem No. 6: The Great Universal Service Hypocrisy (a.k.a.,
A Policy To Ensure that "All the Children of the World Will
Sing Together in the Spirit of Harmony and Peace")
Universal service, as a general public policy, is certainly a worthy so-
486
cial goal. The whole purpose of both the 1996 Act and the February Ac-
cord, however, was allegedly to promote competition and lead to deregu-
487lation. Thus, it seems a bit paradoxical that anyone could rationally
believe that it is possible to have both "competitive" markets yet, at the
same time, require firms (a) to guarantee that everyone will receive reli-
able service, and moreover (b) to ensure that particular sectors of society
484. Considering the fact that the FCC's former Chairman stated publicly that the
Commission would not be in the business of setting rates on the domestic side, it does seem
a bit hypocritical for the FCC to rationally believe that it could otherwise lawfully set prices
in the international context. See Competition: Walking the Walk and Talking the Talk,
Statement of FCC Chairman Reed Hundt before Alex. Brown & Co.'s "Media & Commu-
nications '96 Conference" Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, NY, 1996 WL 529213 (Sept. 17, 1996)
(What "our interconnection order does not do is set any specific prices new entrants will
pay for leasing elements of the existing network, like unbundled loops and switching ca-
pacity. These will be set in state arbitrations or through negotiations between the parties.").
485. See supra note 2; see also Gunship Diplomacy: The FCC's International Settlement
Rate Policies, Dataquest, PUBLIC TELEPHONY SERvIcEs NORTH AMERICA MARKET ANALYSIS
(Feb. 9, 1998) available at <http://www.gartnerll.gartnerweb.com/dq/static/dq.html>
("[W]hile the traditional accounting rate system must be reformed .... the adversarial
structure designed by the FCC is bound to fail in the long term. The FCC does not appear to
want to work cooperatively in international forums but, instead, mandates onerous rates,
terms, and conditions concerning international settlement rates. The FCC's rigid policies
and benchmark rates to improve the international accounting rate system have set off an
international firestorm, and this could come back to haunt the FCC as it strives to effect a
competitive international marketplace.").
486. Spiwak, The Search for Meaningful Definitions, supra note 2, at 14.
487. Id. at 15.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
will enjoy not only "reliable" service but also some sort of subsidized
service as well.48 s
What is so surprising, however, is that it was a majority of the Euro-
pean Union Member States (many of which have long and well-
documented histories of socialist-type public welfare policies), and not the
United States (allegedly the paragon of a successful capitalist, democratic
society), that recognized that trying to reconcile these diametric goals
would be a fool's errand. As such, the European Commission has specifi-
cally refused to permit Member States to use universal service to subsidize
Internet access to the schools. 49 Yet, despite the cacophony of pressure
and empirical evidence demonstrating that the United States should follow
this same path, the FCC nonetheless continues to stick rigidly to enforcing
the Clinton Administration's policy of ensuring that the telecommunica-
tions industry pays for the yellow-brick toll-road that will lead our children
over the bridge to the twenty-first century-even if it takes backroomS 490
deals and regulatory coercion to accomplish this goal.
What is particularly sad, however, is that the FCC apparently be-
lieves that it must also perpetuate this charade on the international tele-
communications community as well.49' Yet, as long as foreign carriers
488. See id.
489. See EU's Bangemann Says Only France, Italy Adopt Universal Service Telecom
Funding, AFX NEws (Feb. 25, 1998), available in WL ALLNEWSPLUS Database
(indicating EC does not "intend to allow money raised from universal-service funding to be
used to fund internet in schools"; rather, while this Internet access to the schools should be
encouraged, it should appropriately "be paid out of education budgets."); see also Spiwak,
The Search for Meaningful Definitions, supra note 2 (outlining massive economic costs to
consumer welfare by current universal service policies).
490. See Scott Cleland, The "Real Story" Behind the FCC's Subsidy Reform Decision?,
TELECOM BULLETIN, May 9, 1997 (Wash. Research Group) ("[O]nly 'escape route' possible
from the 'political trap' of appearing to be increasing the nation's telephone rate burden to
pay for new school subsidies" was for the FCC to enter into a 'last minute 'deal' with
AT&T," which, in "return for public promises from AT&T to pass on any access charge
reductions to basic consumers for the first time in years, the FCC would decrease the local
telcos' price caps by an additional $750 million." This "'deal,' combined with a slower
phase-in of the new universal service fund, enabled the FCC to defensively claim 'offsetting
savings' for both long distance and local customers to pay for the $3 billion in new subsi-
dies."); Furchtgott-Roth Tells LECs To "Stand Up" to FCC on Universal Service, COMM.
DAILY, Mar. 5, 1998, at 3, 4 (reporting that a packed ballroom audience erupted in applause
and jumped to their feet when Commissioner Furchtgott-Roth "sharply criticized fellow
commissioners for what he declared was 'secret deal' made with AT&T and MCI to conceal
actual costs for USF and access reform charges: 'I will never support negotiations in secret
without public notice and comment.' [In addition, Furchtgott-Roth, i]n strongest criticism,
questioned increase in administrative expenses for Universal Service Administrative Corp.
(USAC) to $4.4 million from $2.7 million-65%--in latest quarter: 'That's $18,000 per
day in additional expenses."').
491. See, for example, Benchmarks Order, supra note 315, paras. 148, 171, where the
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must pay access charges to terminate a call in the United States, these for-
eign carriers-and afortiori their customers-must pay into the U.S. uni-
versal service fund whether they like it or not.492 Fortunately, however, the
international community is not so naive as the FCC apparently believes.
As the ITU recently pointed out:
[I]f the international accounting rate system were ever intended to pro-
vide a mechanism for transferring funds from high teledensity coun-
tries to low teledensity ones, then it is a singularly inefficient mecha-
nism for doing so. Indeed, high cost countries, which usually have a
low teledensity, are cross-subsidizing low cost countries in that the ac-
counting rate system, as it currently works, is based on revenue-
sharing rather than underlying costs. Thus, because the accounting rate
is invariably split 50/50, the high cost country (which has a lower
FCC recognized that the "Reference Paper on Procompetitive Regulatory Principles negoti-
ated as part of the WTO Basic Telecom Agreement states that universal service obligations
must be 'administered in a transparent, non-discriminatory and competitively neutral man-
ner."' Id. para. 148. Further, the Commission noted that
[h]idden subsidies such as those contained in settlement rates and subsidies borne
disproportionately by one service, or in the case of settlement rates, by consumers
from net payer countries, are not consistent with these principles and cannot be
sustained in a competitive global market. We also disagree with those com-
menters that compare the hidden subsidies in settlement rates to domestic univer-
sal service policies in the United States, which rely on explicit and transparent
funding mechanisms. Universal service in the U.S. market is based on and uses
end user telecommunications revenues in the United States, not settlements reve-
nues paid by foreign carriers.
Id. (citation omitted).
Of course, given FCC officials' flagrant denials that these fees even exist at all, this
regulatory deception really should not be too surprising. See, e.g., Mike Mills, AT&T Im-
posing Fee on Residential Users, WASH. POST, May 6, 1998, at Cl (reporting that AT&T
has begun to impose a fee on residential customers to pay for FCC's universal service pro-
gram. In a bald-faced lie, however, FCC officials complained that AT&T and other carriers
should be absorbing the charges themselves, and were never ordered by the FCC to pass
them on to consumers. "'This is not a federal charge. This is a charge that AT&T is creating
on its own,' said the FCC's Chief of Staff, John Nakahata." Id. Such a claim is really quite
incredulous, given the fact that former FCC Chairman Reed Hundt tried actively to "keep
the fees from appearing as new line items on consumers' bills. Long-distance companies
declined that request, but in a deal with [Hundt,] AT&T said it would refrain [temporarily]
from charging the fees to consumers who pay undiscounted rates for long-distance serv-
ice.").
492. See David Molony, EC and U.S. To Clash over Universal Service Funds, COMm.
WK. INT'L, Apr. 6, 1998, at 1, 30 (reporting that Diane Cornell, chief of the telecoms divi-
sion of the FCC's international bureau, argued that foreign carriers should pay their fair
share to use U.S. local networks because an ".international carrier benefits from being able
to terminate a call to rural areas or low-income subscribers' in the United States. The arti-
cle further reported, however, that the international telecoms community found this official
U.S. response to be specious at best. Quoting, among other anonymous sources, a leading
Washington, D.C. telecommunications analyst, the article questioned why, given the scale
and scope of the U.S. domestic telecommunications network, "'[elvery call from the poorest
African nation is paying for an ISDN link to Ted Turner's ranch."').
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mark-up over its real cost base) gains less from the transaction than the
lower cost country (which has a higher mark-up). Thus a settlements
system which is actually cost-oriented should be more effective in
transferring funds between countries to meet differing needs because
the underlying cost differences would be reflected in asymmetric rates
for call termination. 493
So long as the FCC continues to strain its own credibility-as well as
the Administration's overall reputation-abroad, the Commission simply
continues to deprive both U.S. consumers and businesses of the very bene-
fits that these policies were supposed to achieve originally.49
V. CASE STUDY: THE BT EXPERIENCE
A. Contextual Background
Before turning to a specific analysis of BT/MCI III, perhaps it might
be useful to summarize some of the FCC's own findings about the U.K.
domestic market and the U.S.-U.K. IMTS market to date, any additional
public information about these markets that was available at the time of
this Order, and the significant exogenous political and current events that
would affect the outcome of this proceeding. In this way, the acts and
omissions of the BT/MCI III Order will be easier to identify and to ana-
lyze.
1. Recap of BT/MCII&II
As discussed supra, the Commission reached several conclusions in
BT/MCI I that are worth highlighting here. For example, it is important to
remember that the Commission specifically rejected the argument that be-
cause BT was a potential competitor for the U.S.-U.K. IMTS market as
well as for the U.S. domestic interexchange, local exchange, and wireless
markets, the FCC should not approve the initial BT investment.495 Citing to
the fact that there were numerous other competitors in all of these markets
(with the exception of local-BT/MCI I was decided before the 1996 Act),
493. Methodological Note on Universal Service Obligations, Note by the ITU Secretar-
iat, Oct. 9, 1998 (visited Nov. 16, 1998) <http://www.iut.int/intset/focus/usos3.doc>.
494. See also Spiwak, The Search for Meaningful Definitions, supra note 2, at 19-21
(explaining ill-effects of Administration's "neo-mercantile policies"). Unfortunately, the
U.S. continues to attempt to perpetuate (unsuccessfully) this charade even at the time of this
writing. See, e.g., Remarks of Vice President Al Gore Before the ITU Plenipotentiary Con-
ference in Minneapolis, calling for a "Digital Declaration of Interdependence" because "our
children and our world are waiting." (Oct. 12, 1998). If this indeed is the case then, as dis-
cussed supra, the current universal service program is clearly "taxation without representa-
tion."
495. BT/MCI I Order, supra note 184.
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the incremental addition of BT would have a de minimis affect on compe-
496tition. Moreover, the Commission adopted a similar view when these
same arguments were raised in the Sprint Declaratory Ruling. Indeed, in
both cases, the Commission found that these foreign investments Would
actually have procompetitive benefits in the form of economies of scale
and scope, new capital, etc.497 This point is especially crucial to remember
with the introduction and application of the FCC's new "Sufficiently Pre-
cluded Competitor" merger analysis
49
Moreover, the FCC specifically declined in BT/IMCI I to regulate
MCI as a dominant carrier on the U.S.-U.K. route because it found that: (1)
there was sufficient competition in this market to constrain BT's behav-
ior;499 and (2) the Commission's existing ISP would protect against any
potential anticompetitive harm.500 However, because of BT's admitted
dominance in the U.K. market at the time of BT/MCI I, the Commission
nonetheless imposed some residual reporting requirements to ensure com-
pliance with its ISP.
501
2. Dancing Around BT's Dominance: The Cable & Wireless
Nondominant Petition 2
In this Order, C&W sought Section 214 authority from the Commis-
sion in order to provide international facilities-based switched and private
line services between the United States and the United Kingdom.50 In or-
der to determine whether it should conduct an ECO analysis, the Commis-
sion initially needed to determine whether C&W possessed market power
in the U.K. market.504 Unfortunately, the FCC's task was not as straight-
forward as it seemed-that is, the FCC was in a rather delicate predica-
ment because BT/MCI III was concurrently pending, and the Commission
did not want to state or find anything in the C&W proceeding about the
state of competition in either the U.K. or the U.S.-U.K. route for IMTS
service that might tie its hands in its final disposition of the BT/MCI
496. Id. para. 50.
497. Id. para. 51.
498. See infra note 523 and accompanying text.
499. BT/MCII Order, supra note 184, para. 49.
500. Id. para. 38.
501. Id.
502. Cable & Wireless, Inc., Application for Auth. Pursuant to Section 214 and Petition
for Non-Dominant Status on Int'l Private Line Routes, Order, Authorization and 'Certifi-
cate, 11 F.C.C.R. 16,486, 5 Comm. Reg. (P &F) 815 (1996).
503. Id.
504. Id. para. 8.
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merger. As such, the FCC attempted to analyze the relevant markets with-
out directly discussing BT's positions in those markets.
The Commission first examined "the local and national (domestic
long distance) markets for terminating international private line and
switched services at their U.K. destination."505 After review, not only did
the FCC find that the market shares (based on revenues) of C&W's U.K.
affiliate, Mercury, in the U.K. domestic market for local services were
low, but the FCC also found that "'Mercury [was] not the sole provider of
telecommunications services in any part of the United Kingdom."' 506 The
Commission also found at the time of this Order that, inter alia, "Mercury
provide[d] facilities-based local and long distance service in the United
Kingdom in direct competition with BT... and 22 [other] regional and
national facilities-based licensed holders"; there were "125 cable operators
licensed to provide local telecommunications services; ... the United
Kingdom [had] opened its markets for the provision of domestic local and
long distance services;.., and 60,000 customers a month [were switching]
from BT to local cable companies for their telephone service" supported a
finding that there was sufficient supply elasticity in the U.K. domestic
market, and therefore, that Mercury certainly did not control bottleneck fa-
cilities and services in that market.
5 7
The Commission next examined the "facilities-based markets for in-
ternational switched and private line services" in the United Kingdom.50'
The Commission found that with the imminent "issuance of new facilities-
based international licenses by DTI," Mercury would "lack the ability to
raise and sustain prices above a competitive level for the provision of in-
ternational switched and private line services."'09 Similarly, the Commis-
sion found that "[w]ith respect to supply capacity in the facilities-based
international services market.... there [was] significant capacity on ex-
isting and future cables and satellite circuits between the United States and
the United Kingdom."510 Indeed, the Commission specifically found that
the "continental United States and the United Kingdom are served or will
soon be served by a number of submarine cables, including the TAT-
12/TAT-13 cable network, the PTAT system, the Atlantic Express I and II
cables, as well as by Intelsat, PanAmSat, Orion, and Columbia/TDRS sat-
505. Id. para. 10.
506. Id. para. 11 (citation omitted).
507. Id.
508. Id. para. 13.
509. Id. para. 14.
510. Id. para. 15.
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ellite systems.".5 . The Commission also found that "the current number of
international service competitors [was] evidence of an elastic demand for
Mercury's services." 512 Indeed, the Commission found, and no party dis-
puted, that "a 'multitude' of carriers resell international private line serv-
ices and IMTS, and 25 operators provide ISR services." 13 Moreover, the
Commission reasoned that "the likely increase in the number of facilities-
based competitors resulting from the issuance of new licenses by DTI
[would] add to the level of competition by vendors for customers.
' 514
With respect to barriers to entry into these product markets, the
Commission noted that "DTI announced that it [would] eliminate the re-
strictions limiting the provision of international facilities-based services to
BT and Mercury and [had] invited companies to apply for licenses to pro-
vide international facilities-based telecommunications services on all
routes from the United Kingdom 'on the same terms enjoyed by BT and
Mercury.'515
At the time of this Order, however, DTI had "not yet authorized any
carrier other than Mercury or BT to provide international facilities-based
services. 51 6 Nevertheless, the Commission stated that it was "encouraged
by the United Kingdom's decision to accept applications for international
facilities-based licenses and its announced intention to 'quickly' issue ad-
ditional licenses for such services 'on the same terms as those enjoyed by
BT and Mercury."' As such, the Commission believed that "DTI's execu-
tion of this intention by issuing additional licenses for international facili-
ties-based services [would] introduce a new wave of competitors in the
provision of international facilities-based and resold services from the
United Kingdom. 517
Moreover, the Commission found nothing in the record to suggest
that the United Kingdom will currently or in the future "impose restric-
tions on foreign ownership or participation in the provision of international
facilities-based switched and private line services. '51 8 Nor did the Com-
mission find any "reason to believe that DTI would impose restrictions on
entrance into the international facilities-based switched services market
based on demand.
'519
511. Id. (citation omitted).
512. Id. para. 18.
513. Id- (citation omitted).
514. Id.
515. Id. para. 16 (citation omitted).
516. Id.
517. Id. para. 17 (citation omitted).
518. Id.
519. Id. (citation omitted).
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
Finally, the Commission granted C&W's petition to be declared non-
dominant on the U.S.-U.K. route because C&W's U.K. affiliate (Mercury)
would "not control bottleneck services or facilities in the United Kingdom
once DTI issue[d] additional international facilities-based licenses."5'"
Consequently, the Commission held:
that [C&W] should be regulated as a non-dominant carrier for the pro-
vision of the international facilities-based switched and private line
services between the United States and the United Kingdom after DTI
issue[d] additional international facilities-based licenses. For the same
reason .... [C&W] should then be regulated as a non-dominant carrier
for the provision of resold interconnected and non-interconnected pri-
vate line services for which [C&W] previously obtained Section 214
authority on a dominant carrier basis on the U.S.-U.K. route.521
3. Timing, Politics and Maneuvering
Notwithstanding the above, because of the extremely political nature
of this case (i.e., the British were invading) and the fact that this case
would be the first test to see exactly how strongly committed the United
States was to the just-concluded February Accord, a tremendous amount of
politics and maneuvering was taking place to influence the decision-
making process. Unfortunately, it appeared that any inquiry about whether
the merger may actually lead to a potential reduction of output or increase
in price was not high on the priority list.
For example, because the ink on the February Accord was not yet
totally dry, the United States was trying to see how far it could unilaterally
stretch the edge of the envelope to assuage nationalistic constituencies be-
fore it had to pay attention to international comity concerns. At the same
time, however, because the 1996 Act sparked a worldwide trend in tele-
communications industry reconcentration (of which the BT/MCI III Order
was a part), the Commission was under substantial pressure to explain
what steps it planned to take in order to ensure that the old Bell System
• 522
was not reconstituted. Finally, and certainly not least on the FCC's col-
lective mind, because the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals struck down the
FCC's much-hyped interconnection rules, the FCC was under substantial
political pressure to make it look like they were doing something to
"enhance competition."
Yet, while all this bickering was going on, everyone seemed to forget
that the merger agreement was conditioned on FCC action by date cer-
520. Id. para. 26.
521. Id. (emphasis added).
522. See Spiwak, Reconcentration, supra note 5; see also PHOENIX CENTER POLICY
PAPER, supra note 10.
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tain. 5 In order to complete the negotiations and not have a multi-billion
dollar deal fall through because of regulatory delay, the FCC issued a very
cryptic press release stating that it had approved the merger, with condi-
tions, over one month before it released a final, written order. 24
B. The BT/MCI III Order
On September 24, 1997, well over one month after the FCC purport-
edly adopted its Order and issued its cryptic press release, the FCC finally
released its final Order in the BT/MCI III Order.52 For purpose of its
analysis, the FCC identified "three relevant end-user markets that [were]
likely to be affected by the merger of BT and MCI: (1) U.S. local exchange
and exchange access service; (2) U.S.-U.K. outbound international service;S ,,126
and (3) global seamless services. In addition, the FCC identified "six
relevant input markets: (1) international transport between the United
States and United Kingdom; (2) U.K. cable landing station access; (3)
U.K. backhaul; (4) U.K. intercity transport; (5) U.K. local terminating ac-
cess services; and (6) U.K. local originating access services.
'5 27
The Commission provided two very legitimate reasons for consider-
ing input markets in the context of this case:
First, if as a result of the merger, the merged parties have increased
market power over an input, they might be able to raise the price of
that input, either unilaterally or through coordinated interaction, which
could harm consumers to the extent that, in the absence of regulation
in the end-user market, the increased input price would be passed on in
the form of higher end-user prices. Second, if as a result of the merger,
the merged parties possessed market power over an essential input and,
at the same time, competed in the downstream, competitive, end-user
market, the merged company conceivably could injure competition by
discriminating against unaffiliated producers of the end-user service.
Because BT control[led] numerous inputs in the United Kingdom that
other carriers need in order to provide U.S.-U.K. outbound interna-
tional service and global seamless services, [the FCC reasoned that]
523. See BTIMCI Merger Agreement Article VI (Conditions Precedent), Section 6.1(d)
("If then legally required, an FCC Order shall have been obtained, which has not been re-
voked or stayed as of the Closing Date."). The Merger of MCI Comm. Corp. and British
Telecomm. PLC, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 15,351, paras. 298-303, 9
Comm. Reg. (P & F) 657 (1997) [hereinafter BT/MCI III Order].
524. International Action FCC Approves MCI/British Telecom Merger Subject to Cer-
tain Conditions, Rep. No. IN 97-25, 1997 FCC LEXIS 4489 (Aug. 21, 1997).
525. BT/MCI III Order, supra note 523.
526. Id. para. 52; see also id. paras. 53-57.
527. Id. para. 52; see also id. paras. 58-60.
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these input markets [were] accordingly relevant in assessing the com-
petitive effects of the merger of BT and MCI.
528
Turning to the merits of the case, the FCC found it unlikely that the
merger would "have any [horizontal] anti-competitive effects on any of the
three relevant end-user markets." 29 In fact, the FCC actually found that the
merger would have procompetitive benefits in two of the three relevant
markets-"the market for U.S. local exchange and exchange access serv-
ices and the market for global seamless services." '  The Commission
similarly concluded that it was unlikely that the merger would have any
horizontal anticompetitive effects in four out of the five input markets. The
only reservation the FCC had was toward the merger's affect on the mar-
ket for international transport between the United States and the United
Kingdom. The Commission found that, at the time of this Order, there was
a short-term capacity constraint that the merged company could use to its
strategic advantage to the detriment of competition as a whole. Until this
short-term constraint was ameliorated, therefore, the FCC suggested, and
the applicants "voluntarily" proposed, certain commitments to mitigate the
5311FCC's concerns.
The FCC next looked to see if the applicants, post-merger, would be
able to use their position in any of the input markets to create successfully
any vertical anticompetitive effects in any of the relevant end-user mar-
kets. In the Commission's opinion, because of the voluntary commitments
offered by BT, it was unlikely that the merged entity could use its position
in the international transport on the U.S.-U.K. market to affect adversely
532the performance of any of the end-user markets. The Commission also
concluded that, given demonstrable entry and effective regulation by
OFTEL, it was unlikely that the merged company could use its positions in
528. Id. para. 58.
529. Id. para. 132.
530. Id.; see also id. paras. 126-31.
531. See id. paras. 133-52. Specifically, BT/MCI committed to:
(1) offer U.K. international facilities licensees a total of 147 whole circuits, for
sale on an IRU basis to new entrants; (2) allow certain U.K. international facilities
licensees that are currently taking eastern end half-circuit international private
leased circuits (IPLCs) for international simple resale to convert the IPLCs into
IRUs; (3) sell to U.S. correspondents or their U.K. affiliates, upon request, eastern
end matched half-circuits owned by BT and currently used for the provision of
IMTS or international private line services between BT and the U.S. correspon-
dents; and (4) offer to convert such international private lines leases into IRUs in
such a manner that international simple resellers that become U.K. international
facilities licensees will be in the same financial position as if their international
private line leases had been scheduled to terminate on the date on which the con-
version takes place.
Id. para. 136 (citations omitted).
532. See id. paras. 164-65.
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the U.K. cable landing station access, 533 U.K. backhaul,534 U.K. intercity
53 536
transport, 3 and U.K. terminating access services markets. The FCC was,
however, very concerned about the merged entity's ability to use its posi-
tion in the U.K. originating access services market to affect anticompeti-
tively the three end-user markets.537 Unfortunately, it appears that these
concerns are related more to the British government's refusal to adopt a
regulatory regime identical to one adopted in the United States, rather than
any particular harm specifically created by the merger. As such, even
though the FCC conceded that BT faced "increasing competition in this
market,"53'8 and that "U.K. originating access services [were] subject to
many of same regulatory constraints as those described for terminating ac-
cess services (e.g., price caps and various license conditions regarding
non-discriminatory behavior)," the FCC again had little reservation in
publicly criticizing another sovereign government.539 To wit, "[o]ther U.K.
regulatory policies, however, undermine these constraints and allow BT to
leverage its market power over originating access market [sic] into the
markets for end-user services that depend on originating access (e.g., U.K.
domestic and international services)."
[These policies include the decision not to require BT to provide
equal access to other long distance carriers, to provide unbundled local
network elements to other carriers, and to resell local service at whole-
sale prices. Alternatives to BT's local network may grow in time and
eventually constrain BT's control of originating access services, but
they do not significantly do so at this time. In fact, the absence of
equal access, unbundled local exchange network elements, and resale
in the United Kingdom appears to create the conditions by which BT's
market power over U.K domestic and international services will be
perpetuated.541
Both "BT/MCI and the U.K. Government respond[ed] that there
[wa]s no need to require BT to implement equal access in order to ensure
effective competition in the provision of U.K. outbound calls to the United
States." 542 In their view, "the different regimes in the United States and the
United Kingdom [were] due to differences in the development of the tele-
533. See id. paras. 166-69.
534. See id. paras. 170-71.
535. See id. paras. 172-74.
536. See id. paras. 178-80.
537. Id. para. 181.
538. Id.
539. Id. para. 182.
540. Id.
541. Id. (emphasis added).
542. Id. para. 186.
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communications markets and competition in the respective countries.
More specifically, the U.K. Government state[d] that its industrial policy
of encouraging facilities-based competition would be undermined by the
introduction of equal access." 54'
The FCC ignored and rejected outright these comity arguments. In
the FCC's opinion, "[b]y not providing equal access to long distance carri-
ers," BT was engaging-with the help of Her Majesty's Government-"in
a form of non-price discrimination which allow[ed] it to leverage power
over the local exchange to enhance its control over the U.K. long distance
and international markets."54 To prove this point, the FCC proudly pointed
out that equal access was an essential requirement for the development of
competitive intercity and international markets.54 Yet, because the United
Kingdom refused to implement an equal access policy (even though this
policy was intended to, and succeeded in, "foster the development of alter-
native facilities-based local infrastructure"), the FCC maintained that this
"deliberate omission allowed BT to minimize its loss of intercity and in-
ternational market share."5 6 In this case, however, because the European
Union was making its own plans to implement an equal access requirement
for Member States by January 1, 2000, the FCC conditioned its "grant of
this license transfer upon MCI' s non-acceptance of BT traffic originated in
the United Kingdom to the extent BT is found to be in non-compliance
with U.K. regulations implementing the European Union's equal access
requirements." 5"
The FCC was equally dismayed with the U.K.'s choice not to require
incumbent LECs (i.e., BT) to provide unbundled local exchange network
elements and resale as U.S. ILECs are required to do under the Telecom-
munications Act of 1996.548 Once again, the U.K. Government disagreed
that "'lineside' unbundling was necessary or appropriate in the United
Kingdom." In its view,
the cost advantages of lineside unbundling would be small in the
United Kingdom because prices are in line with costs, interconnection
charges are to be based on long-run incremental costs, and access defi-
cit charges have been abolished. The U.K. Government also claimed
that making BT unbundle its local exchange network elements would
be unlikely to promote local competition but would instead jeopardize
543. Id. (citations omitted).
544. Id. para. 187.
545. Id.
546. Id. para. 188.
547. Id. para. 294; see also id. paras. 190-91.
548. Id. para. 192.
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the development of facilities-based local competition now under-549
way.
And, once again, the FCC ignored and rejected outright these comity ar-
guments. 550 Yet, the FCC found that other factors were present-in par-
ticular, the recently concluded WTO Agreement and ongoing EU regula-
tory initiatives-to mitigate its concerns. I
Finally, even though the WTO Agreement was signed over seven
months prior to this Order, because the FCC had yet to adopt final rules
that implemented the WTO Basic Telecom Agreement, it stated that it was
obligated to examine BT's entry as a foreign carrier into the U.S. market
under its ECO test.55 Because the Commission had previously found that
BT did possess market power in its home market, but that the U.K. market
nonetheless provided U.S. carriers with effective competitive opportuni-
ties, the FCC decided to regulate the merged entity as a dominant carrier.
53
On its own motion, however, "[the FCC] waive[d] the application of [its
then]-current dominant carrier requirements to MCI pending the effective
date of any new rules [it might] adopt in the Foreign Participation pro-
ceeding." 5 4 Instead, because the FCC believed that "it would be unduly
burdensome, and therefore not in the public interest, to require MCI at this
time to comply with [its then-]current dominant carrier regulations which
may be modified in a few months," the Commission simply required MCI
to continue to comply with the safeguards it imposed on MCI in BTIMCI I
• I .. 555
until it adopted final dominant carrier regulations.
C. The Fallout
Tragically, in the end, all of this effort-both public and private sec-
tor-that was put into resolving this case, was for naught. After MCI an-
nounced that it lost over $800 million in its efforts to enter the U.S. local
549. Id. para. 194.
550. Id. para. 195.
551. Id. paras. 197-98.
552. Id. para. 214.
553. BT North America, Inc., Order and Authorization, 13 F.C.C.R. 5992 (1997).
554. BT/MCI III Order, supra note 523, para. 286.
555. Id. para. 287. In a small gesture of international comity, however, the Commission
recognized "OFrEL's active role in the United Kingdom in protecting against abuse of
market power by BT." Id. para. 288. This gesture completed, the FCC went on to state that
[it did] not believe that OFTEL's regulation of BT alone [was] sufficient to justify
regulating MCI as non-dominant on the U.S.-U.K. route. [In the FCC's view,]
[u]naffiliated U.S. competitors of BT/MCI who must rely on BT in order to ter-
minate traffic in the United Kingdom should be able to rely on [its] enforcement
process to address complaints of discrimination.
Id. para. 288.
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market, (not surprising given the FCC's almost total failure post-1996 Act
to promote affirmatively new facilities-based entry for local service),5 6
coupled with all of the events chronicled above, BT was looking for an ex-
cuse to get out of the deal. As fate would have it, Bernie Ebbers of World-
Coin gave BT that excuse by counter-offering $34.5 billion (and, coinci-
dentally, providing BT with a $1.2 billion profit on their original
investment made in BT/MCI 1).557
Yet, regardless of whether BT had decided to go ahead with its ac-
quisition of MCI, the adverse precedent created by the FCC's embarrass-
ing conduct in the BT/MCI III Order-in particular, the stringency of
"voluntary commitments" the FCC imposed and the appalling breach of
international comity-makes neither investment in U.S. companies an at-
tractive opportunity for foreign firms nor does it help grease the skids for
U.S. firms to make investments abroad. Moreover, the analytical hypoc-
risy of this case is truly astounding, as it is quite unclear why the FCC
found it necessary to impose more regulation on the parties in BT/MCI III
than it imposed in BT/MCI I (even though the FCC proceeded to waive
these additional regulatory constraints), when competitive conditions both
in the U.K. domestic market and along the U.S.-U.K. route for IMTS serv-
ice demonstrably and substantially improved since BT/MCI L559 Of course,
considering the fact that the Chairman of the FCC during this period stated
publicly that if the FCC approves the various mergers pending before it, it
556. See Ford, supra note 310; see also Comments filed by the Technology Entrepre-
neurs Coalition in the FCC's Section 706 "Advanced Network Proceeding," Sept. 14, 1998,
Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecomm. Capability to All Americans
in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment
Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecomm. Act of 1996, Notice of Inquiry, 13 F.C.C.R.
15,280 (1998).
557. See Peter Elstrom et al., The New World Order, Bus. WK., Oct. 13, 1997, at 26.
558. See, e.g., Guy de Jonquieres, Rules for the Regulators, FiN. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1998, at
21 (While the "US, in particular, is a frequent advocate of global rules-where they suit its
own interests... it has [, however,] been repeatedly tripped up by its own demands" in
cases like its dispute with the Japanese in the WTO about film and its dispute with Mexico
about how inadequate regulation is blocking U.S. companies' access to Mexico's telecom-
munications markets.); Mark Clough, Caught Out on Film, FIN. TIMEs, Jan. 20, 1998, at 13
("The US cannot credibly criticize [WTO] panel decisions that refrain from findings on re-
strictive business practices when such practices are not within its jurisdiction.").
559. Indeed, just three months after the FCC issued its BTIMCI III Order, the European
Commission issued a public report finding that "[e]ffective local loop competition currently
only takes place in three Member States"-one of which is the United Kingdom. See Com-
mission Communication Concerning the Review Under Competition Rules of the Joint Pro-
vision of Telecommunications and Cable TV Networks by a Single Operator and the Abo-
lition of Restrictions on the Provision of Cable TV Capacity over Telecommunications
Networks, 1998 O.J. (C 71) 4, 7; see also Guatam Naik, Telecom Deregulation in Britain
Delivered a Nice Surprise: Jobs, WALL ST. J., Mar. 5, 1998, at Al.
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is actually possible to have more competition with three RBOCs-down
from the original seven-we really should not be so surprised."6°
VI. CONCLUSION
In sum, the preceding Article, at bottom, requires us to ask a funda-
mental yet heretofore unsatisfactorily answered (or, perhaps, deliberately
unanswered) question: exactly what is the purpose of the FCC in interna-
tional telecommunications? Should the FCC act as yet another arm of the
Executive branch to promote trade agendas which, by their very definition,
seek to promote competitors (i.e., competitors of the "domestic" sort), or
should the FCC limit appropriately its scope of inquiry to determining ex-
clusively that U.S. consumers enjoy just and reasonable rates for IMTS
service-regardless of provider? As I have argued in the past, and as I
continue to believe today, the latter course must be followed. Indeed, as
Adam Smith observed well over two hundred years ago, "Consumption is
the sole end and purpose of all production; and the interest of the producer
ought to be attended to only so far as it may be necessary for promoting
that of the consumer."' 561 Competition, therefore, is not something to be
feared; rather, it is something to be welcomed.
Accordingly, because trade goals are generally inapposite to the goals
of antitrust and economic regulation, trade policy is best left for those
agencies or departments responsible for implementing these objectives-
not with antitrust enforcement or independent regulatory agencies respon-
sible for protecting and promoting static and dynamic economic efficien-
cies and the maximization of consumer (and not individual competitors')
welfare. As long as "FCC" continues to improperly stand for "Facilitating
Cartels and Collusion," however, it is unlikely that consumers will enjoy
any of these competitive benefits anytime soon.
560. See Jared Sandberg & Steven Lipin, Bell Atlantic and GTE Boards Approve Plans
for a Merger, WALL ST. J., July 28, 1998, at A3 (According to Mr. Hundt, the spate of re-
cent consolidations (in particular, AT&T/TCI, Ameritech/SBC, and Bell Atlantic/GTE)
"would mean a triumvirate of telecom giants is likely to emerge, resulting in more competi-
tion.") (emphasis added).
561. 2ADAMSMrrH, THE WEALTHOFNAioNS 155 (1910).

